
UNITED NATIONS COUNTRY TEAM

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

COMMON COUNTRY ANALYSIS

2016

Leave No One Behind: A Perspective on Vulnerability and Structural Disadvantage in Palestine



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Acronyms and definitions

List of Acronyms

ACRI	Association of Civil Rights in Israel
ARA	Access Restricted Areas
ARIJ	Applied Research Institute Jerusalem
CAAC	Children and Armed Conflict
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CESCR	UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CPWG	Child Protection Working Group
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DCI	Defense for Children International
DCO	District Coordination Office
DWRC	Democracy and Workers' Rights Center
EJ	East Jerusalem
EU	European Union
EWASH	Emergency Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FC	Faecal Coliforms
FS	Faecal Streptococcus
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit; German company which specializes in international development
GNC	Government of National Consensus
GoI	Government of Israel
GPP	Gaza Power Plant
GRM	Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism
GS	Gaza Strip
H2	Hebron 2
HR	Hague Regulations
ICA	Israeli Civil Administration
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IEC	Israeli Electricity Company
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISF	Israeli Security Forces
LACS	Local Aid Coordination Secretariat
LGUs	Local Government Units
MCM	Million Cubic Metres
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDLF	Municipal Development and Lending Fund
MIFTAH	Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOL	Ministry of Labour
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoSD	Ministry of Social Development
MOWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
NER	Net enrolment rate
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
oPt	occupied Palestinian territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PAC	Prisoners' Affairs Commission
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PHC	Population, Housing and Establishment Census
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation

PMRS	Palestinian Medical Relief Society
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEFSec	Socio-economic food security
SOP	State of Palestine
TC	Total Coliforms
UN WOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Assistance Development Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process
VAW	Violence against women
VCs	Village Councils
VTC	Vocational Training Center
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WB	West Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Definitions

Area C: As part of the 1995 interim Oslo II agreement, the West Bank (except East Jerusalem) was divided into three administrative areas; referred to as Area A, B and C. Area A has full Palestinian civil and security control, Area B has full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control and Area C has full Israeli civil control and control over security, planning and construction. Area C surrounds Areas A and B of the West Bank, and is mostly located in the eastern part of the West Bank along the Jordan Valley, and in the western and central parts of the West Bank. It constitutes over 60% of the West Bank and is fundamental to the contiguity of the West Bank and the viability of the Palestinian

Barrier: A barrier of 25-foot-high concrete walls, fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone. Israel has been constructing the Barrier since 2002, with the stated aim of preventing violent attacks by Palestinians inside Israel. The vast majority of the Barrier's route deviates from the Green Line and runs within the West Bank, separating Palestinian communities from the rest of the West Bank and contributing to the fragmentation of the oPt.On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The ICJ stated that the sections of the Barrier route which run inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, together with the associated gate and permit regime, violated Israel's obligations under international law.

Green Line: The 1949 Armistice line (West Bank, including East Jerusalem and theGaza Strip).

Hebron H1 and H2: The West Bank City of Hebron is divided into H1 and H2 under the 1997 Hebron Protocol. H1 covers approximately 80 per cent of the city and is under Palestinian civil and security control. H2 is under Israeli military control and Palestinian civil control.

Israeli Civil Administration (ICA): A governing body that operates in the West Bank, which was established by the GoI in 1981 to carry out bureaucratic functions within the oPt. The ICA is largely staffed by Israeli Military personnel and is part of a larger entity known as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) – a unit in the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

"Palestine", "State of Palestine", "occupied Palestinian territory": In this report the terms "Palestine", the "State of Palestine" and "occupied Palestinian Territory" have been used interchangeably depending on context. Specifically the term "occupied Palestinian territory" refers as a whole to the geographical area of the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967. The terms "Government of Palestine", "Palestinian government", "Palestinian Authority" have been used interchangeably. Consequent to the adoption of resolution 67/19 by the United Nations General Assembly on 29 November 2012, Palestine was accorded the status of non-member observer State in the United Nations. As a result, Palestine can generally be referred to as a State or Country, and its authorities can generally be identified as the Government of Palestine.

Seam Zone: The Seam Zone corresponds to areas in the West Bank situated between the Barrier and the original Green Line.

Settlements: cities, towns, and villages established by Israel in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, since its occupation by Israel in 1967. This policy has been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations Security Council and other international bodies as a violation of international law. The total settler population is currently estimated at approximately 600,000, two thirds of them living in Area C and the rest in East Jerusalem.



Executive Summary

This United Nations (UN) Common Country Analysis (CCA) examines the state of development in Palestine* as the Israeli occupation of its territory enters its 50th year. The report focuses on the most vulnerable groups in Palestine and seeks to identify the key drivers of their vulnerability and the challenges they face under Palestine's current development course. In the context of the 2030 Agenda, the report analyses why some groups in society are systematically more disadvantaged than others in accessing Palestine's development gains.

This report will serve as the analytical basis of the UN's development strategy for Palestine for the next five years, to be elaborated in the next United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the period 2018-2022. Its findings also bolster Palestine's historic accession to seven of the nine core human rights treaties during 2014, and respond to the Government's new National Policy Agenda, which seeks a more 'citizen-centric' development path.

The deliberate focus on systematic disadvantage and vulnerability in this analysis derives from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda imperative to leave no one behind on the path of progress.

Development under Occupation: The Inherent Vulnerability of All Palestinians

Any discussion of development in Palestine must start with the fact that the largest and most visible constraint on Palestinian development is the occupation. After nearly 50 years of occupation every Palestinian living in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is vulnerable to some degree. Though the occupation affects different groups of Palestinians in unique ways, for most Palestinians there is scarcely any sphere of life that the occupation does not touch.

Lifting the occupation is the single most important priority to enable Palestinians to chart a successful course to the SDGs. Development actors need to be conscious about the limits on both Palestine's development prospects and the impact of donors' development investments in a country under occupation, where the government has highly restricted control over the levers of development. As long as it remains the occupying power, the ultimate accountability for Palestine's ability or failure to reach the global goals articulated in the 2030 Agenda remains largely with the Government of Israel.

The occupation impacts the movement of people and goods, fragments the territory geographically and socio-politically, stunts economic growth, and restricts Palestinian use of critical resources such as land, water and minerals. With the very same instruments, it hinders policymaking, governance and service delivery by the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Restrictions on Movement: Israeli restrictions on the movement of people, both Palestinian and international, have far-reaching consequences for both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Restrictions are implemented through a complex system of checkpoints, permits, military roadblocks, settlements, a bypass road system, parallel legal regimes and the Barrier.[1]

Such restrictions have fragmented the Palestinian landscape. They have created isolated communities, undermined social cohesion, ruptured a common identity and reduced economic activity within and among the fractured Palestinian populations of the territory. The Barrier not only separates West Bank Palestinians from Israelis but also Palestinians from each other.

"As long as it remains the occupying power, the ultimate accountability for Palestine's ability or failure to reach the global goals articulated in the 2030 Agenda remains with the Government of Israel."

* On the use of the terms "Palestine", "State of Palestine" and "occupied Palestinian territory, please refer to the Definition section.

Stunted Economy: Restrictions on economic and productive activities, including restrictions on movement of goods, severely impair the Palestinian economy and its potential for growth. The ability of the private sector to function, let alone thrive and generate employment, is limited.[2] Frequent military assaults on Gaza have crippled its economy, while the closure has prevented reconstruction and magnified the effect of shocks. As a result, the Palestinian economy remains highly dependent on its public sector, which in turn is highly dependent on external budgetary support.

Trade barriers have been in place since Israel imposed its external trade and fiscal regime on the oPt in 1967. The flow of Palestinian labour and goods to Israel was allowed under non-reciprocal restrictions and imports to the oPt were subjected to Israeli tariff structures and quotas. Palestinian producers became increasingly cut off from their traditional trading partners and had to reorient trade towards the Israeli economy. Over time, Palestinian exporters lost much of their competitive edge while Israeli products enjoyed unhindered access to Palestinian markets.[3]

From 2000-2015, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been volatile and structurally unbalanced in favour of sectors not exposed to foreign competition. Total GDP grew on average by over 3%, but agriculture – the main sector exposed to foreign competition and a key driver of inclusive growth – contracted.[4]

Inequitable Access to Resources: Both horizontal (land area) and vertical (intensification) expansion of the agriculture sector have been restricted for decades.[5] Horizontal expansion is limited by restrictions on essential land and water resources. Vertical expansion of agriculture is limited by lack of access to markets, high costs of production and lack of access to pesticides and equipment, and in Gaza, restrictions associated with the closure. Constraints on trade have deprived the agriculture sector of low-cost inputs and markets for its products. Bans by Israel on the import of items deemed 'dual use', such as fertilizers, reduce productivity and profitability of Palestinian farming.

The industrial sector is also profoundly affected by limits on land availability and by limited opportunities for quarrying and mining of minerals. Israeli settlements, military zones, nature reserves, and the Barrier make up 70% of Area C (or about 44% of the overall West Bank). The remaining 30% is heavily restricted for construction; Palestinians can build on less than 1% of the land.[6] Some 40% of area C is private Palestinian land on which settlements are built.[7] The construction industry in the West Bank is constrained by so-called 'zoning rules' imposed by the Israeli authorities.

Palestinians face major water shortages in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel controls all shared surface and ground water resources and utilizes 85%, leaving only 15% for Palestinian use.[8] Restrictions related to water affect the livelihoods of communities, deepening poverty levels and further increasing vulnerability.

Policy-making constraints: Palestinian attempts to overcome these numerous hurdles to development are likewise circumscribed by the occupation. In 2011, the World Bank stated that "the PA has continued to strengthen its institutions, delivering public services and promoting reforms that many existing states struggle with. Significant reforms still lie ahead for the PA – but no more than those facing other middle income countries".[9] Nevertheless, the PA to this day has limited space for policy development and implementation, restricting its ability to deliver on its obligations as a duty bearer to its people. In the process, the most vulnerable and structurally disadvantaged groups – the ones that most need government support – are those that suffer the most.

The Palestinian government has no control over its borders – land, air or sea - or of its customs revenues. It does not have its own currency or authority to print money. It lacks access and policy prerogative over Area C. It lacks influence over Gaza, due to territorial fragmentation and internal Palestinian division that prevents the operationalization of a government of national consensus in all of oPt. The PA's fiscal space is restricted. A major part of the PA's revenue (60%-70%) comes from the clearance revenues system, in which all taxes and revenues due at borders, seaports and by air on Palestinian goods and services are collected by the Israeli fiscal authorities on behalf of the PA in return for a 3% administrative charge to Israel.[10]

The PA also has limited space for the development of effective local government and local development policies. Israel's planning

regime in Area C and East Jerusalem is discriminatory and restrictive. It is not designed for the benefit of the protected population. Palestinian local governance and service delivery is limited by increasing territorial fragmentation. Freedom of movement and lack of jurisdiction in large parts of the oPt for example hamper rule of law, maintenance of security, and the delivery of justice services by the Palestinian state.

Palestine's control over its development prospects remains highly circumscribed. A government that does not control its borders, its revenue, and its monetary policy and cannot access much of its natural resources is embarking on the 2030 Agenda with an overwhelming handicap.

Who is Left Behind? Vulnerability and Disadvantage in Palestine

While all Palestinians are vulnerable on account of the occupation, some appear to be perpetually more vulnerable, and systematically at a greater disadvantage, than others. A set of 20 disadvantaged or vulnerable groups was identified to inform an analysis of what are the key drivers of vulnerability in the country.

These groups are: adolescent girls; women exposed to gender-based violence (GBV); food-insecure households headed by women; children facing obstacles in accessing schools; children in the labour force; children subject to violence; out-of-school children; youth; the elderly; communities in Area C; Bedouins and herder communities living in Area C; Gaza residents without access to clean water or sanitation; Hebron H2 residents; persons living in the Seam Zone[11]; persons with disabilities; individuals in need of urgent medical referrals; refugees living in abject poverty; refugees residing in camps; small-scale farmers, non-Bedouin herders, fisher folk; and the working poor.

These marginalized groups were found to be most impacted by one or more of the following five structural drivers of disadvantage and vulnerability in the Palestinian context: location (or place of residence), exposure to violence, economic factors, institutional and political factors, and socio-cultural norms. This report calls for concerted efforts by policy makers and development partners around these five structural challenges.

Locational Drivers of Vulnerability

Where people live within the oPt is central to understanding their vulnerability and disadvantage. Location determines who has jurisdiction over delivery of basic services, who the duty bearers are, and the quality of service delivery.

Area C[12] covers approximately 60% of the West Bank, and is the site of Israeli settlements and other land set aside solely for Israeli use. Bedouin and herder populations living in Area C[13] are often at risk of forced displacement by the Israeli authorities and face persistent restrictions on their movement and access to resources and services. Bedouin, small-scale farmers and livestock herders living in Area C have limited access to markets and inputs, including land, and water for animal husbandry and irrigation.[14] Planning and zoning restrictions in Area C make it difficult for Palestinians to build homes, businesses or other critical infrastructure such as water, sewage or power networks. If they build without a permit, residents risk the structure's demolition.

In Hebron H2, over 120 physical obstacles, including 18 permanently-staffed checkpoints established by the Israeli military segregate the restricted areas from the rest of the city. [15] Palestinians living in the restricted areas of Hebron H2 face serious challenges in accessing water and sanitation facilities and services. Children and teachers' ability to reach schools in the Old City is hampered by checkpoints and settler harassment. Businesses are often shuttered, lacking clientele.

In East Jerusalem, Palestinian residents are deemed 'permanent residents' of Israel. Since 1967, on average six Palestinians per week have had their residency rights revoked, meaning they can no longer live or work in the city, or access public services.[16] Poverty rates are high in East Jerusalem with 83.9% of Palestinian children living below the Israeli-defined poverty line.[17] Most Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem suffer from high density, poor living standards, deteriorating housing, and inadequate public facilities and services. There is a chronic shortage of classrooms. School dropout rates are much higher here than in the rest of the oPt.[18]

The Seam Zone refers to the area between the Barrier and the 1949 Armistice (Green Line),

excluding East Jerusalem, which has been declared a 'closed military area' by the Israeli army and is cut off from the rest of the West Bank. Most Seam Zone communities lack basic health, education and other services, with residents having to pass through a checkpoint to reach agricultural land, workplaces and essential services, and to maintain social relations with family and friends on the 'Palestinian side' of the Barrier. Residents with Jerusalem IDs have to pay municipal taxes but do not get services of the municipality.

Finally, Gaza, home to 1.9 million people, has witnessed a dramatic process of de-development, due to recurring cycles of violence, demographic pressures, and the closure imposed by Israel. Physical destruction during successive rounds of hostilities has impacted all aspects of personal, public and economic life. Over 60% of the housing stock incurred significant damage as did service infrastructure (including water, energy, health, and education facilities and governments buildings) and private sector facilities and assets during the 2014 hostilities. The effects of this most recent escalation were estimated at $1.4 billion in damages and $1.7 billion in economic losses.[19] The land, sea and air closure imposed by Israel since 2007 severely restricts the movement of people and goods into and out of the Strip, with all of the resulting effects of isolation on employment, education, healthcare, commerce and social ties. The on-going division between Fatah and Hamas also compounds the impact of the closure on Gaza's population.

Violence as a Driver of Vulnerability

Pervasive violence, which causes physical harm and limits daily options in the oPt, is a key driver of vulnerability. For 18 of the 20 disadvantaged groups analysed for this report, both political violence and social violence constrain possibilities and potential. The average Palestinian may experience, witness, and engage in violence in the public sphere, at home, at the workplace or school, and within the community. The counterparties are agents of the Israeli and Palestinian states, as well as other individuals. As noted below, violence is layered with location and other drivers of vulnerability, compounding the crisis for those most in need.

Both Israeli and Palestinian security forces engage in violence against Palestinians. Violence at checkpoints, clashes, search and arrest operations, detentions, demolitions, evictions, and forced displacement are among the chronic forms of violence experienced primarily in Area C, East Jerusalem, and Hebron H2.

In addition, there have been three escalations of hostilities, regular ground incursions and airstrikes in Gaza since 2007, resulting in widespread death, trauma, disability and destruction. Accountability for violations of international law by both Israeli and Palestinian actors during these escalations remains elusive.

Palestinian refugees who reside in the West Bank refugee camps are particularly vulnerable to Israeli armed forces violence during clashes and search operations. Male youth are more likely to be targets of search and arrest operations and harassment at checkpoints, as well as participants in clashes. In 2015, over 1,000 Palestinian children were arrested by Israeli forces and prosecuted before military courts on security-related charges. Children detained by the Israeli military are often denied their rights.

Palestinian security forces and authorities are also generally not held to account for violations of international law,[20] despite concerns over the detention and torture of political prisoners in Palestinian jails and the use of force and violence by Palestinian security forces.[21] The spread of incitement to violence on social media has gained momentum since October 2015, and is particularly affecting youth.

Attacks by Palestinian civilians against Israeli security forces and civilians have negatively impacted the security atmosphere in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, particularly since the last quarter of 2015. The attacks were not coordinated and were carried out by individuals, presenting a disturbing trend where young men and women, in some cases boys and girls, many without prior history of politicization, engaged in attacks knowing that death was almost inevitable.

Settler violence has a direct impact on nine out of the 20 vulnerable groups reviewed for this report.[22] These are individuals who live or work in Area C, especially Bedouin and herder communities and small-scale farmers and non-Bedouin herders, people living in the Seam Zone, Hebron's H2 area and Old City of Jerusalem, children facing obstacles in accessing schools or exposed to violence, adolescent girls and youth.

GBV is a key protection concern in the oPt, with women being particularly vulnerable. Limited support services are available and these existing services are highly inaccessible to women due to long distances, mobility restrictions, and fragmentation of areas and services. Six of the 20 analysed vulnerable groups, specifically women exposed to GBV, children, adolescent girls, youth, persons with disabilities, and the elderly, are highly vulnerable to domestic violence.[23] They are also vulnerable to other types of social violence.

Economic Drivers of Vulnerability

Poverty, inequality of economic opportunity and high dependency rates, exacerbated by limited employment opportunities as well as increasing environmental constraints on livelihoods, are some of the key economic drivers of vulnerability in Palestine. Economic factors appear to contribute to disadvantage and vulnerability among at least 17 of the 20 groups analysed.

Some 25.8% of Palestinians are poor.[24,25] some 12.9% of Palestinians (7.8% of those in the West Bank and 21.1% of those in Gaza) are living in "deep poverty".[26] Poverty also increases risk of human rights violations. For instance, the poor with disabilities and the elderly poor are less likely to be able to afford care and support than their more affluent counterparts. Poverty and inequity of income distribution is associated with inequities in reproductive choices as well. The total fertility rate for the poorest quintile of Palestinians is five, while it is 3.3 for the richest quintile.[27] Lack of sufficient income and assets also reduces an individual's ability to cope with shocks.

Inequality of opportunity manifests in unequal access to productive resources and assets, unequal access to decent employment, and an unequal burden of unpaid work. Women are among those most affected by the unequal burden of unpaid work, even without including care work undertaken at home – usually by women and girls. Additionally, women are the dominant unpaid agricultural labour force. Still, women and female-headed households are often deprived of assets due to discriminatory inheritance laws. And lack of access to productive assets like livestock and agricultural land impacts women's economic self-sufficiency and food security. Less access to assets, and hence collateral, also translates into fewer formal sources of credit.

Unemployment is a major driver of vulnerability for youth. Unequal access to decent work is often associated with unequal access to the right networks and/or affiliation with political parties. Young women are more affected by this than young men.

A high dependency ratio in Palestine[28] together with very high unemployment creates vulnerability. The dependency ratio in Palestine (74.8%) has been declining over time,[29] but is still high compared to other Arab countries.

Environmental threats are also undermining Palestine's economic potential and affecting different parts of the population to varying degrees. Those who engage in climate-dependent livelihoods (agriculture, fishing, herding) and manual labour, for example, are being undermined by environmental threats, including global warning.

Institutional and Political Drivers of Vulnerability

Poverty is layered with geographical and political marginalization to compound these groups' vulnerability. In turn, patterns of vulnerability and disadvantage in Palestine appear to reflect the precedence of some groups over others when creating policy and law.

It is important to view the institutional and political drivers of vulnerability of affected groups in the context of the limits that the occupation places on the Palestinian government's policy space.

The PA does not have effective access to East Jerusalem and the Seam Zone. It has very little operating space to provide basic services in Area C and Hebron H2 or to impose law and order in Area B where Israel is still responsible for security and order. The government is highly dependent on direct budgetary support from international donors which declined by a third between 2014 and 2015[30]. Constrained fiscal space including Israel's control of clearance revenues also restricts the Palestinian government's ability to deliver as a duty-bearer. However, these factors do not fully explain how and why some groups appear to receive less policy support than others. Many of the 20 vulnerable groups, for instance, have less access to basic public services than do others.

Two sets of gaps in service provision in the oPt stand out. First, some groups have inadequate access to quality education and healthcare. Further, groups like the elderly and persons with disabilities have additional special needs that are inadequately met. When their needs are not met, they are at an additional disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the population. Second, there is a lack of services that enable and empower groups such as youth or small-scale farmers to seize economic opportunities and thereby become drivers of change for themselves and for the rest of society.

The Palestinian Basic Law recognizes that "Palestinians are equal before the law and that there should be no discrimination because of ethnicity, sex, colour, religion, political opinion or disability".[31] However, some groups – especially women – feel the negative effects of discriminatory laws that prevent them from exercising their human rights and fulfilling their potential.

Institutional and policy-making gaps tend to reflect lack of influence within the existing socio-political system. Two elements of that lack of influence are lack of voice and participation, and the limits to free media, freedom of speech and access to information in the oPt.[32] National-level elections have not taken place in Palestine in a decade. With the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) suspended, laws are passed by presidential decree or by limited members of the Hamas PLC Bloc in Gaza. The narrowing of parties involved in policymaking likely increases exclusion of those on the margins.

Another manifestation of institutional vulnerability is the absence of adequate data on specific groups. Up-to-date and periodic disaggregated data are lacking on out-of-school children, children in labour, persons living in the Seam Zone and Area C, and persons with disabilities, in particular.

Civil society provides external oversight to monitor government institutions. It also plays a key role in amplifying the voices of the voiceless. However, attempts by both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities to impose greater control on civil society activities and funding streams affect their independence and their ability to advocate for human rights.[33]

Sociocultural Drivers of Vulnerability

As in all societies, economic, institutional and political determinants of development in Palestine are also heavily influenced by sociocultural norms.[34] Some social norms and traditional values can have a positive impact on development and human rights. Others have been used to justify gender-based inequalities, discrimination and violence.[35]

Palestinian society is predominantly patriarchal.[36] Patriarchal norms lead to asymmetrical gender roles. While women are more directly affected than men, the culture of dominance favours the able over the disabled, the physically strong over the weak, and the mainstream over the marginal. This engenders models of masculinity that contribute to male-on-male violence and discrimination against persons with disabilities.

Adolescent girls and women of reproductive age are among the first victims of gender discrimination rooted in patriarchal norms. These norms are among the key drivers of Palestine's high fertility rates, of women being the primary caregivers in families, of the vast majority of unpaid work devolving upon women by default. Traditional attitudes and behaviours that focus on the reproductive role of women also contribute to early marriage, and often early childbearing. Persons with disabilities, especially those with mental disabilities are more vulnerable than other groups to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation, on account of discrimination, isolation, and exclusion from mainstream processes.

The Palestinian Labour Law does not prohibit discrimination in pay or promotion. It makes no reference to harassment in the workplace. It also prevents women from working in a number of occupations defined as hazardous or hard work, where exceptions can be made if the employer provides safety guarantees. The delay in amending such laws impacts women's private lives as well as their freedom to participate in public spaces.

Patriarchal attitudes and practices that condone unequal power relations between men and women often enable and condone acts of violence.[37] Such norms contribute to the notion of domestic issues being a private family matter, resulting in a widespread acceptance

of intimate partner violence. The same mind-set is among the main drivers of the blame, stigmatization, social exclusion and reprisals towards women subjected to GBV. This is not unique to Palestine but is observed in patterns of femicide and GBV worldwide.

Leaving No One Behind – What Will it Take?

Seven key imperatives have been identified to translate these findings into action, a process that will intensify with the elaboration of the forthcoming UNDAF.

Closing data gaps: Almost all groups that are falling behind are less visible in the statistics, thus difficult to track, rendered less visible to policymakers, and often assigned lower priority than others when resources are limited. Upgrading the current data sets to catch and track these trailing groups will require considerable investment and coordination.

Opening up to new voices and new partners: How do these vulnerable or disadvantaged groups participate in our development processes? For the UNDAF, the aid community and government will need to 'walk the talk' and open itself up to a greater cross-section of voices from Palestinian society.

Investing in integrated cross-sectoral planning processes: The analysis clearly shows that multiple drivers of vulnerability often affect the same vulnerable group. The drivers themselves are inter-linked. For instance, several economic drivers of vulnerability derive directly from locational and institutional factors. Hence, the strategies to address the needs of the most vulnerable will require a much greater integration of efforts cutting across traditional sectors to address the multiple dimensions of disadvantage.

Factoring political realities into development interventions: While the State of Palestine has committed itself to Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, the accountability to reach these goals is a shared one as long as Israel remains an occupying power. Israel's progress towards the SDGs will necessarily be measured by the progress of Palestinians as well. The SDGs' emphasis on equity, access, and justice will increase the scrutiny on Israeli policies in the oPt.

Countering fragmentation through development interventions: A geographically and politically fragmented Palestine requires a response from development partners calibrated to that reality. Policies around the closure (Gaza) or annexation (East Jerusalem) or security (central Hebron) have created a patchwork of 'development micro-climates'. In the spirit of 'do no harm', development interventions must avoid creating or further entrenching fragmentation of the policy and development landscape of Palestine. The Government of Palestine needs to keep making policy for all Palestinians. Where donors or their implementing partners are delivering programmes to communities that the government has limited or no access to, there is an obligation to ensure that these efforts are aligned with government policies and coordinated with government programmes.

Bridging the development-humanitarian divide: The chronic and political nature of the protection crisis that drives Palestine's humanitarian need challenges any notion of the short-term nature of emergency response. A much closer collaboration between humanitarian actors and the government is necessary in such an environment. Humanitarian action in Palestine also extends to less traditional areas of intervention. A number of the vulnerable groups mentioned here are subjects of both humanitarian and development interventions. Both interventions run in parallel in Area C, the Seam Zone, and Gaza.

Towards a new UNDAF: The UNDG in Palestine will work to support the Government of Palestine in implementing the 2030 agenda with the SDGs at its core. It will also continue to advocate strongly for Israel to fulfill its obligations as the occupying power to ensure that all Palestinians can exercise their basic human rights, and partake in progress.

The UNDAF for 2018-2022 will align with the Palestinian government's development priorities for the next six years as outlined in its NPA, and will seek to complement its key sectoral strategies. The content of the UN programming under the UNDAF will be driven directly by the imperative to address the five drivers of vulnerability identified in this report. By placing its most vulnerable groups and the key drivers of their vulnerability at the core of its development planning, the UNDG in Palestine will seek to ensure that no one is indeed left behind.



CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Development, Occupation and the 2030 Agenda Imperative to 'Leave No One Behind'

"As we embark on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind. Recognizing that the dignity of the human person is fundamental, we wish to see the Goals and targets met for all nations and peoples and for all segments of society. And we will endeavour to reach the furthest behind first."

Declaration of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, United Nations General Assembly, 2015

1.1 Background

This report examines the state of development in Palestine as the military occupation enters its 50th year. The report focuses especially on those who are being left behind on Palestine's current development trajectory. It explores why some groups in society appear to be systematically more disadvantaged than others in accessing Palestine's development progress. It also looks ahead at how some groups may be more vulnerable than others to the hazards the future may bring.

In the Palestinian context, it is almost impossible to separate the effects of the Israeli occupation and continued conflict from other factors affecting development dynamics. It is, therefore, especially challenging to isolate the factors on which the Palestinian government has meaningful policy influence vis-à-vis the occupying power.

This report also attempts to look beyond the generalized impact of the occupation on Palestine as a whole, and to dig deeper. First, it seeks to identify ways the occupation affects different groups of Palestinians differently. Second, it examines the factors outside of the occupation derived from Palestine's internal socio-political dynamics that influence the different development constraints faced by such groups. In so doing, this report contributes to the analysis necessary for Palestine to meet the 2030 Agenda imperative 'to leave no one behind' and to actualize on the ground Palestine's historic accession to seven of the nine core human rights treaties during 2014. Further, it responds to the Government of Palestine's new National Policy Agenda, which seeks a more 'citizen-centric' development path.

The analysis is intended to help shape the UN's development strategy for Palestine in the coming years. Whenever the United Nations Development Group[1] embarks on developing a new cycle of programmes, the process begins with a Common Country Analysis (CCA). A CCA assesses the development landscape of the country concerned and identifies key issues and priorities that will inform the programmatic response under the next United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This report lays out the development challenges at a granular level but does not offer solutions or prescriptions. Solutions in terms of policy and programmatic response, and the


OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY | AUGUST 2016
OCHA
Lebanon
Occupied Golan Heights (Syria)
Syria
Al Quneitrah
Acre
Haifa
Tiberias
Nazareth
Jordan River / Sheikh Hussein
Irbid
Jenin
Tulkarm
Tubas
Ajloun
Qalqilya
Nablus
Salfit
Tel Aviv-Yafo
West Bank
Ramallah
Balqa
Amman
Jericho
Allenby / King Hussein
Jerusalem
Ashdod
Madaba
Bethlehem
North Gaza
Gaza
Hebron
Khan Yunis
Middle Area
Rafah
Gaza Strip
Rafah
Be'er Sheva
Jordan
Karak
Israel
Al 'Ojah / Nitzana
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15
30
60
Km

means of implementation, are the prerogative of the UNDAF. A new UNDAF for the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) will be launched in January 2018 covering a five-year period.

Any analysis of Palestine's development must start with the reality that Palestinians are trying to achieve their development ambitions under military occupation. The UN and others have documented in many different reports the destructive impact of the occupation on the lives of Palestinians[39] and the related obstacles, uncertainties and injustices. In the 2030 Agenda context it needs to be forcefully restated that all Palestinians, by the mere fact of living under occupation, are disadvantaged and vulnerable, that under occupation all Palestinians are being 'left behind' in the sense that all Palestinians are denied the autonomy and ability to exercise the agency that much of the world enjoys. Palestine begins the 2030 Agenda with severe constraints that are ultimately of a political nature but manifest themselves very concretely in the daily lives of its people. This report documents how the occupation translates into restricted development opportunities for all Palestinians of all walks of life, in every corner of the oPt.

Ending the occupation is therefore the highest development priority. Establishing an independent, sovereign, democratic Palestinian state with full control over its territory and its own development trajectory is central to the UN's agenda for Palestine. Building the institutions to support a successful democratic Palestine is an integral part of this effort.

The experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) clearly demonstrates the impact of the occupation on Palestinian development opportunities. Palestine's MDG balance sheet is impressive on targets such as vaccination rates, neonatal mortality rates, literacy, and education attainment. Yet, for other targets touching areas in which the occupying power has considerable control, particularly economy, trade, access to natural resources and the movement of people and goods, much remains to be done. Indicators on employment, economic growth, food insecurity and water fall far behind.

In the spirit of the 2030 Agenda, this CCA delves into the experiences and prospects of different groups of Palestinians. The analysis looks at the most vulnerable groups, the main drivers of their vulnerability, and thus, drivers of an enabling or 'disabling' environment. In doing so, it contributes to the development dialogue in Palestine and to a future UNDAF where the family of UN development actors operates both within their respective mandates and on broader drivers of vulnerability and disadvantage that may not be as visible through a sectoral lens. The results should be felt not only by the specific groups identified in this report but also by a broad cross-section of Palestinians.

In this report, 'structural disadvantage' refers to systematic deprivation of the means of achieving or sustaining progress. This includes but is not limited to systematic denial of the services and protection of the state, systematic limits to the exercise of human rights and discrimination. Vulnerability, in this report, refers to a group's prospects of erosion in development gains.[40] Some groups, thus, are vulnerable not only because they are exposed to a hazard but also as a result of being marginalized, of everyday patterns of social interaction or of having inadequate access to resources.[41] Vulnerable groups are those human rights-holders who are particularly affected by the underlying structural factors that cause a disabling environment. The report also analyses the role of duty bearers – the Palestinian state, or the occupying power depending on the context – that have a responsibility under human rights law to address these factors and ensure the full realization of rights in the oPt. Identifying the drivers of vulnerability is a first step to understanding the fundamental human rights challenges in the oPt.

In Palestine, as in many other countries, even the best MDG achievements are not equally distributed amongst all Palestinian groups. The 2030 Agenda stipulates that the quality of

"All Palestinians, by the mere fact of living under occupation, are disadvantaged and vulnerable; under occupation all Palestinians are being 'left behind' in the sense that all Palestinians are denied the autonomy and ability to exercise the agency that much of the world enjoys."



Palestine's development achievements, i.e. the extent to which progress reaches all groups, is as important as the aggregated nationwide results.

A set of 20 disadvantaged or vulnerable groups were identified to inform the analysis in this report. These groups are: adolescent girls; Bedouins and herder communities living in Area C; children facing obstacles in accessing schools; children in the labour force; children subject to violence; communities in Area C;[42] the elderly; food-insecure households headed by women; Gaza residents without access to clean water or sanitation; Hebron H2 residents; individuals in need of urgent medical referrals; out-of-school children; persons with disabilities; persons living in the Seam Zone; refugees living in abject poverty; refugees residing in camps; small-scale farmers, non-Bedouin herders, and fisher folk; women exposed to gender-based violence (GBV); the working poor; and youth.

The evidence bears out the unequal experience and prospects of these different groups of Palestinians. For instance, food-insecure households headed by women have lower mean income than similar households headed by men. They are also more likely to be in dire poverty. Youth have higher unemployment rates than the rest of the labour force. They are also more vulnerable to violence than other age groups. Residents of Area C and the Seam Zone have far poorer access to services than the residents of Areas A and B. Residents of Gaza have far less access to specialized medical care than say residents of East Jerusalem. They are also facing a water and sanitation shortage of near-crisis proportions.

Searching for patterns amongst these

Key Geographical Terms

Areas A, B & C: The Oslo Accords signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993 divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions – Areas A, B and C. Under the Oslo framework, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was given full civil and security control of Area A and civil control of Area B where it is also responsible for public order. Area C is under administrative and military control of Israel.

Hebron H2: Hebron H2 is a zone in the centre of Hebron city that was created by the 1997 Hebron Protocol and placed under Israeli military/security control and Palestinian civil control. The area covers 20% of Hebron city, including the whole Old City. About 40,000 Palestinians (19% of the Hebron city population) live in the H2 area, in addition to 850 Israeli settlers who live in five settlements in H2. A further 8,000 settlers reside in the Kiryat Arba settlement on the outskirts of Hebron.

Seam Zone: In 2002, the Government of Israel passed a resolution to a build a Barrier in the West Bank "to impede…the infiltration of terrorists and war materiel into Israel". However contrary to international law, most of the Barrier is built inside the West Bank, creating a "Seam Zone" or closed military zone between the 1949 Green Line and the Barrier itself.

groups reveals a series of structural factors that contribute to their lower development trajectories. Although the line between what is a 'cause' and what is a 'symptom' is not always clear, the analysis focuses on five structural drivers of disadvantage and vulnerability in the Palestinian context and argues for more concerted efforts by policymakers and development partners around these challenges. The five structural drivers include location (or place of residence), heightened exposure to violence, access to economic opportunities, institutional and political factors and sociocultural norms.

The locational drivers of vulnerability relate to the fact that where people live in Palestine has a significant impact on their day-to-day lives, their access to basic services, their ability to cope with shocks and their ability to graduate out of poverty. Since the Palestinian Authority (PA) does not have equal jurisdiction over all of the oPt, location also plays a role in determining who the duty-bearers are and the state of public service delivery. Exposure to violence profoundly affects many Palestinians. Some groups are more exposed to threats of violence than others, and it imposes different constraints on the choices and opportunities of different groups. Economic drivers of vulnerability include poverty, unequal access to economic opportunities, high dependency rates, and environmental threats. They affect some groups more than others. Several of these factors are correlated with locational and sociocultural drivers of vulnerability. Institutional and political drivers of vulnerability relate broadly to elements of good governance like responsive and accountable institutions, inclusive political processes, rule of law, and well-functioning justice and security systems. Failures of governance usually leave the most vulnerable segments of society the most affected. And they allow human rights violations to go unaddressed. Sociocultural norms that are either discriminatory or restrictive tend to affect some groups more than others. Ranging from discriminatory treatment in job markets to discriminatory inheritance laws and restrictions on women's access to reproductive health services, these norms affect women more than men, the

disabled more than the abled and youth more than older generations. In some cases, these norms are direct drivers of vulnerability, in other cases they compound the impact of other vulnerabilities.

The occupation influences many of these structural issues. Location, for example, explains the heightened vulnerability of Palestinians who find themselves on the physical 'front line' of the occupation. The extent to which some groups are more directly exposed to violence is heavily, though not exclusively, influenced by the occupation. Other structural factors like governance and sociocultural norms are less intrinsically linked to the occupation.

***

The body of the CCA is organized in nine chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the disadvantage and vulnerability of life under the occupation. Its focus is on all Palestinians and the limits of what can and cannot be expected for 'development' under these circumstances. Chapter 3 describes 20 of the most vulnerable groups that provide the entry point to our analysis. Chapters 4 through 8 explore the different structural drivers of vulnerability: location (Chapter 4), exposure to violence (Chapter 5), access to economic opportunities (Chapter 6), institutional and political factors (Chapter 7) and sociocultural norms (Chapter 8). A final chapter provides a conclusion to the overall analysis. More detailed profiles of the 20 vulnerable groups are provided in the annex.

1.2 Process & Methodology

The methodology adopted to conduct the CCA is based on a review of primary and secondary data and documentation, consultations with UN agencies, the Government of Palestine, civil society and donors, as well as reviews and validation of content by UN agencies, relevant bilateral agencies, government ministries, private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs). Consultations included UN resident and non-resident agencies and inter-agency thematic groups, select ministries of the government, donors, CSOs and the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS).

The review of data consisted of the assessment of quantitative and qualitative data including United Nations System and development stakeholder documents, key national documents, data and surveys from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), national and sector strategies as well as international obligations and human rights' treaties.

Disaggregated data (by sex, age, financial status, rural/urban, ethnicity, region, religion and language as well as disability, HIV/AIDS and other status), where available, was used to deepen the analysis of the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and drivers of vulnerability.

UN agencies were requested to identify groups they considered to be among the most vulnerable and disadvantaged to serve as the entry point for this analysis. In the first round, some 69 groups were proposed. The process of reducing the list to 20 and analysing the drivers of their vulnerability followed an iterative process. After an initial round of screening to reduce overlaps among groups, merge similar or closely related groups and subsume smaller groups into larger ones, detailed analysis of the remaining groups was undertaken. After an initial analysis of the drivers of vulnerability of the groups, those groups that suffered from multiple overlapping disadvantages were the first ones to be selected for the final list. These included women-headed food-insecure households, refugees living in camps, and the population of Hebron H2, among others. In a second round, the remaining groups were reassessed on the basis of the range of issues they illustrate. The purpose in the second round was to bring to the table as broad as possible a range of constraints to development so as to inform the analysis on the drivers of vulnerability.

A CCA Task Force was created by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) to guide the writing team and facilitate the selection of the final set of vulnerable groups. The original list of 69 groups was reduced to 20 which were felt to be representative of vulnerability in the oPt. The final list was then validated by the UNCT. Detailed profiles were prepared for each of the 20 groups with a focus on the drivers of their vulnerability.



Analysis of the vulnerable groups focused on (a) the characteristics of the group (b) the drivers of vulnerability and (c) the effects of the driver of vulnerability on the group. A review and validation exercise was conducted with the CCA Task Force and was further validated by the UNCT. The five drivers of vulnerability emerged out of a human rights-based analysis of the vulnerable groups. A gender-based analysis was conducted under the guidance of the UN Gender Task Force – an inter-agency group in the oPt.

1.3 Brief Country Overview

Key figures		
West Bank	5,655km^2	2.9 million people (including East Jerusalem)
Gaza Strip	365km^2	1.9 million people
Poverty Rate	34.5% (2014)	
GDP per capita	US$ 1,745.9 (2015)	

The oPt consists of the West Bank (5,655 km^2 including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (365 km^2, with a coastline of 40 km), with a total population of 4.8 million, of which 2.9 million live in the West Bank, concentrated in urban areas and 1.9 million live in Gaza.[43] The illiteracy rate for over-15-year-olds in the oPt stands at 3.3%;[44] the poverty rate is 34.5% [2014][45]. The GDP per capita stands at US$ 1,745.9 [2015][46] at 2004 prices and its Human Development Index ranking is 113 out of 188 countries [2014].[47]

Mandatory Palestine was divided in 1949 between Israel, Jordan and Egypt. In the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and annexed East Jerusalem. The Oslo Accords signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993 divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions – Areas A, B and C. Under the Oslo framework, the PA was given full civil and security control of Area A and civil control of Area B where it is also responsible for public order. Area C is under administrative and military control of Israel. This arrangement was meant to last for five years pending negotiations on a final status agreement to be reached by 1999. A final status agreement has not yet materialized.

Palestinian presidential elections were held in 2005 and led to the election of Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah party. In September 2005, Israel unilaterally "disengaged" from the Gaza Strip, withdrawing all settlers and military personnel although it continues to retain control of Gaza's airspace, maritime access, and most land borders and to restrict the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza. In 2006, elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) were held; Hamas secured 74 out of 132 seats and Fatah took 45 seats. Hamas formed a government, led by Ismail Haniyeh, in April 2006 which continued until the February 2007 Mecca Agreement was reached, leading to a unity government between Fatah and Hamas headed by Prime Minister Haniyeh. However, Israel, the United States, and the European Union (EU) did not recognize the new unity government on the grounds of Hamas' involvement in terrorism and its refusal to recognize Israel or past Israeli-PLO agreements. The United States and the EU, then the largest donors to the PA, cut off assistance to the government[48] and, given counter-terrorism legislation, financial restrictions have remained tight. Disagreements and clashes erupted between Fatah and Hamas supporters in 2007, and in June 2007 Hamas forcefully took over the running of all government institutions in Gaza. President Abbas appointed an emergency cabinet and dismissed Hamas, resulting in the PLO governing the 40% of the West Bank not directly administered by Israel[49] and Hamas governing Gaza. Fatah and Hamas have since been unable to reconcile and no presidential or legislative election has been held in the oPt. To break the political stalemate, a "consensus" non-factional Palestinian government was established in April 2014 with a cabinet of technocrats, not affiliated to any political party, endorsed by both Fatah and Hamas. The Government of National Consensus (GNC) has so far proven unable to play the role of an inclusive caretaker government.

1.4 Brief Demographic Overview[50]

Key figures	
Population below 29 years-old	69%
Current population (2015)	4.8 million
Projected population (2050)	9.5 million
Current population density in Gaza	5,070 inhab. per km^2

The Palestinian population is young (69% are below the age of 29)[51] and growing fast. The population almost quadrupled over the past 50 years and is projected to increase from 4.8[52] million to 6.9 million in 2030 and 9.5 million in 2050. Gaza's population will more than double, from 1.9 million to 4.8 million in 2050, while the West Bank will grow from 2.9 million to 4.7 million. Gaza's population will slightly exceed the population of the West Bank by 2050 and will remain younger. This is a serious development concern for Gaza as its population density – already high at 5,070 inhabitants per square km[53] – will rise to nearly 14,000 inhabitants per square kilometre, threatening the economic, social and environmental sustainability of the territory.

Rapid population growth will increase demand for public services including health care and education. The increase of youth's share in Palestine's total population for the past 20 years is the highest increase among Arab countries. With youth at 30% of the total population, effective development planning for youth will be essential in areas including education, decent work, health care services and adequate and affordable housing.

An increase in the proportion of the working age population (15-64 years) will increase demand for employment. It will also create a potential for a demographic dividend if Palestine invests well in economic, social and governance policies and in human capital, while promoting equity, health, quality of education and productive employment.



CHAPTER 2

Development Under Occupation

The Inherent Vulnerability of All Palestinians

After nearly 50 years of occupation every Palestinian living in the oPt is vulnerable to some degree. Being under occupation, Palestine is also heavily disadvantaged vis-à-vis other countries in its efforts to reach the SDGs. Any discussion of development in Palestine must start with the fact that the largest and most visible constraint on Palestinian development is the occupation. Though the occupation affects groups of Palestinians differently, for most Palestinians there is scarcely any sphere of life that it does not touch.

The tools to reverse this fundamental vulnerability are not in the hands of Palestinian development policy makers nor the UN Development Group. Development (and humanitarian aid) can only mitigate its effects. This vulnerability can be reversed only by ending the military occupation of Palestine, and in the short term, mitigating its most pernicious measures.

Therefore, lifting the occupation is the single most important priority to enable Palestinians to chart a successful course to the Sustainable Development Goals. Meanwhile, development actors need to be conscious about the limits on Palestine's development prospects and the impact of donors' development investments in a country under occupation where the government has highly circumscribed control over the levers of development. As long as it remains the occupying power, the ultimate accountability for Palestine's ability or failure to reach the global goals articulated in the 2030 Agenda remains with the Government of Israel.

As the occupying power[54] and a party to seven of the international core human rights treaties, Israel has clearly defined obligations to the people of the oPt under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) to allow development to proceed during what should be a temporary period of occupation.[55] Israel's obligations under IHL include the duty to treat the Palestinian population humanely and to respect and ensure public order and safety within the oPt including public welfare,[56] the responsibility to ensure proper access to healthcare facilities and services to the whole population without any discrimination,[57] as well as to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.[58] IHL also notably prohibits the destruction of public and private property within the oPt[59] as well as the forcible transfer of populations.[60]As a State party to core international human rights conventions,[61] Israel has the duty to respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within its jurisdiction without any discrimination.[62] IHRL also creates an obligation to prevent human rights violations, as far as possible.[63]Israel's engagement in the oPt has been marked by violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as selective adherence to the provisions of the Oslo Accords. In addition, East Jerusalem's

"Lifting the occupation is the single most important priority to enable Palestinians to chart a successful course to the Sustainable Development Goals."

unilateral annexation by Israel violates the international law prohibition of acquiring territory by the use of force.[64]

Despite these obligations, some of which are contested by Israel, Israeli policies and practices actively limit the development potential of Palestine. These limitations are manifested in two fundamental ways: first by constraining the lives and the agency of people directly, and second, by limiting and encroaching upon the policy space of the government. These two spheres are elaborated upon below.

2.1 Constraining the Lives of People

The policies and practices of the occupation that have widespread impact on the lives of people include restrictions on access and movement of people and goods, on access to natural resources, on economic and productive activities, as well as the practice of demolitions and the threat of forced displacement and violence. The following analysis focuses on restrictions on movement, access to natural resources, economic and productive activities and on the impact of these policies on access of Palestinians to health and education. Policies around demolitions, forced displacement and violence, and permits for travel – which affect some groups disproportionately more than others – are discussed in later chapters of the CCA.

2.1.1 Restrictions on Access and Movement of People

Israeli restrictions on the movement of people, both Palestinian and international, have far-reaching consequences for both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Restrictions are implemented through a complex system of checkpoints, permits, military roadblocks, ethnically exclusive settlements, a segregated pass road system, parallel legal regimes and the Barrier.[65]

Such restrictions have fragmented the Palestinian landscape. They have created isolated communities, destroyed social cohesion, ruptured a common identity and reduced economic activity within and among the fractured Palestinian populations of the territory. The Barrier, which is the main impediment to Palestinian access in the West Bank, not only separates West Bank Palestinians from Israelis but also Palestinians from each other. Much of the land in the West Bank that falls between the Barrier and the 1949 Armistice Line has been declared "closed" and is referred to as the 'Seam Zone'. This area is largely severed from the rest of the oPt and Palestinians require special permits to live in or enter this area. If the Barrier is completed according to plan, approximately 9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the former Israeli-Jordanian no-man's land[66] will be isolated. This area is home to an estimated 11,000 Palestinians. If the Barrier is completed according to plan, an additional 25,000 Palestinians, principally in the Bethlehem area will reside between the Barrier and the Green Line.[67] As of 2008, some

Key figures	
Unemployment	26.9% (44.7% for women)
Israel use of surface and ground water resources	85%
PA revenue from the clearance revenues system	60% -70%
West Bank cultivated land the affected by the Barrier	10.2%
West Bank land used for Israeli of settlements, military zones, nature reserves and the Barrier	44%
Palestinians water consumption	73 litres / person/day (WHO Standard: 100 litres / person/ day)

170,000 dunums[68] of fertile agricultural lands are affected by the Barrier, or some 10.2% of the total area cultivated in the West Bank.[69] The separation of Gaza from the West Bank including East Jerusalem has restricted the ability of residents of Gaza to visit family and seek medical care.

Occupation and conflict is an additional hazard to the health of the Palestinian population because it causes injury, disability, and death, and affects access to health services.[70] Permits must be obtained for each health appointment requiring travel to Jerusalem or to neighbouring countries and are often delayed or denied without apparent reason. In the West Bank in 2014, 22.6% of travel permit applications by patients and their companions were denied or delayed. In 2015, the rate was 16.8%.[71] Ambulance transportation for patients from the West Bank to Jerusalem hospitals requires a 'back-to-back' procedure where two vehicles meet and the patient is moved between them over the checkpoint or barrier.[72]

Occupation also impairs access to education in the oPt. The planning and zoning regime applied by the Israeli authorities in Area C and East Jerusalem has created a shortage of school buildings. In addition, the protracted conflict is impairing the ability of children and youth to access schools and contributing to the rate of children dropping out of school. Children report harassment and/or violence by the Israeli military ranging from unnecessary delays, bag searches and physical harassment when crossing checkpoints.[73] In 27% of assessed communities, harassment and violence by Israeli settlers was identified as the main issue affecting access to education.[74] Students living in areas near settlements often have to walk through these settlements to reach their schools and those living in Area C often incur lengthy commutes to reach schools, during which time they may be exposed to violence. The psychosocial effects of the conflict on students include excessive stress, trauma and pervasive fear.[75] Further, the end of 2015 saw attacks and forced entry into schools by Israeli military increase in frequency.[76]



The collective impact of the loss of schooling, trauma and lack of access to healthcare is affecting the development potential of an entire generation. For the most vulnerable groups, this means impairing their ability to improve their socio-economic conditions and impeding social mobility within the oPt.

2.1.2 Restrictions on Economic and Productive Activities

Restrictions on economic and productive activities, including restrictions on movement of goods, severely impair the Palestinian economy and its potential for growth. The ability of the private sector to function, let alone thrive and generate employment, is limited.[77] As a result, the Palestinian economy remains highly dependent on its public sector, which in turn is highly dependent on external budgetary support. The average Palestinian lives a precarious existence dependent on government or donor support.

2.1.2.1 Constrained Economic Growth

Economic decline has been a key consequence of the protracted occupation and the frequent military assaults on Gaza have crippled its economy. Over the period 2000-2015, GDP growth has been volatile and structurally unbalanced in favour of sectors not exposed to foreign competition; total GDP grew on average by over 3%, but agriculture – the main sector exposed to foreign competition and a key driver of inclusive growth – contracted.[78] Israeli restrictions on water rights and access to fertile land in Area C and the Seam Zone have contributed to this.

In 2014, the economy of the oPt witnessed its first recession since 2006 and the second consecutive decrease in GDP per capita. The contraction of the Palestinian per capita GDP by 3.1% in 2014 and a high unemployment rate has deepened poverty levels among Palestinians. In 2015, the economy recovered slightly but economic growth was barely enough to keep up with population growth. This was in part due to a decline in foreign aid and the liquidity squeeze caused by the Israeli decision to suspend the transfer of clearance revenues[79] from December 2014 to April 2015.[80]

Real GDP growth has been volatile, influenced by political dynamics and donor support, which have been both unpredictable and outside the control of the PA. The influence of politics on Palestinian economic development is illustrated by the fact that the period of relative stability from 1995 to 1999 witnessed robust economic performance, while all episodes of economic contraction (2000–2002, 2006 and 2014) were preceded by political and military confrontations.[81]

Occupation policies on access, restrictions, building permits and demolitions as well as successive rounds of conflict have taken their toll on the economy of Palestine, depressed the investment climate, and made it difficult if not impossible for the private sector to thrive. This has increased poverty and led to a shortage of decent work,[82] which are primary drivers of food insecurity in the oPt. In the second quarter of 2016, the unemployment rate in the oPt stood at 26.9% (44.7% for women, 22.1 for men 22.1%).[83] Even though food is available, many Palestinians cannot afford it; 27% of households across the oPt (and 47% of households in Gaza) are food-insecure.[84]



2.1.2.2 A Weak Agriculture sector

The protracted occupation has significantly undermined agriculture in Palestine. Both horizontal (land area) and vertical (intensification) expansion of the agriculture sector have been restricted for decades.[85] Horizontal expansion is limited by restrictions on essential land and water resources. Most land resources are located in Area C, which is sparsely populated and underutilized by the Palestinian population, mainly as a result of impediments to infrastructure and urban development.

Vertical expansion of agriculture is limited by lack of access to markets, high costs of production and lack of access to pesticides and equipment, and in Gaza, restrictions associated with the closure. These constraints contrast sharply with the agricultural sectors in Israel and other neighbouring Arab countries, which are protected by agricultural subsidies.[86] Palestinian permanent investment and the intensification of agriculture are not allowed in Area C. Palestinian use of water in the West Bank, most of which lies in Area C, is limited to 20% of the total water in the aquifers.[87] Irrigating this unexploited area as well as accessing additional range and forest land could deliver an additional US$ 704 million in value-added to the Palestinian economy – equivalent to 7% of GDP at 2011 levels.[88]

Constraints on trade (see Section 2.1.2.3) have deprived the agriculture sector of low-cost inputs and markets for its products. Perishable agricultural produce with a short shelf life has been disproportionately impacted by the restrictions, which involve, for example, the unloading and reloading of products on trucks at checkpoints. Bans by Israel on the import of items deemed 'dual use' such as fertilizers, reduce productivity and profitability of Palestinian farming.

2.1.2.3 Trade Restrictions

Trade barriers have been in place since Israel imposed its external trade and fiscal regime on the oPt in 1967. The flow of Palestinian labour and goods to Israel was allowed under non-reciprocal restrictions and imports to the oPt were subjected to Israeli tariff structures and quotas. Palestinian producers became increasingly cut off from their traditional trading partners and had to reorient trade towards the Israeli economy. Israeli traders benefited from high state subsidies, import quotas and a policy aimed at eliminating competition from Palestinian enterprises. Palestinian exports, both to Israel and the rest of the world, were hampered by non-tariff barriers and delays caused by cumbersome overland transport and security procedures, in particular for goods that could potentially harm existing Israeli market shares. In addition, most raw materials and intermediate goods had to be imported at higher prices from Israel. Cheaper imports from other countries were either prohibited or too expensive due to extremely high transaction costs ensuing from Israeli measures. Over time, Palestinian exporters lost much of their competitive edge while Israeli products enjoyed unhindered access to Palestinian markets.[89]




Currently most Palestinian trade is conducted with or through Israel. However, the costs of exporting and importing are twice as high for Palestinian as for Israeli businesses while the procedures for importing require four times the amount of time Israeli importers spend on similar activities.[90] Despite the fact that the PA has signed a number of preferential trade agreements, it is impossible to realize their full potential without significant relaxation of Israeli restriction on movement of goods. Compliance with Israeli standards, high input costs that create uncompetitive pricing for Palestinian goods and high transaction costs, all restrict Palestine's exports even though the Paris Protocol views the two countries as a customs union implying the absence of economic borders between Israel and the oPt.[91]

Restrictions on trade have debilitated Palestine's productive sectors and changed the structure of its economy. In 2015, the share of tradable sectors had diminished to 19% of GDP from 36% in 1994, while the share of non-tradable sectors has increased to 81% from 64% in 1994 (Figure 2.1). This shift constrains employment generation due to the limited room for further expansion in the trade, services and construction sectors, which are less dynamic than the manufacturing and agricultural sectors and have less potential for job creation and technological innovation.[92] In 2014, Palestine's trade-GDP ratio stood at 73.8% as compared with 83.7% for the Middle East and North Africa region.[93]


The Gaza Strip has been particularly affected. Since the tightening of the closure on Gaza by Israel in 2007, Gaza's exports, imports and transfers of cash have also been severely restricted. Exports from Gaza declined sharply after 2007 (Figure 2.2) and the resulting loss from lack of access to external markets has decimated Gaza's productive sector.


Figure 2.1: Share of Tradable and Non-tradable Sectors in GDP



Source: National Accounts Statistics, PCBS
Note: Tradable sectors in the graph include agriculture and industry (excluding water and electricity generation activities)

Figure 2.2: Registered Trade from Gaza





Source: PCBS. (2015).

Imports into Gaza have not fallen sharply but remain inadequate relative to growing demand and have shown a high degree of volatility. The composition of Gaza's import basket has also been severely restricted. Israel operates a list of items that are either restricted or banned from entry into Gaza due to their possible 'dual use' (i.e. they could be used for civilian or military purposes). The 'dual use' list has grown over time and places constraints on many goods that need to be imported into Gaza. Since the list is neither transparent nor specific enough, it leaves a lot of ambiguity about what can be imported. It has severely hindered specific sectors like the furniture industry, which despite high potential for exports cannot import wood and thus cannot produce and export most furniture. Exports of processed food to Israel are restricted on grounds of not meeting Israeli hygiene requirements. However, hydrogen peroxide, which is used to sanitize food containers before placing food inside, has been on the 'dual use' list since 2007. Restrictions to external markets and high transactions costs for doing business also apply to the West Bank although not to the extent experienced by the Gaza Strip.

2.1.2.4 An Eroded Industrial Sector

The industrial sector is profoundly affected by limits on land availability and by limited opportunities for quarrying and mining of minerals. The Dead Sea is a highly concentrated source of reserves of potash, bromine, magnesium and salt. However, due to access and permit restrictions and an uncertain investment climate, Palestinians are not able to access these resources.

The West Bank, especially Area C, is rich in gravel, stone and marble, the major merchandise export of the oPt. Palestinian marble and stone quarries are subject to arbitrary closures and confiscation of equipment. Additionally, nature reserve areas in Area C are under severe restrictions for development and revitalization, precluding the realization of this potential in the Palestinian tourism sector.

Israeli installations of settlements, military zones, nature reserves, and the Barrier make up 70% of Area C (or about 44% of the overall West Bank). The remaining 30% is heavily restricted for construction; Palestinians can build on less than 1% of the land.[94] Some 40% of Area C is private a Palestinian land on which settlements are built.[95] The construction industry in the West Bank is constrained by so-called 'zoning rules' imposed by the Israeli authorities. The zoning limits construction in the West Bank largely to Areas A and B. This is compounded by serious shortcomings in the PA's approach to building in Areas A and B, including registration of land. These factors continue to push up the price of land for construction, buildings/physical infrastructure and rents.

2.1.3 Magnifying Environmental Threats

Activities undertaken and sanctioned by the occupation have also had a debilitating impact on Palestine's environmental resources. The damage to Palestine's resources have come from pollution of land and water resources by settlements, damage to land and biodiversity on account of the Barrier, limited environmental regulation of Israeli industries in the West Bank, and exploitation of natural resources by Israel.[96] The restrictions on access, movement, development and construction have hampered adequate disaster risk management planning. Poor infrastructure in Area C and the Gaza Strip is reducing the adaptive capacity of local communities to climate change. At the same time the high degree of congestion in East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip are exposing Palestinians to catastrophic risks in the event of earthquakes.[97]

In addition, Palestinians are deprived of accessing natural resources – land, water and minerals – on their own land. The majority of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are at risk of declining access to water and energy. Thus while the rest of the world strives to achieve Sustainable Development Goals 6 and 7 – to ensure safe and sustainable drinking water and affordable and clean energy – in Palestine, the shortage of drinking water and energy are likely to assume crisis proportions in the near future.

2.1.3.1 Water and Wastewater

Palestinians face major water shortages in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel controls all shared surface and ground water

resources and utilizes 85%, leaving only 15% for Palestinian use.[98] In Area C, the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) has full control over all development projects including water and sanitation projects. Palestinians are not allowed to build any infrastructure including wells in Area C without Israeli permits which are difficult to obtain, while any work related to extraction of ground water including the rehabilitation of wells or irrigation networks is subject to approval of the Joint Water Committee which has not met since 2011. Since wastewater is not treated in the West Bank, some of it flows to Israel. Israel treats this water and uses it for agricultural irrigation and rehabilitation of streams but makes the PA pay for the cost of such treatment.[99]

Palestinian herders and Bedouins in remote communities have to rely on water sold from tankers at high costs. Water consumption in some of these communities is as low as 20 litres per capita per day, one-fifth of the World Health Organization's recommended consumption. An estimated 113,000 people from 70 communities are not connected to a water network in the West Bank, which translates into enormous costs for water purchase.[100] Because of limited availability, on average, Palestinians in the West Bank connected to the water grid consume 73 litres per person per day, compared with 240 litres per Israeli[101] and 154 litres per Jordanian.[102] In the Gaza Strip, three rounds of hostilities since 2007 have destroyed the water infrastructure and water distribution system (see Chapter 4).

Restrictions related to water have hindered economic activity including agriculture, thus affecting the livelihoods of communities, deepening poverty levels and further increasing vulnerability. In the West Bank, only 12% of the cultivated area is irrigated[103] even though irrigated land is, on average, 15 times more productive than rain-fed land.[104] The effects of prolonged Israeli restrictions on the access of Palestinians to water resources are exacerbated by natural conditions and climate change, which is expected to increase the severity of water scarcity through increased spells of drought.

In this situation, recycled wastewater is a precious resource for Palestinian agriculture. Currently about 106 MCM of wastewater is discharged annually into the environment,[105]



while only 50 MCM of water is reclaimed annually (35 MCM in Gaza Strip and 15 MCM in the West Bank). Increased recycling of wastewater for agriculture would allow a 35% increase in water for agriculture, or enough to irrigate an additional 70,000 dunums adequate to generate US$ 84 million per year and provide 13,000 additional jobs in agriculture.[106] However, the huge potential offered by reclaimed water is not being realized due in part to the lack of efficient irrigation schemes, weak regulation, monitoring and management of reclaimed water utilization in agriculture and disincentives to private investment in agriculture. Most fundamentally, developing wastewater treatment plants and other sanitation infrastructure faces the same restrictions by the Israeli authorities as other infrastructure.

2.1.3.2 Energy

The oPt is highly energy-insecure. This has an impact on a range of interlinked domains including water, food and livelihoods. While close to 95% of the population is on the grid, access to energy is neither reliable nor sustainable. Electricity is supplied and controlled by the occupying power. Israeli restrictions have prevented the construction of power plants in large sections of Area C. Per unit cost of electricity charged to Palestinians is higher than that charged within Israel and in West Bank settlements. Many Palestinian consumers cannot afford to cover their energy costs. The PA pays energy-consumption costs to the Israeli Electricity Company (IEC) and to its subsidiaries that control and manage electricity in the West Bank and Gaza. The PA's dues are calculated without transparency and periodically adjusted against the PA's transfer revenue receipts from Israel. In several instances, power supply has been cut off to Bethlehem, Hebron and Jericho for non-payment of bills.

In Gaza, wars have exacerbated the energy crisis. The Gaza Power Plant (GPP) was first damaged by a targeted airstrike in June 2006 and subsequently bombed during hostilities in 2008/2009, 2012 and 2014. Electricity demand in the Gaza Strip is estimated at 470 megawatts (MW), of which less than 45% is currently met.[107] Severe fuel shortages since July 2013 have kept the GPP operating at half of its capacity (60 out of 120 MW) or below[108] and have forced it to shut down on several occasions.[109] Frequent cuts have undermined private sector activity and affected residential homes, hospitals, schools and wastewater treatment plants.

Further, the occupying power does not allow Palestinians to develop and use the offshore natural gas fields discovered since the 1990s on the Mediterranean coast. Two high-quality gas fields have been discovered, one entirely within the waters of Gaza and the other on the border with Israel. Natural gas from these fields could provide much-needed energy to the entire oPt.[110]

2.2 Restrictions on Policymaking by the Government of Palestine

In 2009 and 2010, the World Bank noted that if the PA "maintains its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services, it is well-positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future".[111] In 2011, it stated that "the PA has continued to strengthen its institutions, delivering public services and promoting reforms that many existing states struggle with. Significant reforms still lie ahead for the PA – but no more than those facing other middle income countries".[112] Nevertheless, the PA to this day has limited space for policy development and implementation, restricting its ability to deliver on its obligations as a duty bearer to its people. In the process, the most vulnerable and structurally disadvantaged groups – the ones that most need government support – are those that suffer the most.


The Palestinian government has no control over its borders – land, air or sea - or of its customs revenues. It does not have its own currency or authority to print money. It lacks access and policy prerogative over Area C. It lacks influence over Gaza, due to territorial fragmentation and Palestinian division that prevents the operationalization of a government of national consensus in all of oPt.

The PA's fiscal space is restricted. A major part of the PA's revenue (60%-70%) comes from the clearance revenues system, in which all taxes and revenues due at borders, seaports and by air on Palestinian goods

and services are collected by the Israeli fiscal authorities on behalf of the PA in return for a 3% administrative charge to Israel.[113] The agreement under the Oslo Accord requires that these revenues be transferred to the PA on a regular basis. Periodically, however, revenues are withheld arbitrarily and without warning, resulting in the high volatility of clearance revenue receipts. Since the Oslo Accords, clearance revenues have been withheld on at least eight occasions including once for two years and once for 16 months.

From January 2013 to April 2016, the PA's clearance revenue receipts were nearly twice as volatile as its gross domestic revenue (Figure 2.3).[114] Fluctuations in the clearance revenue add to the variability of the PA's total revenue. This has impacted the ability of the PA to plan its expenditures and, in some cases, to honour its commitments. Withheld clearance revenues have, in the past, resulted in non-payment or partial payment of government salaries, and accumulation of arrears. This dampens economic growth as the PA is Palestine's biggest employer in a consumption-driven economy. Due to its multiplier effect, the negative impact of delayed salaries and payments can endure for months even if the withheld revenues are released after a short delay.

Figure 2.3: Monthly Revenue of the PA 2013-2016 (Million NIS)



Source: Monthly Financial Reports of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, various

Fiscal space is further limited by the arbitrary and opaque way in which the clearance revenue dues are calculated. When Palestinian electricity distributors (municipalities, village councils and distribution companies) fail to pay the IEC utility costs, Israel adjusts the bill against the oPt's clearance revenue dues and registers any remaining balances as debt owed to the IEC, which are then deducted from clearance revenue at later stages. In order to recover part of the debt to IEC in 2012, the Government of Israel deducted an estimated US$ 280 million – 14% of the PA's total revenues – from the clearance revenues it collected on behalf of the State of Palestine. As of February 2014, the remaining accumulated balance brought the debt to US$ 330 million. This has increased the fiscal burden on an already deteriorating Palestinian fiscal state and economy.[115] Such deductions are made by Israel without the consent of or verification by the PA. Israel also deducts the 3% administration fee directly from the clearance revenues. According to the IMF, 2015 saw the PA charged some NIS 250 million (approximately US$ 67 million) in handling fees or more than double that eight years prior.[116]

Israeli control over land, natural resources and tourist sites in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, deprive the PA of tax revenue. The World Bank estimated annual output losses associated with restrictions in Area C at US$ 3.4 billion, with a consequent loss of US$ 800 million in tax revenues annually.[117] The lifting of restrictions could cut the PA's fiscal deficit by half, thereby substantially reducing its donor dependency.

The PA also has limited space for the development of effective local government and local development policies. Israel's planning regime in Area C and East Jerusalem is discriminatory and restrictive. It is not designed for the benefit of the protected population but is geared to facilitate and support the construction and expansion of settlements. Such settlement construction and expansion is associated with a range of human rights violations in the West Bank including East Jerusalem. It is also in violation of IHL and a number of Security Council resolutions.[118]

Palestinian local governance and service delivery is limited by the resulting territorial fragmentation. In Area C, the PA provides health and education services for the Palestinian population, though not as effectively as in Area A, mainly due to the difficulties in accessing locations in Area C. The occupation also restricts the legal sovereignty of the PA**.** Freedom of movement and lack of jurisdiction in large parts of the oPt hamper rule of law, maintenance of security, and the

delivery of justice services by the Palestinian State. Palestinian justice institutions are unable to enforce the law in East Jerusalem and Area C. Since June 1967, Israel has imposed military law on the oPt which gives the Israeli military authority full legislative, executive and judicial authority. Further, since Palestinians with Jerusalem IDs do not come under the jurisdiction of the PA, they cannot be held accountable for crimes committed in the West Bank. Israel is responsible for providing security services in Area C but does not provide police services for Palestinians there.

Israeli control of the PA's policy space is enhanced by the Israeli laws, regulations and policies that support the occupation, particularly in the West Bank. Prior to 1967, a system of Ottoman, British Mandatory, and Jordanian laws was in force in the West Bank. Since 1967, this system has been supplemented and in some cases overlaid by a system of military legislation consisting of military orders, regulations, and planning schemes among others. These laws go beyond security and military authority to affect purely civilian aspects of Palestinian life, including land, taxes, planning and construction. The battle over control, ownership and use of land lies at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[119] Israel also purports to adhere to customary international law, including regulations annexed to the Hague Convention. Such adherence is focused more on the prerogative of Israel as the occupying power than on its obligation to respect the existing laws of the occupied territory.[120]

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Palestine's control over its development prospects remains highly circumscribed. A government that does not control its borders, its revenue, its monetary policy and cannot access much of its natural resources is embarking on the 2030 Agenda with an overwhelming handicap.

The occupation of Palestine represents the single most important brake on Palestine's development prospects. Development actors need to promote and support the political process in the name of Palestinian development. The global agenda that is the SDGs needs to be tapped to accelerate the resolution of this long-standing crisis. The work of building the institutions of a future independent, viable Palestinian State must continue; a State that serves all of its citizens equally, in order to start repairing decades of exclusion, rights abuses, uncertainty and vulnerability.



CHAPTER 3

Who is Left Behind?

Vulnerability and Disadvantage in Palestine

While all Palestinians are disadvantaged by virtue of living under the occupation, some Palestinians are clearly more vulnerable than others. The 2030 Agenda imperative to 'leave no one behind' requires Palestine to look beyond national averages to identify who these Palestinians are and what makes them vulnerable.

In order to identify why some groups are at greater risk than others of being 'left behind,' this report analyses the situation of select highly vulnerable groups in Palestine. The identification of the key drivers of vulnerability and disadvantage in Palestine in the pages that follow is based on an analysis of 20 groups identified in Table 1 below. As discussed in Chapter 1, the starting point of the exercise was a set of 69 groups considered among the most vulnerable in Palestine. From this a subset of 20 were selected. The criteria for selection included two essential questions: first, "In what way is this group more vulnerable than others?" and second, "In what way is this group getting left behind by Palestine's development process?" This chapter explains who the 20 vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are in greater detail and makes the case for their selection. It starts by establishing a shared understanding of the terms 'structural disadvantage' and 'vulnerability'.

By structural disadvantage, the report refers to the condition whereby some individuals or groups are systematically deprived of the means of achieving or sustaining progress. Systematic denial of the services and protection of the state, systematic limits to the exercise of human rights or systematic discrimination could all result in structural disadvantage.

Structural disadvantages leave people more vulnerable than they would otherwise have been. Chronic vulnerability results in structural disadvantages, as negative coping mechanisms drain individuals' ability to cope with shocks and to maintain progress.

Vulnerability is defined differently in different contexts. It can be defined as the diminished capacity of an individual or group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from adverse shocks (such as natural calamities, adverse life events, job loss) including changes in their environment. In this report, vulnerability is understood to refer to an individual's or group's prospects of erosion in their choices and capabilities or their development gains.[121] Vulnerable groups are at risk not only because they are exposed to a hazard but also as a result of being marginalized, of everyday patterns of social interaction or of having inadequate access to resources.[122] People differ in their exposure to risk as a result of their social group, gender, ethnic or other identity, age and other factors. Vulnerability is thus, not identical to, but closely related to, structural disadvantage.

A study of Palestine's development landscape readily yields some groups that appear to be among the most structurally-disadvantaged. In some cases the constraints are a direct outcome of the occupation. In others, the constraints arise from factors inherent in Palestinian economy, society and polity and may be exacerbated by the occupation. Table 1 presents the list of 20 groups identified as highly affected by structural constraints to development, cross-referenced with the key drivers of their disadvantage. A more detailed profile of each group is presented in the annex.

While the selected groups are only a subset of vulnerable groups in Palestine, this report will make the case that the five drivers of vulnerability identified underlie the vulnerability and structural disadvantage of a broad range of groups, well beyond the 20 highlighted. The 20 groups provide an entry-point to understanding key drivers of vulnerability in Palestine.

Table 3.1: Palestine's most disadvantaged and structural drivers of their disadvantage

Groups	Approximate number of Palestinian Individuals[123]	Drivers of Vulnerability and Disadvantage				
		Location	Exposure to Violence	Economic access	Institutional and Political factors	Socio-cultural factors
Adolescent girls	530,000		•		•	•
Bedouins and herder communities living in Area C	30,171[124]	•	•	•		
Children facing obstacles in accessing schools	50,000	•	•			
Children in labour	39,644		•	•	•	•
Children subject to violence	1,992,065	•	•		•	
Communities in Area C	297,986	•	•	•		
The Elderly	216,742		•	•	•	•
Food insecure households headed by women	175,000[125]			•	•	•
Gazans without access to safe water or sanitation	1,787,078	•	•	•		
Hebron H2 Residents	40,000	•	•	•		
Individuals in need of urgent medical referrals	102,000	•	•	•	•	
Out of school children	123,219	•	•	•	•	•
Persons with disabilities	130,045		•	•	•	•
Persons living in the Seam Zone	11,000	•	•	•		
Refugees living in abject poverty	619,133	•		•		
Refugees residing in camps	789,524	•	•	•		•
Small-scale farmers, non-Bedouin herders and fisher folk	111,310	•	•	•		
Women exposed to gender-based violence	998,583[126]		•	•	•	•
Working Poor	>250,000[127]		•	•	•	
Youth	1,440,000	•	•	•	•	•

3.1 The 20 Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups

This section presents a snapshot of the 20 groups in alphabetic order. There are several overlaps between the groups; for instance 'adolescent girls' overlap with youth and children. 'Refugees in abject poverty' and 'refugees living in camps' also contain significant overlaps. The reason for these groups to be viewed separately is for the particular insights they provide into different drivers of vulnerability.

3.1.1 Adolescent Girls (Aged 10-19 years)

There are an estimated 530,000[128] adolescent girls in Palestine. The number is projected to reach 720,000 in 2030.[129] At the formative period of their lives, adolescent girls suffer multiple overlapping vulnerabilities as a result of their exposure to violence, limits put on their choices by sociocultural norms, early marriage and motherhood. Early marriage, early and unplanned pregnancies and poor access to education and health services keep many adolescent girls trapped with restricted opportunities and limited capabilities. Some 4.6% of females between ages 15-49 are married before their 15th birthday, and 24.2% of women aged 20-24 got married before 18 resulting in early child bearing[130] with higher prevalence in rural areas, refugee camps, and Gaza. The insecurity in day-to-day life of internally displaced persons, loss of livelihoods, overcrowded housing, and loss of social networks contribute to an increased sense of urgency to get adolescent girls married off early.[131] Gaza's adolescent birth rates are extremely high (66 per 1000), a public health concern, as adolescents are exposed to a higher risk of complications and maternal and infant mortality.[132] While school dropout rates are higher for boys (1.6% versus 0.9% for girls)[133], when there are security-related obstacles to accessing schools, adolescent girls are more affected.

3.1.2 Bedouin and Herder Communities Living in Area C

Bedouin and herder communities are among the most vulnerable communities in Area C. An estimated 30,171 individuals reside in 183 Bedouin and herding communities in Area C.[134] Israeli restrictions imposed on them deepen their poverty, severely impact their quality of



life, and violate their human rights including rights to freedom of movement, housing, health, education, and employment. Over 70% are refugees, and by virtue of their location, Bedouin and herder communities are under the constant threat of forced displacement and settler violence. Movement restrictions affect these communities more than others because over 90% of them depend on herding as their primary source of income, which requires moving over large areas to enable their livestock to graze. The Israeli planning regime requires Bedouins to stay within limited areas contrary to their nomadic lifestyle.

3.1.3 Children Facing Obstacles in Accessing School

Many Palestinian children cannot exercise their right to quality education and a safe learning environment because of the obstacles they face in getting to school. In Area C, 50,000 children enrolled in 183 schools lack sufficient access to education, and over 1,700 children from 37 West Bank communities commute to schools more than 5km away.[135] Permits, closure and curfews mean journeys to and from school can take three to four times longer than it should. The vulnerability of children facing obstacles accessing schools is compounded by financial difficulties and the high cost of transportation, resulting in drop-outs, lack of attendance, decreased learning time in school, and deterioration in the quality of learning.[136] Girls are affected disproportionally, as their families tend to pull them out of school due to harassment, violence and intimidation on their way to school. Incidents involving schoolchildren and schools almost tripled in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, affecting nearly 25,000 Palestinian children in 2014.[137] In 2015 there were 123 attacks on schools and 143 incidents of denial of education.[138]

3.1.4 Children in Labour

As a direct consequence of security concerns, mobility restrictions, classroom shortages, substandard facilities and high poverty rates, many Palestinian families resort to engaging their children in labour.[139] Working children are highly vulnerable to loss of education, exposure to hazardous conditions, violation of their rights, and a loss of their childhood.



Current Palestinian law prohibits the employment of children before they reach the age of 15, though the law does not protect against children working for first-degree family members, nor those working in Israeli settlements.[140] In 2015, 3.7% of children aged 10-17 years old[141] (2% of 10-14 olds and 9% of 15-17 olds) were working.[142] Overall, 15.5% of working children are not enrolled in education.[143] There are reports of child trafficking from the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel as well as within the West Bank for the purposes of agricultural work and/or to beg.[144]

3.1.5 Children Subject to Violence

Children (45% of Palestine's population) are exposed to various forms of violence at home, in school, in public places and by the Israeli occupation. In 2014, over 92% of children (a nearly equal proportion of girls and boys) reported facing psychological aggression or punishment in the previous month.[145] Some 69% of children reported being exposed to psychological violence by their parents.[146] Children exposed to or under threat of violence are at increased risk of having lower academic achievement and/or dropping out of school. Violence can also cause physical and psychological harm including bodily harm, low self-esteem, anxiety, fear, introversion, depression, bed-wetting, and nightmares. It can also affect their lifetime development trajectory.

3.1.6 Communities in Area C

As a result of Israeli policies, the residents of the 532 Palestinian **communities located in Area C**[147] are faced with land confiscations, home demolitions, and forced displacements. Home demolitions are often carried out in the context of discriminatory Israeli planning and zoning policies that make it almost impossible for Palestinians to secure building permits. Movement restrictions affect children attending schools, farmers, workers and those in need of health and other services outside their communities.[148] This prevents Area C communities from exercising their rights to movement, adequate housing, health, education, employment, an adequate standard of living and access to justice. Restricted access to water and electricity affects the livelihoods of those communities in Area C that are dependent on agriculture and herding. Merely on account of their location, residents of Area C are more vulnerable than many others.

3.1.7. The Elderly (Those Aged 60 and Above)

The elderly in Palestine rely primarily on traditional systems whereby their families are their main source of upkeep, care and support. The physical and mental health of the elderly is negatively affected as a result of having limited or no support systems, lacking access to social protection and health services and being exposed to discrimination, violence and abuse. Estimated to be 4.5% of the population, 78% of the elderly live in their own homes with family members.[149] Their numbers are projected to reach 470,000 in 2030.[150]



3.1.8. Food Insecure Households Headed by Women

Food-insecure households headed by women face serious economic constraints to cover their basic needs. One fourth of Palestinian families (1.6 million people) are either severely or moderately food-insecure,[151] and in 2016, 11% of these households are headed by women.[152] These households often engage in a range of negative coping mechanisms that include accessing high cost loans or cutting down on vital family activities/practices. Around 45% of severely food-insecure households headed by women reduce school expenses on education/ health/clothes compared to 22% for the food-secure households headed by women.[153]

3.1.9. Gaza Residents without Access to Clean Water or Sanitation

Water and sanitation are basic human rights that Gaza's population cannot fully enjoy. There is a severe water shortage. Some 100,000 people in the Eastern areas of Gaza remain entirely disconnected from any water network.[154] Similarly, the absence of sewage treatment facilities is exposing Gaza residents to a range of diseases and is further contaminating soil and water. Overall, 95% of the 1.9 million Gaza residents may now be at risk of waterborne diseases.[155]



3.1.10. Hebron H2 Residents

Approximately 40,000 Palestinians live in H2 in central Hebron alongside 850 Israeli settlers, with a further 8,000 settlers residing in Kiryat Arba settlement on the outskirts of Hebron.[156] Residents in the H2 area of Hebron have impaired access to education, health, cultural heritage and economic activity on account of settlement and related military activity in and around the Old City of Hebron. In absence of formal governmental authority to safeguard their rights, women and men facing settler attacks have very little possibility for legal redress. There are over 120 physical obstacles, including 18 permanently staffed checkpoints deployed by the Israeli military, separating the restricted areas from the rest of the city. As a consequence, in the Old City and areas near settlements, the majority of commercial activity has ceased and thousands of Palestinians have been displaced.

3.1.11. Individuals in Need of Urgent Medical Referrals

Movement and access is restricted for patients who are in need of specialized medical care that is not available in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 2015, 22.5% of the almost 22,000 patients from Gaza who required a medical referral permit to exit Gaza from the Erez check point were either denied or delayed access, an increase over 2014 figures of 17%. In 2015, 12.8% of the more than 80,000 patients from the West Bank who required a permit were denied one.[157] Patients including those in need of urgent care like women in labour, when delayed or denied access to specialized medical services, can suffer from deteriorating medical conditions which can affect their quality of life and contribute to death in some cases.



3.1.12. Out of School Children

Out of school children are either children who have never been to school or children that dropped out of the education system. Children in detention and children who are impacted by forced displacement often drop out from the education system. Children with disabilities face not only physical barriers to education, but gaps in school support for their special needs (for example only 54.6% of schools have appropriate toilets for persons with physical disabilities[158]). In 2014, 123, 219 children of basic education age were not enrolled in school. School dropout rates are higher for boys than for girls, primarily because adolescent boys are expected to contribute to household income during crises, and they are more likely to be subject to direct protection threats. Thus, many out of school children are either working children exposed to protection violations or children in the streets exposed to negative behaviours including violence, alcohol and drug abuse. These factors render out of school children more vulnerable than children in school.

3.1.13. Persons with Disabilities

Persons with disabilities in Palestine face geographical, institutional and attitudinal barriers that hinder the enjoyment of their rights. In 2011, 2.7% of the population of Palestine (2.9% of males and 2.5% of females) suffered from at least one disability.[159] Most disabilities are mobility-related (48.4%), and the absence of infrastructure adaptations to support persons with disabilities impairs their ability to engage with their community. Persons with disabilities are more likely than the general population to experience violations of their rights, poor physical and mental health conditions, poverty, and social isolation. Women with disabilities are more likely to face discrimination than other women, or men with disabilities. Public transportation and the majority of schools and offices are not adapted for easy access by persons with disabilities. More often than not, homes of persons with disabilities are not adapted for their convenience. This puts near-unsurmountable barriers in the path to their leading active and productive lives.

3.1.14. Persons living in the Seam Zone

Some 11,000 individuals live in 12 Palestinian communities between the Barrier and the Green Line, inside the area Israel declared as the "Seam Zone". According to various estimates, when the Barrier is completed, 25,000 more Palestinians will be living in similar enclaves. Most residents over 16 years of age are obliged to apply for 'permanent resident' permits just to continue to live in their own homes, even if their homes, lands or sources of income have been in this area for generations. The imposed permit regime and loss of livelihood contributes to unemployment, poverty and even death in medical emergencies. Gender-disaggregated data on health, educational attainments, income and other indicators of human development are not available for this group. This makes specific targeting within this group difficult.

3.1.15. Refugees Living in Abject Poverty[160]

Refugees in Palestine are poorer than non-refugees, and have higher unemployment and fertility rates. Refugees account for 41.2% of the population of the oPt, of which 31.2% suffer from poverty.[161] A large percentage of these poor refugees are food-insecure and have to depend on food aid to survive. Many are unable to afford health and education services and have become highly dependent on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other aid agencies. Most refugees living in abject poverty do not own assets or capital and are thus highly susceptible to further deterioration in their circumstance should they be faced with any sort of emergency.

3.1.16. Refugees Residing in Camps

While there are overlaps between refugees living in abject poverty and refugees residing in camps, a distinct set of issues emerge for refugees residing in camps. Palestinian refugees in camps live in extremely poor living conditions, with inadequate and poor sewage and water networks, chronic poverty, unemployment, over-crowding and occasional Israeli military incursions.[162] The state of

service delivery is far poorer than in the rest of Palestine. Areas close to camps like Shu'fat and Tulkarm see frequent clashes with Israeli security forces. At the beginning of 2015 there were 228,560 refugees residing in 19 camps in the West Bank, and 560,964 refugees residing in eight camps in Gaza. Refugees residing in camps in the West Bank make up 24.3% of all registered refugees, while in Gaza, refugees living in camps constitute 41.6% of the total registered refugee population. [163]

3.1.17. Small-Scale Farmers, Non-Bedouin Herders & Fisher Folk

The occupation of Area C deprives the Palestinian economy of 63% of the agricultural resources of the West Bank. Systematic erosion of the agricultural productive base, particularly in Gaza, has deprived small-scale farmers and herders of their ability to produce adequate food. Products of small-scale farmers, non-Bedouin herders and fishermen are not competitive in local and international markets because of degraded land, shortage of water and lack of access to quality inputs. This increases their marginalization and impoverishment. This group is at a high risk of facing destitution on account of extreme weather events driven by climate change, increasing water shortage and ongoing land degradation. Agriculture, fisheries and forestry employ 7.4% and 8.8% of all employed men and women, respectively[164], and there are 111,310 farmers owning agricultural small-holdings in Palestine. The majority of women working in agriculture in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are likely to be unpaid family members.



3.1.18. Women Exposed to Gender-Based Violence

GBV includes intimate partner violence, forced and/or early marriage, physical assault, resource denial, psychological abuse, honour killings, sexual assault and rape. In 2011, 37% of women in Palestine who had "ever been married" (29.9% in the West Bank and 51.1% in Gaza) were exposed to GBV, along with 54% of "never married" women.[165] Among these women, only 0.7% sought support outside the home.[166] Further, women in East Jerusalem desist from getting Israeli police involved or seeking support of Israeli social affairs institutes for fear that it might imperil the entire family.

3.1.19. The Working Poor

The working poor are defined as those with vulnerable employment or employed persons living in households with incomes below the nationally-defined poverty line (based on real disposable income and referring to the nationally-defined real absolute poverty line).[167] Some are private sector employees who earn below-minimum wage and some are low-paid public employees subject to income shocks resulting from the fiscal crisis. The working poor also include Palestinians working in Israel and Israeli settlements who pay brokerage fees and lack entitlements. The minimum wage is NIS 1,450 per month and teachers in the public sector receive between NIS 2,500 and NIS 5,000[168] per month. Teachers working in nurseries and in private schools earn monthly wages as low as NIS 400. Private sector salaries are affected by the continuous decline in economic growth. Moreover, 38.9% of wage employees in the private sector received less than NIS 1,450 in the second quarter of 2016.[169] Poor women workers in the garment and textile industries, where there is a significant gap in wages between women and men, also fall into this category.[170]

3.1.20. Youth (Aged 15–29)

Palestinian youth face economic and social hardships directly linked to restrictions imposed by the occupation, high unemployment rates (much higher for young women than young men) and lack of influence on decisions that affect their lives. They are economically and socially marginalized, have few productive outlets for their energy and are at a high risk of self-destructive behaviour and negative influences. The social, economic, and political marginalization facing youth and the lack of appropriate leisure time activities and spaces for youth negatively influence their psychosocial wellbeing and their hopes for the future. Youth in East Jerusalem suffer additional challenges to their identity formation including lack of contact with youth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Youth (15-29 year olds) account for 1,440,000 individuals and 30% of the 2016 Palestine population.[171] Of them, 37% are adolescents aged 15-19 and 63% are young adults aged 20-29.[172] The youth population is projected to reach 1.9 million in 2030.[173]

The presentation of 20 disadvantaged or vulnerable groups in Palestine sets the stage



for a discussion about why some groups in Palestine may be more vulnerable than others. What explains why one group's trajectory is more troubled than that of others? How can one distinguish between the symptom of a problem and the cause of the problem itself? These questions need answers in order to reverse the trends successfully and sustainably. The answers may also unlock the potential of a wide range of disadvantaged groups well beyond this particular list of 20. They can also guide development partners of Palestine, like the UN, to strategic areas of support and cooperation with the government that will have a significant impact on a cross-section of Palestinians.

As has been underlined in earlier chapters, the occupation touches the lives of all Palestinians. The different structural drivers of vulnerability outlined in subsequent pages are tied to the nature of the military occupation to differing degrees: in some cases almost entirely, to the point of being indistinguishable (such as the impact of location or residency of people on their vulnerability profile), in others to a considerable extent (such as the impact of exposure to violence on vulnerability) and in others still to only a limited degree (such as sociocultural factors and their impact on vulnerability). The following chapters on the drivers of vulnerability are sequenced in this way – from the least to the most distinguishable from the effects of occupation or from more to less influence vis-à-vis the government's development interventions.





CHAPTER 4

Locational Drivers of Vulnerability

Where people live within the oPt is central to understanding patterns of vulnerability and disadvantage. Geography in this context is almost more a political than a physical construct, as it refers to locations that are created and defined by the occupation. Location also determines who has jurisdiction on delivery of basic services, who the duty bearers are, and thus the quality of service delivery. Israel as the occupying power and a State party to core international human rights conventions is obliged to ensure that Palestinians are able to exercise their rights, including their right to freedom of movement. The State of Palestine also has obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights treaty standards throughout the oPt. The analysis that follows focuses on the West Bank's Area C, Hebron's H2 area, the Seam Zone, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip to demonstrate how specific groups living in these areas are systematically left behind, obstructed in their access to essential services and work and unable to live normal lives.

Locational drivers of structural disadvantage overlap greatly with economic drivers of disadvantage and with exposure to violence; communities living in the five areas identified above typically face greater constraints in earning livelihoods and higher exposure to violence.

4.1 Area C Communities

Area C[174] covers approximately 60% of the West Bank. Israeli settlements, military zones, nature reserves, and the land behind the Barrier comprise 70% of it. Around 300,000 Palestinians live in 532 residential areas that are wholly or partially located in Area C,[175] which is also home to an Israeli settler population of at least 375,500 living in 125 settlements and 100 outposts.[176] The expansion of settlements and related activities in Area C includes expropriation of land, demolition of houses, confiscation and destruction of property, expulsion of Palestinians, and the construction of bypass roads, all of which change the physical character and demographic composition of the oPt.[177] Area C is under Israeli civil and military control. However, the PA provides health and education services for the Palestinian population living in Area C.

Palestinian movement within and out of Area C is restricted by a complex system of physical and administrative measures. These include checkpoints, roadblocks, segregated transportation routes, limits on access to agricultural land and water resources and the Barrier itself, an Israeli spatial planning regime and permit system. Collectively these restrict Palestinian land and housing rights, freedom of movement, rights to water, sanitation, education and health care. They also impair the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver relief. These restrictions affect some groups more severely than others.

Bedouin and herder populations often live in very isolated areas with few internal roads and public transportation. In 2013, a total of 30,171 individuals resided in 183 Bedouin and herding groups in Area C.[178] These groups are often at risk of forced displacement by Israeli authorities and face persistent restrictions on their movement and access to resources. Taking livestock out to pasture is forbidden in some rural areas near Jericho and the Jordan Valley.[179] In the past, some Bedouin communities like Al Azazmeh in Masafir Bani Naim might have travelled 15 to 20 km in search of better pastures, depending on the season. Now they can only move within a range of one or two km around the village. This increases the risk of degradation of


Key Figures	
Area C	60% of West Bank territory; Est. 300,000 Palestinians and at least 375,500 Israeli settlers; 1% of the land is allowed for Palestinian construction
Hebron H2	600,000 Palestinians; Over 120 physical obstacles established by the Israeli military
East Jerusalem	70 km^2; Palestinians represents 40% of the total population of the city
Seam Zone	Expected to include an est. 11,000 Palestinians, if the Barrier is completed according to plan, with aproximately 9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the former Israeli-Jordanian no-man's land isolated.
Gaza	1.9 million Palestinians, 61% youth unemployment, 47% food insecurity, 70% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.

the land from overgrazing (with a loss of biodiversity), and in turn further stresses the livelihoods of herder communities.

Small-scale farmers and livestock herders, especially those living in Area C, have limits on their access to equipment, markets and inputs, including land and water for irrigation. These limits, together with expansion of settlements and urban expansion that eats into agricultural land, have reduced Palestinian access to cultivable land and also the productivity of land that is cultivated.[180] Agricultural land is also affected by land degradation due to lack of proper tending, discharge of wastewater into nearby *wadis* and release of solid domestic and industrial waste from settlements onto Palestinian lands.

The Israeli planning and zoning restrictions in Area C make it difficult for Palestinians to obtain the permits from the ICA required to build or rehabilitate their homes, and other structures, including water wells. Between




AREA C IN WEST BANK | AUGUST 2016
OCHA
Palestinian Community
International Border
Green Line
Barrier
Constructed / Under Construction
Planned
Israeli Closed Military Area
Israeli settlement outer limit, municipal boundary, outposts and land cultivated by settlers
Oslo Agreement
Area A
Area B
Area C
"Wye River" Nature Reserves
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarm
Nablus
Qalqiliya
Ramallah
Jericho
East Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Hebron
Dead Sea
0 5 10 20
Km

2010 and 2014, Palestinians submitted 2,020 applications for building permits; just 33 of these (1.5%) were approved.[181] Only one permit for house construction was approved in 2014 and there do not appear to have been any approved in 2015.[182] The permit restrictions severely restrict any kind of spatial planning in Area C resulting in systematic de-development of the area. About 50% of Bedouin and herder communities living in Area C have no access to piped water and 41% of Bedouin families do not have a source of electricity compared to 1% in the rest of the West Bank.[183] Some use generators, although this is an economic burden many cannot afford.[184] Small-scale farmers are also affected by the lack of efficiency in water pumping and immense water waste.

Communities in Area C that build without permits risk having the structures they built demolished. Between 1988 and 2014, the ICA issued 14,087 demolition orders against Palestinian-owned structures located in Area C of which 2,802 orders had been executed as of the end of December 2014, 1% (151 orders) were revoked and the remaining 11,134 demolition orders were outstanding as of January 2015 (amongst which 2,454 orders are on hold due to legal proceedings).[185]

Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley, in southern Hebron in proximity to settlements, and in villages not recognized by Israel are often targeted for repeated demolitions and displacement. In 2012, the Israeli government announced several plans to displace Palestinian villagers in the southern Hebron hills and Jordan Valley for "military training exercises".[186] Around 7,000 Palestinian Bedouins and herders reside in 46 small residential areas in the hills to the east of Jerusalem and in the central West Bank.[187] Many of them may be at risk of forcible transfer due to a "relocation" plan advanced by the Israeli authorities.

Cumulatively, these circumstances undermine the right of affected Palestinians to an adequate standard of living and hamper the development of a viable Palestinian economy.

Residents of Area C, particularly those living in areas located close to settlements, the Barrier, or in closed military areas, face restricted access to health services. Access to basic social services is also hindered by lack of transportation, infrastructure and health care facilities or by violence by Israeli security forces and settlers. Those groups that




are most affected by poor access to health services are women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities. Women are most vulnerable during pregnancy, childbirth and newborn care, while sick children and infants may also need emergency care at night. The elderly, chronically ill and disabled depend on others for access. More than half of the 101 communities that are totally within Area C have significant difficulties accessing primary and emergency health services.[188] In the West Bank, 117 communities primarily in Area C have no access to primary and secondary health care services.[189]

Movement restrictions in Area C also affect children attending school, working individuals and those in need of health and other services outside their communities. In 2014, more than 1,700 children in 37 localities in Area C had to walk five km or more to school. Around 2,500 children are forced to cross military checkpoints to reach school on a daily basis.[190] For the most isolated communities, journeys to and from school can take three or four times longer than they should. Transport costs are unaffordable for many marginalized and poor families.[191] In 2015, around 10,000 children were learning in tents, caravans and tin shacks that provided no protection against heat or cold. About 50,000 children enrolled in 183 schools in Area C do not currently have access to education because of a lack of schools and perceived risks on the way to and from school.[192]

4.2 Inhabitants of Hebron H2

In the zone of Hebron H2, over 6,000 Palestinians live in restricted areas, neighbourhoods adjacent to the settlements that include the bulk of Hebron's Old City.[193] Over 120 physical obstacles, including 18 permanently-staffed checkpoints established by the Israeli military, segregate the restricted areas in Hebron H2 from the rest of the city and restrict Palestinian movement in these areas.[194] Several streets in the restricted areas that lead to the Israeli settlements are closed to Palestinian traffic and pedestrian movement. Palestinians living in the restricted areas of Hebron H2 face serious challenges in accessing water and sanitation facilities and services. Water tankers are unable to reach many households, denying people a main coping mechanism during water shortages. Poor water and sanitation infrastructure compound the problems from poor services.





Children and teachers' ability to access schools in the Old City is hampered by checkpoints, arbitrary detention, settler harassment, threats and attacks on schools. In Hebron H2, 6,791 girls and 4,538 boys attend 29 schools.[195] Approximately 37% (4,200) of these students in Hebron pass through checkpoints on their way to and from school every day.[196] In 2015, 29 incidents of denial of access to education were recorded in H2, affecting 2,787 children.[197] Incidents included the arrest of children on their way to and from school, closure of schools as a preventive measure during Jewish holidays and harassment by settlers.

Access to adequate housing is also restricted in the Old City of Hebron. Israeli policies in the Old City have pushed many Palestinians out by denying them free access to their neighbourhoods. Palestinians encounter daily difficulties in rehabilitating cultural heritage assets including deteriorating housing units. According to a survey conducted in the Old City of Hebron and its vicinity in 2014, a total of 1,105 abandoned residential units (33% of the total residential units) in the Old City are in need of restoration.[198] In addition, cultural heritage assets and resources are under threat of demolition and abandonment.

Access restrictions and threats of violence have impaired the economy of H2. Much commercial activity has ceased and thousands of Palestinians have been displaced in the Old City and from areas near settlements. By 2007, 77% of Palestinian businesses (1,829) had closed and 42% of Palestinian housing units (1,014) had been vacated, with thousands of Palestinians displaced.[199] Poverty is rampant. According to an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study of households in the restricted areas of the Old City undertaken in 2009, 86% of families live in relative poverty on only US$ 97 per person per month for food, clothes and all other living expenses.[200]

The right to healthcare in H2 of Hebron[201] is compromised by lack of health services including poor emergency services and primary health care, particularly for pregnant women and children, and a lack of psychosocial support services especially for children and youth affected by violent events.

4.3 Residents of East Jerusalem

Residents of East Jerusalem (an area of 70 km^2)[202] have been under the jurisdiction of the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem since 1967. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem hold the status of 'permanent residents' of Israel. Since the beginning of Israel's occupation, on average six Palestinians per week have had their residency rights revoked.[203] Difficult living conditions and numerous restrictions on every aspect of life are some of the factors forcing Palestinians to leave the city. The Palestinian community constitutes close to 40% of the total population in the city.[204]


Most Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem suffer from high density, poor living standards, deteriorating housing and inadequate public facilities and services. This can be attributed in part to the significant discrepancy in public services provided between East and West Jerusalem residents despite the fact that both East and West Jerusalem fall under the planning jurisdiction of the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem. The discrepancy in services is one of the most visible locational drivers of vulnerability in East Jerusalem.

Spatial planning has been used by various Israeli authorities to assert control over the city. The construction of Israeli settlements, by-pass roads, and the Barrier are all underpinned by a set of policies that include freezing the registration of land ownership in East Jerusalem and its environs.[205] This planning regime has impacted housing, availability and distribution of public or open spaces, mobility and accessibility and the availability of health and education facilities.[206]

Only 9% of the land in East Jerusalem is allocated for Palestinian use, while 26% of the land is confiscated for Israeli settlements. Some 29% of the land is designated as green areas for public use and 11% is without a plan.[207] Most of the land allocated for Palestinian use is already built on with a population density exceeding 300 persons per hectare. This leaves very little vacant land for further development. Obtaining a building permit is an arduous, complex and expensive process that can take many years. As a result, housing and land prices are high. This places a large financial burden on young families and those with limited income who have to live in the city to maintain their residency rights.

Health personnel in the six Palestinian specialized hospitals in Jerusalem who do not have Jerusalem residency must obtain permits to travel to work that must be approved every six months.[208] Since December 2006, Palestinian-produced and/or -imported pharmaceuticals into East Jerusalem have been subjected to permits from the Israeli Ministry of Health. This decision has affected the private sector pharmaceuticals industry in the West Bank and the financial position of East Jerusalem hospitals which are forced to buy more expensive Israeli-made and/or imported pharmaceutical products.

The chronic shortage of classrooms in East Jerusalem is the main reason why 5% of Jerusalemite children are not registered in school. School dropout rates (26% in the 11th grade and 33% in the 12th grade) are much higher in East Jerusalem than the rest of Palestine.[209] [210] Education in East Jerusalem is further impeded by a range of administrative and skill-related shortages worsened by the occupation.



In Focus: East Jerusalem Education System

The education system in East Jerusalem is fragmented and delivers service of varying, often lacking, quality. It consists of a complex arrangement involving the Municipality of Jerusalem, UNRWA, the Waqf*, private entities, and sakhneen** schools, without a coordinating body. The quality of education is further compromised by the low remuneration of teachers. Difficulties faced by teaching staff from the West Bank in accessing East Jerusalem due to permit restrictions also impede the delivery of quality education. Before the construction of the Barrier, up to 25% of the teachers employed by Waqf schools in East Jerusalem were West Bank ID holders. The scarcity of training opportunities also impairs the quality of education.***

Notes:

*Schools established in 1968-69 by the Islamic Makassad Society as a response to Israeli attempts to impose a new curriculum on Palestinian schools, later attached to the Jordanian Ministry of the Waqf and subsequently placed under the supervision of the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education.

**Sakneen schools are a special type of recognized unofficial schools considered 'for profit' schools. They are financed by the Israeli Ministry of education and run by a centralized administration.

***Education quality and equity in East Jerusalem, UNESCO and UNICEF 2013 (internal UN analysis).

Further, over 99,000[211] Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are isolated behind the Barrier in poor living conditions, completely detached from the city and neglected by the municipality. Despite holding Jerusalem residency status and paying the Jerusalem property tax (*arnona*), residents of these communities do not receive adequate municipal services. The water and sewage systems are overburdened. Often people have to cross checkpoints to access services.

Women are particularly vulnerable as they are responsible for their own access to these services, as well as for children and the elderly. The security situation is in dire straits. Israeli police have almost completely suspended operations in these areas except during 'security incidents', while the Palestinian police are prohibited from operating there, leading to a security vacuum. Conditions are particularly dire in the Shu'fat refugee camp even though it is within the Barrier.

In Focus: Conditions in Shu'fat Refugee Camp


Shu'fat camp, located between the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods of Shu'fat, Anata, and the Israeli settlement Pisgat Zeev, is currently home to approximately 24,000 residents, just over half of whom are refugees registered with UNRWA. It lies on the 'West Bank side' of the Barrier so that residents holding Jerusalem IDs still have to pass through a checkpoint to access Jerusalem.

The camp has poor access to municipal services, poor and deteriorating living conditions, a problem of solid waste disposal, high rates of crime, and recurrent violence and protection threats. It has become dangerously overcrowded and lacks a proper plan to accommodate the increasing population adequately and safely. The rapid growth of the camp population, together with the inability of the camp to expand outside its original borders, has led to unauthorized 'vertical' construction. The original housing units built by UNRWA in 1965, which have foundations designed to hold two floors, now reach between three and six floors. UNRWA does not administer the camp. Since it is outside the Barrier, there is little to no oversight on construction. Makeshift overhead electricity cables and water lines have been installed by residents, increasing security hazards. Many of the streets of the camp are narrow and inaccessible, preventing access to emergency and fire services.

With the camp under the effective control of the Jerusalem municipality, PA security forces have no jurisdiction in Shu'fat camp. Instead, responsibility for law enforcement rests with the Israeli authorities. Residents frequently complain of a lack of law and order, a rise in drug dealing and other illicit activities taking place openly. Clashes between Palestinian youth and Israeli forces manning the checkpoint occur frequently, often involving the use of tear gas, skunk spray and plastic-coated metal bullets.

Young people in East Jerusalem face issues of high unemployment, as well as unfair labour practices by Israeli businesses. The youth unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2016 was 39.5%.[212] Young men face the threat of being detained by the Israeli police and army personnel at checkpoints as well as within the Old City. Poverty rates are high in East Jerusalem: some 75.4% of Palestinian residents including 83.9% of Palestinian children live below the Israeli-defined poverty line.[213]

This results in many youth dropping out of school to work on farms, in family businesses, or to seek employment in Israel in order to help provide for their families.[214] Many Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, particularly youth above age 18, cannot afford to pay the Israeli social security taxes and therefore do not have any health insurance coverage, which restricts their access to health services.


THE BARRIER ROUTE IN WEST BANK | AUGUST 2016
OCHA
Governorate Boundary
Armistice Green Line
Constructed Barrier
Projected Barrier
Under Construction Barrier
Area Behind the Barrier
Area A
Area B
Nature Reserve
Area C
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarm
Nablus
Qalqiliya
Ramallah
Jericho
East Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Hebron
0 5 10 20
Km

4.4 Inhabitants of the Seam Zone

Some 11,000 individuals live in 12 Palestinian communities inside the Seam Zone.[215] Most residents over 16 years of age are obliged to apply for 'permanent resident' permits just to continue to live in their own homes. This permit is designated solely for the closed area: holders are prohibited from entering Israel, although they reside on the 'Israeli side' of the Barrier with no physical obstacle to prevent them from crossing the Green Line.[216]

Most Seam Zone communities lack basic health, education and other services including shops, obliging residents to pass through a checkpoint to reach workplaces and essential services and to maintain social relations with family and friends on the 'Palestinian side' of the Barrier. Their family members and friends, in turn, require the military-issued permits that all non-resident Palestinians need to enter these areas with the result that birthday parties, religious holidays and weddings have to be held on the 'West Bank' side of the Barrier. The entry of dairy products, meat and eggs is also restricted in the "Seam Zone" and service providers require permits to enter these areas.

The Barrier has not only affected access to agricultural land but its construction has also had serious effects on the environment. Excavations and land levelling have changed geographic features, destroyed water resources and biodiversity.[217] The Barrier obstructs the flow of surface water after heavy rains and leads to flooding of adjacent areas. Drainage pipes under the Barrier can get blocked by debris and Palestinians are not allowed to approach the Barrier to clear the debris.[218] Flooding can damage agricultural land through waterlogging and soil erosion.

4.5 Residents of Gaza

Recurring cycles of violence compounded by demographic pressures and the closure imposed by Israel has contributed to a dramatic de-development of Gaza. The latest escalation of hostilities, the third in seven years, was unprecedented in destruction and the number of lives lost. At least 2,257 people were killed, including 299 women[219] and 539 children.[220] Physical destruction impacted all aspects of personal, public and economic life. Over 60% of the housing stock incurred significant damage (nearly 18,000[221] homes were completely destroyed or rendered uninhabitable), as were service infrastructure (including water, energy, health, education facilities and governments buildings) and private sector facilities and assets. More than 180 of the 690 schools were damaged enough to need extensive repair and reconstruction. This delayed school for 475,000 children and contributed to long-term deterioration in the quality of the learning environment.[222] The effects of the escalation of hostilities in Gaza in 2014 were estimated at US$ 1.4 billion in damages and US$ 1.7 billion in economic losses.[223]

A substantial portion of the chronic disadvantages experienced by the 1.9 million Palestinians in Gaza can be attributed to the land, sea and air closure imposed by Israel since 2007, which severely restricts the movement of people and goods into and out of the Strip, affecting all aspects of their lives including their livelihoods, education and health. The closure, which entered its tenth year in June 2016, together with recurrent cycles of conflict and violence, has had a profound socioeconomic and psychosocial impact on people in Gaza. A child under age 10 has witnessed three rounds of hostilities (2008-2009, November 2012 and July-August 2014). Further, the closure has severely limited opportunities for economic development and resulted in GDP losses of 50%.[224] Restrictions on the movement of people have impaired access to employment and education opportunities and isolated Gaza from the rest of the world. Daily, the number of people leaving Gaza via Israeli-controlled Erez Crossing in the first five months of 2016 was 505 people. In the first five months of 2015, it stood at 449, more than double the same period of 2014 but less than 2% of the 26,000 daily crossings prior to September 2000 (the second intifada).[225]

Despite the Israeli disengagement and withdrawal of settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005, access restricted areas (ARA) continue to be maintained within the Gaza Strip. The extent where access is permissible by land remains unclear. Areas up to 300 meters from the perimeter fence are considered to be a 'no-go' area and up to 1,000 metres or more as 'high risk'. In the past year some farmers have been able to access their lands within

100 metres of the fence with the support of international organizations. Israel enforces a six-nautical-mile fishing limit along the entire coast although between April and May 2016, it extended the fishing area in the South of the Strip temporarily to nine nautical miles.[226]

Palestinians in Gaza are in dire need of sustainable water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) solutions. The water supplied by the Coastal Aquifer meets 96% of Gaza's requirements but at the cost of over-extraction. Besides, most of the water extracted is unfit for human consumption unless desalinated.[227] The aquifer could become unusable by the end of 2016 and irreparably so by 2020.[228] Eastern areas of the Gaza Strip, home to some 100,000 people, are entirely disconnected from any water network.

Wastewater and sewage treatments lack the appropriate infrastructure to respond to population growth. Some 90,000 CM of raw or partially treated sewage is released daily into the Mediterranean Sea, creating pollution, public health hazards and problems for the fishing industry.[229] About 23% of the Gaza population is not connected to the sewage network.[230] Without a sewer, residents depend on cesspits to dispose of their liquid waste. Overburdened with regular emptying fees, many people living in the area end up discharging their sewage into nearby agricultural lands. This creates large ponds of sewage that pose a serious threat to the residents of the neighbourhood, particularly children.[231]



Restrictions on construction materials, water pumps and other key items into Gaza make it virtually impossible to develop Gaza's WASH sector. Water consumption is severely reduced in Gaza where 95% of the population may now be at risk of water-borne diseases and 68% of the water is deemed unfit for consumption.[232] The price of water purchased from private vendors is prohibitive and many vulnerable households in Gaza end up spending up to a third of their income on water.[233]

The decimation of Gaza's economy has resulted in high unemployment rates, poverty and food insecurity. Per capita income levels and wage rates have diverged from those of the West Bank's over time, especially since 2007. The unemployment rate in Gaza in the second quarter of 2016 stood at 41.7%,[234] the highest in the world, and youth unemployment at 61% in 2015.[235] Around 60% of Gazans are food-insecure. Nearly 80% of Gaza's population receives some form of international aid, the bulk of which is food assistance.[236]

Together with very high unemployment rates, youth suffer from economic, cultural and social exclusion and mental health problems such as depression. As a result, youth are at a high risk of self-destructive behaviour and unsafe migration. A recent survey shows that 60% of young people, especially single males in Gaza, are thinking of leaving Gaza.[237]

After the escalation of hostilities in 2008-2009, households reported a rise in expenditures on psychosocial health as high as that for food and water. Lower education levels, economic insecurity and unemployment, large family sizes and overcrowding may also add to the vulnerability of the poor to mental disorders and mental health needs.[238,239,240]

Patients in need of referrals for tertiary medical care are particularly vulnerable since such care is limited within Gaza and restrictions hinder the movement of patients and their companions to Palestinian health facilities outside Gaza. The Gaza closure inhibits health professionals from Gaza from attending training courses abroad, restricting necessary improvements to health care services in Gaza. Obtaining a permit from Israeli authorities to exit Gaza is a complex process that can result in health care being denied for 'security' reasons, or delayed, both of which violate patients' right to health. Patients who are delayed or denied access to specialized medical services found outside Gaza may suffer deterioration in their health status.[241] In 2015, 22.5% of over 22,000 patients from Gaza who sought a permit to exit Gaza from Erez checkpoint were denied or delayed.[242]

The proportion of patients' permit applications from Gaza that were denied or delayed increased from 10.2% in 2011 to 22.5% in 2015[243] and 30.69% for the first six months of 2016 even though the absolute number of approvals has increased.[244]

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Addressing the locational drivers of vulnerability could contribute to progress on a number of SDG targets. However, short of lifting the occupation, the influence of development policy makers on sustainably addressing the underlying vulnerabilities and disadvantage that come with place of residence in the Palestinian context is limited. For instance, to meet SDG1, target 1.4 and ensure "equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land" would require offsetting the structural disadvantages of groups such as the Bedouins and herders and small-scale farmers and livestock herders in Area C, residents in Area C, inhabitants of H2, residents of East Jerusalem and residents of Gaza.

To alleviate these vulnerabilities in the short term at least, greater resources need to be allocated to people living with such acute vulnerability. Mitigating measures that can be promoted, include reducing the 'dual use' list in Gaza to gaining more construction permits for people living in Area C, recognizing that these are not a substitute for long-term solutions that will truly enable the full development potential of the communities in these areas.



CHAPTER 5

Violence as a Driver of Vulnerability

Violence and its threat is a constant presence in the lives of the majority of Palestinians living in the oPt. It permeates their public and private lives and profoundly shapes the Palestinian psyche. Some groups are more exposed to threats of violence than others and different groups internalize the threat and experience of violence differently. In some cases opportunities are forgone for fear of violence. In other cases choices are restricted and human rights violated through the perpetration of violence. And in yet other cases victims turn into victimizers perpetuating the cycle of violence. The pervasiveness of violence in the oPt is a key driver of vulnerability for 18 of the 20 disadvantaged groups analysed for this report.

Various forms of violence pose a direct threat to Palestinians right to life, liberty and security of person. The indirect effects of violence include dampening of the investment atmosphere, impairment of the ability of small businesses to operate, losses of wages and livelihoods, lowered productivity and costs of medical treatment. Violence creates a public health crisis and can drive mental health challenges. Children deprived of adequate quality education on account of violence have poorer income and health outcomes throughout their lives.

This chapter explores the various ways violence constrains the lives and development potential of Palestinians. In doing so, it looks at both victims and perpetrators of violence. The discussion is divided into two sections: Political Violence and Social Violence.

5.1 Political Violence

Political violence here refers to (i) violence where the state or its institutions are a party and (ii) violence where all parties are non-state actors but are motivated by political reasons or have political factors enabling them. In cases like the escalation of violence in Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank in October 2015, this distinction is more difficult to make. Israeli military and security forces perpetrated numerous acts of violence as did members of the Palestinian security forces. However, they were also targets of knife attacks by individuals. There were also several instances of attacks by Israeli and Palestinian civilians against each other.

5.1.1 Violence Perpetrated by the State and its Institutions

Both Israeli and Palestinian security forces are among the parties that engage in violence against Palestinians. The impact of such violence goes beyond those directly affected and their families. The mere threat of violence by security forces can cause people to desist from going out into public spaces, engaging fully in their day to day activities, and seeking assistance from police and other state institutions to address the violation of their rights in private spaces.

5.1.1.1 Israeli Security Forces

Palestinians are exposed to multiple dimensions of violence in their engagements with the Israeli military and security forces as part of the apparatus of the occupation. Violence at checkpoints, clashes and search operations, arrests and detentions, demolitions, evictions, and forced displacement are among the chronic forms of violence experienced primarily in Area C, East Jerusalem and Hebron H2. In addition, there have been three escalations of hostilities, regular ground

Key Figures	
Palestinians killed in protests/clashes with the Israeli security forces in 2015	169 (including 34 children)
Palestinians injured in protests/clashes with the Israeli security forces in 2015	15,477
Israeli search operations and arrests in the West Bank in 2015	4,568
Palestinian children arrested by the ISF and prosecuted before military courts on security-related charges in 2015	>1,000
Women who were ever married reported being subject to GBV	37%

incursions and airstrikes in Gaza since 2007 resulting in widespread death, trauma, disability and destruction.

In 2015, 169 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were killed by Israelis, many of them while carrying out or reportedly carrying out attacks against Israelis.[245] That year, 25 Israelis were killed and 304 including 16 children were injured. Out of the Palestinian casualties, 34 Palestinian children were killed and 2,423 injured. Many of the deaths of Palestinian children took place in the context of protests and clashes with the Israeli security forces in which a total of 15,477 Palestinians were injured.[246]

In 2015, the Israeli military conducted 4,568 search and arrest operations in the West Bank (on average 88 per week), though not all of these were violent. The weekly average has decreased to 78 in 2016 (as of August).[247] There have also been regular incursions into Areas A and B. There were 56 incursions into Gaza in 2015.[248] In addition, Israel conducted 65 airstrikes in Gaza between January 2015 and May 2016, usually in retaliation against rockets fired from Gaza towards Israel.

The 194,000 Palestinian refugees who reside in the West Bank refugee camps[249] are particularly vulnerable to Israeli violence during clashes and search operations. From 2012 to 2014, 38 Palestinian refugees were killed (including 25 refugees from West Bank camps) and at least 1,410 Palestinian refugees were injured by Israeli security forces (including 1,302 from West Bank refugee camps).[250]

Male youth are more vulnerable to political violence as compared with their female counterparts and with other age groups. They are more likely to be targets of search and arrest operations and harassment at checkpoints as well as participants in clashes. Male youth are also more likely to participate in activities like protests and demonstrations that expose them to Israeli security forces.

During the escalation of violence in Jerusalem in October 2015, a number of Palestinian women were injured and killed, some allegedly in the course of carrying out knife attacks and car rammings. However, it was mostly boys and young men who were targeted for stop and search operations, detentions at the many ad-hoc checkpoints that had been established within the city, and search and arrests carried out in Palestinian neighborhoods, though women and girls are increasingly being stopped, searched and detained.

In 2015, more than 1,000 Palestinian children were arrested by Israeli security forces and prosecuted before military courts on security-related charges. That same year, the Government of Israel passed legislation that allows individuals (children and adults) to be jailed for up to 20 years for throwing stones. Some 422 children (414 boys and eight girls) aged 12-17 were held in Israeli detention for alleged security violations at the end of December 2015. This was the highest number of children recorded in military detention since March 2009.[251] Children detained by the Israeli military are often denied their rights. In many cases they are denied access to lawyers when being interrogated and even family members are not allowed to be present. The majority of these children are charged with throwing stones and about 75% of them report experiencing physical violence during arrest, transfer or interrogation.[252]

Humanitarian workers carrying out their protection duties are affected, as well. For example, during the escalation of violence in October 2015, UNICEF partners that accompany children to school in Hebron H2 had to pull out temporarily due to a closed military zone in the area.

5.1.1.2 Military Action Against Gaza

Apart from chronic, low-intensity violence, Gaza has faced three escalations in violence in recent years in which the sophistication and power of the Israeli military was directed at a densely-populated civilian urban area. As described earlier, the escalation of hostilities in 2014 took an immense physical and psychological toll on its residents. Even after the ceasefire, most of the public surveyed reported less than good health (62%) and low satisfaction with life (72%). Some 32% of respondents had a negative mental health status/well-being, 26% of respondents reported moderate to high levels of distress, and 51% reported moderate to severe insecurity.[253] Health infrastructure suffered serious damages: 87 health facilities suffered damage, including a hospital that was targeted and totally destroyed, 23 health care workers were killed (16 while on duty) and 83 were injured, the majority of them ambulance drivers. Several patients and visitors were killed when hospitals came under bombardment. Economic losses to the health sector exceeded US$ 149 million.[254]

Children living in the Gaza Strip are especially affected by Israeli military operations there, and the resulting deaths, injuries, disabilities, destruction of homes and livelihoods, and lack of access to services. During the escalations in July and August 2014, 2,257 people, including 539 children aged 10 days to 17 years were killed, 2,956 children (1,938 males and 1,018 females) were injured, 1,500 children were orphaned and 54,000 children became homeless.[255] Children in Gaza have also been injured and killed by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) after periods of conflict.

The three escalations of hostilities in Gaza have highlighted the failure of accountability for violations of international law, carried not only by Israel but also by Palestinian authorities. Impunity for IHL violations during the conduct of hostilities in Gaza as well as violations of rules of engagement during law enforcement operations is perpetuating the cycle of violence. The failure of duty-bearers to ensure accountability creates a climate of impunity which perpetuates and furthers violence and violations of human rights.[256]



In Focus: Gaza 2 two years on

During the 51 days of hostilities in July 2014, over 2,220 people were killed, of which 1,460 are believed to be civilians, including 11 United Nations (UN) personnel. Another 11,231 people were injured, of whom 899 people were permanently disabled. Children accounted for more than a quarter of all deaths and a third of those injured. Half a million people – or 28% of Gaza's population - were displaced due to the fighting, and even as hostilities subsided, over 18,000 families - 100,000 people - were unable to return as their homes had been heavily damaged or completely destroyed.

5.1.1.3 Palestinian Security Forces and Authorities

Palestinian security forces and authorities are generally not held to account for violations of international law.[257] Palestinian journalists and media organizations are specifically targeted by violations in regard to their freedom of expression.[258] The number of press violations by Palestinian authorities in 2015 (192, 116 in the West Bank and 76 in the Gaza Strip) was 68% higher than in 2014. Seventeen types of violations were reported, the most common being summoning and interrogation, arrests, physical assaults, detentions and denial of coverage. These accounted for 77% of the total Palestinian violations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Several human rights organizations have raised concerns over the detention and torture of political prisoners in Palestinian jails and the use of force and violence inflicted by Palestinian security forces on the public during protests, demonstrations and clashes[259]

In the West Bank a number of cases of human rights violations, particularly against perceived political opponents and activists, have been documented. These included the use of vague and overly broad laws as a basis for detention, non-compliance with court orders for release, the use of the executive powers of the governor to detain on an administrative basis and non-compliance with time limits for court appearances prescribed by law.[260] Mass arrests of individuals with alleged links to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in particular students, were reported in the first and third quarters of 2015.[261] The Independent Commission for Human Rights registered 194 complaints of torture and ill-treatment, which are prohibited by law, between November 2014 and October 2015 in the West Bank. Around 6% of youth in the West Bank reported experiencing modest physical violence by a Palestinian security official; 5.4% reported psychological violence.[262]

Due process violations including arbitrary arrests, as well as torture and ill-treatment by security forces, have been reported in Gaza as well. The Independent Commission for Human Rights registered over 708 complaints of arbitrary detention and violations of due process guarantees, and 462 allegations of torture or ill-treatment in Gaza between November 2014 and October 2015.[263] Widespread human rights violations were recorded in Gaza by the de-facto authorities during the 2014 war and after. During the war, members of Palestinian armed groups were alleged to have summarily executed at least 21 "collaborators". The de facto authorities in Gaza imposed the death penalty on several occasions without due judicial process. Further, summary extra-judicial executions of suspected collaborators took place during each of the last three wars.[264] The atmosphere of legitimized state violence in Gaza is taking a toll, particularly on its youth who, faced with little hope for the future, are at increasing risk of radicalization. Hamas and other radical factions are responsible for the most explicit and widespread forms of incitement.[265]

5.1.2 Violence Perpetrated by Individuals

It is sometimes difficult to separate incidents of violence involving agents of the state with those involving civilians since security personnel, usually the police, can become involved in conflicts among civilians. Usually, these incidents are initiated by civilian individuals against other individuals. These include settler violence against Palestinian civilians and stone throwing, car ramming and knife attacks by Palestinians against Israelis during the recent escalation of violence and shooting of Palestinians by Israeli civilians during the same period.

5.1.2.1 Settler Violence

Nine out of the 20 vulnerable groups reviewed for this report were highly vulnerable to settler violence.[266] These are individuals who live or work in Area C, especially Bedouin and herder communities, small-scale farmers and non-Bedouin herders, people living in the Seam Zone, Hebron H2 area and Old City of Jerusalem, children facing obstacles in accessing schools or exposed to violence, adolescent girls, and youth. Most of these groups also face home demolitions, evictions and forced displacement as a result of Israeli settlement policies in areas near their homes.

Due to the proximity of Israeli settlements to their communities, Palestinian communities in Area C, H2 and the Seam Zone are often victim to violence and intimidation including arson and vandalism by settlers. Violence

during olive harvest season results in lower productivity and impairs a vital traditional economic activity of Palestinians. Small-scale farmers, especially those living in Area C, face violence and harassment while tending to their land and trees from Israeli settlers. Conditions are worsened by the lack of law enforcement and accountability as the rule of law is often disregarded in favour of the territorial interests of settlements. Between 2005 and 2014, 91% of settler violence investigations were reportedly closed due to investigatory failures on the part of police.[267] A complaint submitted by a Palestinian to the Israel police has a less than 2% chance of leading to an investigation, trial and conviction[268] despite the fact that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations obliges an occupying power to take all the measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.

Two-thirds of the Bedouin and herder communities living in the central West Bank reported facing settler violence over the past three years.[269] In addition to physical violence, settler groups are petitioning the Israeli High Court to enforce the state's implementation of pending demolition orders against Bedouin structures and ICA plans to transfer the Bedouins.

Over the years, settlers in the H2 area of Hebron have routinely abused the city's Palestinian residents, sometimes using extreme violence. The rare Palestinian complaint filed with Israeli police is frequently closed.[270] The impact of settler harassment and violence on communities, families and individuals include physical injuries and insecurity, psychosocial distress, impeded access to education and services, loss of livelihoods and risk of displacement.

Settler violence and assault have also been identified as one of the primary challenges affecting access to education in vulnerable communities, impacting children including children facing obstacles in accessing schools. In some cases such as in Beit'ur Al Fauqa, the settlement is located directly next to the school. The most frequently reported types of settler violence include settlers throwing stones and Palestinian children being physically pushed around or stopped on the street. Settlers at times also set up their own checkpoints, causing panic amongst children, long delays and preventing them from going to school at all.

5.1.2.2 Palestinian Attacks Against Israelis

Attacks by Palestinian civilians against Israeli security forces and civilians have had a significant impact on the security atmosphere in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, particularly since the last quarter of 2015. Some 25 Israelis, most of them civilians, were killed and 304 injured (227 of them civilians) in 2015[271] due to knife attacks and incidents of car ramming. The attacks were not coordinated and were carried out by individuals, mostly youth and polarized by the atmosphere, creating fear and distrust. Most of the attackers were killed on the spot and the few that survived sustained grave injuries. Punitive demolitions of the family homes of alleged perpetrators took place in many cases. This presents a disturbing trend where young men and women, in some cases boys and girls, many without prior history of politicization, engaged in attacks knowing that death was almost inevitable.

The atmosphere of bitterness, distrust and hopelessness was deepened by alleged incitement to violence on the Palestinian side and alleged excessive use of force by Israeli security forces, which was encouraged by statements by senior officials and politicians.[272] There have been numerous incidents of stone throwing at Israeli vehicles, most of them carried out by young boys.

5.2 Social Violence

Social violence refers to violence inflicted on Palestinians by other Palestinians that is not driven directly by political factors. Such violence can occur within the public or private sphere, within households, schools, work places and communities. As in other societies, social violence can be partly attributed to patriarchal sociocultural norms, parenting and teaching styles and intergenerational dynamics prevailing in Palestinian society (see Chapter 8). Poverty, political fragility and loss of hope can also contribute to social violence. Chronic political violence engenders anger, frustration, humiliation and hopelessness that can result in physically or socially stronger individuals and groups engaging in acts of violence against weaker and more vulnerable individuals and groups.[273] Political violence also normalizes the use of violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution. Those most affected

include women, children, youth, persons with disabilities and the elderly.

Unlike political violence, social violence even in public spaces tends to be more diffuse. And its perpetrators not as clearly differentiated from its victims. The same person may be a victim and a perpetrator at various stages of his or her life cycle. It is useful therefore, to examine the different forms of social violence by the domain where it takes place. This section analyzes the impacts of social violence in Palestine within the household, in schools and workplaces and within the community.

5.2.1 Domestic Violence

Six of the 20 analysed vulnerable groups, specifically women exposed to GBV, children, adolescent girls, youth, persons with disabilities and the elderly are highly vulnerable to domestic violence.[274] They are also vulnerable to other types of social violence.

While GBV[275] could take place in both private and public spaces, it is particularly common within households. GBV is a key protection concern in the oPt, especially for females. Exposure to GBV can have severe consequences for the physical, sexual, and psychological health and wellbeing of women exposed to it, threatening life in extreme cases. As elsewhere, victims of GBV in Palestine often suffer shame, fear of blame, social stigma and reprisals from both family and community. Additionally, limited support services are available and are highly inaccessible to women, as a result of long distances, mobility restrictions and fragmentation of areas and services. The social groups most vulnerable to GBV include girls under the age of 15, female adolescents, elderly women and females with disabilities.[276]

Some 37% of women in the oPt who were ever married reported being subject to one or more forms of GBV (29.9% in the West Bank, 51.1% in Gaza Strip) including physical assault, psychological abuse, intimate partner violence, sexual assault and/or rape, forced and/or early marriage, and resource denial.[277] The exposure to violence among ever-married women is associated with their socioeconomic conditions. The percentage of ever-married women who were exposed to physical violence at least once during the previous year was higher among women with lower education (33.1% among women with elementary education versus 43.3% of women with preparatory education and 33.8% among women with secondary and higher education). The percentage of ever-married women who were exposed to violence in general at least once during the previous year was higher among women outside the labour force (38.1% versus 25.7% among women in the labour force).[278] GBV against women has increased in the Gaza strip since the last war.[279] Negligence and emotional abuse by parents was the most common type of domestic violence reported by children, followed by physical abuse.[280] Adolescent girls are often exposed to family and societal control and violence from their male relatives. Some 69% of females aged 12-17 were exposed to psychological abuse and 33% were exposed to physical violence by their fathers.[281]

5.2.2 Violence in Schools and Workplaces

Children and persons with disabilities are most vulnerable to exposure to violence and bullying by teachers and fellow students in schools. One-third of all male students aged 12-17 reported that they had experienced violence from teachers (28% reported psychological violence during the previous year and 21% reported physical violence).[282]

Palestinian youth are exposed to violence from their peers or supervisors at university. Some 9% of 18-29 year olds faced psychological violence and 4.2% of them physical violence at educational institutions. Male youth were more likely to be victims than women.[283]

Children in labour, youth, people with disabilities, Hebron H2 residents and the working poor are also highly vulnerable to workplace violence. With child labour increasing in the Gaza strip particularly older children (see 3.4.1 Children in Labour), working children are especially vulnerable to workplace violence and abuse.

5.2.3 Violence in Communities and Other Public Spaces

Children, youth, and persons with mental disabilities are more likely than others to experience violence in communities and public

spaces. Male children and youth who are school dropouts and/or are involved in child labour are at an increased risk of exposure to violence from other male children, youth or older adults in the streets and in public places in their communities. Many of these children end up out of school in light of few national programs designed to adequately cater for their needs. Women were likely to face violence from those in positions of power – some 4% of women who were ever married faced psychological violence by service providers and other individuals while receiving health and social services.

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Reducing all forms of violence and upholding the rule of law are essential components of the 2030 Agenda (SDG 16), which is cognizant of the links between poverty, fragility, weak institutions and violence. Addressing social violence, specifically violence against women, will lead to the achievement of SDG Goal 15 target (15.3) to "eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres". To address violence, it is essential for development policy-makers to design tools to tackle violence related to the occupation separately but in conjunction with addressing violence perpetrated within Palestine itself, be it by the security forces or within communities.

To protect the most vulnerable from violence experienced by the occupation, additional efforts must be made in the areas of monitoring, advocacy and protection. Within Palestine, efforts must continue to strengthen national institutions to prevent violence, enhance transparency, promote rule of law and accountability and ensure access to justice for all, especially in the context of Palestine's accession to the core human rights treaties. Development can only flourish to its full potential when there is peace and when citizens can live without fear.





CHAPTER 6

Economic Drivers of Vulnerability

documented the negative impact of occupation on the Palestinian economy as seen in an impaired Palestinian private sector, a dampened investment atmosphere and de-development of many sectors of the economy. This, in turn, has contributed to high levels of unemployment, underemployment and inequality.[284] The occupation, however, is not the only economic driver of vulnerability in Palestine. In reviewing the vulnerable groups identified for this study, a range of additional economic factors emerged that appear to contribute heavily to patterns of disadvantage and vulnerability among at least 17 of the 20 groups analysed.

Poverty, inequality in economic opportunity and high dependency rates, exacerbated by limited employment opportunities as well as increasing environmental constraints on livelihoods, are some of the key underlying economic drivers of vulnerability. Individually and combined, these structural factors lead to a number of groups being highly vulnerable and at much greater risk of losing development gains than other groups.

These economic drivers affect different groups differently. For instance, despite a general lack of employment opportunities, some individuals get relatively well-paid jobs within the government or international NGOs while others stay unemployed or work in poor conditions. Despite the declining quality of education, some Palestinians receive high quality education in some of the best universities in Palestine, Israel and abroad, while others drop out of school or complete higher education without skills relevant to the labour market. Economic drivers of vulnerability are also almost always both causes and consequences of human rights violations.

Three observations emerge from the analysis of these economic drivers of vulnerability. First, some economic drivers appear at first glance to be symptoms or manifestations of a structural disadvantage rather than a root cause. Such drivers include poverty and low labour-market participation rates of some groups. Each of these can be attributed to other structural factors such as the lack of access and availability of quality education and marketable skills (in the case of poverty) and sociocultural norms (for low labour-market participation by women). Yet these factors are also drivers of vulnerability in ways that cannot be explained solely by their underlying causes.

Second, the economic drivers identified above are interdependent. For instance, unequal access to employment opportunities and productive resources both contribute to poverty and to structural disadvantages of certain groups through channels other than poverty.

Third, there are large areas of overlap between the economic drivers of structural disadvantages and others such as the locational, sociocultural and institutional drivers of vulnerability examined in other chapters.

“Poverty, inequality in economic opportunity and high dependency rates, exacerbated by limited employment opportunities as well as increasing environmental constraints on livelihoods, are some of the key underlying economic drivers of vulnerability.”



6.1 Poverty

Poverty is a consequence of many structural factors including power imbalances, deprivation and discrimination that prevent an individual from enjoying an adequate standard of living and other attributes of human development. At the same time, poverty contributes to undermining a number of human rights such as the right to health, adequate housing, food and safe water. Some 25.8% of Palestinians (17.8% of the population of the West Bank and 38.8% of the population of Gaza) are poor.[285,286] Of these, 12.9% of Palestinians (7.8% of those in the West Bank and 21.1% of those in Gaza) are living in 'deep poverty'.[287]

For groups such as food-insecure female-headed households, poverty is the primary driver of vulnerability. Food insecurity in the oPt is associated more with lack of purchasing power (and physical access) than the non-availability of food.

For groups like the working poor and refugees living in poverty, poverty appears as a manifestation of other problems but can be self-perpetuating. The working poor are those in vulnerable employment or employed persons living in households with incomes below the nationally-defined poverty line.[288] In the oPt, the working poor include Palestinians working in Israel and Israeli settlements, single-headed households in particular those headed by single females, those in occupations such as teaching with very low wages, or where wages are actually below the minimum wage such as in the day-care sector.[289] Increasing rates of unemployment and high levels of economic exclusion particularly among women and youth make these groups more willing to accept poor working conditions and very low wages. This, in turn, inhibits their ability to access better education and healthcare and hence to access better quality jobs. The result is a structural disadvantage that can endure across generations.

For Palestinians relying on livelihoods other than formal sector jobs, the poverty trap perpetuates itself through lack of savings, assets, skills, access to finance and productive resources. The savings rate for the Palestinian economy is negative (-19.6% of GDP in 2015)[290] and the poor typically have lower savings rates than the affluent. In the absence of savings, the poor cannot acquire new assets, improve their livelihood tools or invest in better technology. In the absence of collateral, they do not have access to credit. Lack of savings associated with very low disposable incomes keeps small-scale farmers and livestock holders as well as Bedouin communities trapped in low-yield production and poverty. As a result, many of the poor in the oPt continue to be part of the humanitarian caseload for years.

Poverty not only implies economic deprivation but also increases vulnerability to violations of a range of human rights. For instance, the poor with disabilities and the elderly poor are far less likely to be able to afford care and support than their more affluent counterparts. Poverty and inequity of income distribution is associated with inequities in reproductive choices as well. The total fertility rate for the poorest quintile of Palestinians is five, while it is 3.3 for the richest quintile.[291] Higher fertility rates imply a larger number of children in the household, lower per capita income and limited access to education, health and other basic services. Families with lower fertility rates, thus a smaller number of dependents and more economically-active members, have higher income and possibly better access to education and health care.

Lack of sufficient income and assets also reduces an individual's ability to cope with shocks. An illness, accident, job loss or crop failure can take a family from the margins of poverty to destitution in a short time. Segments of refugees living in camps and Bedouin and herder communities in Area C live with these chronic risks. Even the working poor and other marginalized groups with limited assets and access to services struggle to cope with adverse shocks. The impact of shocks on such groups is often extended over time by the negative coping mechanisms they are forced to use. These could include sale of assets at unfavourable prices, withdrawing children from school and postponing or forgoing medical treatment. Families in East Jerusalem and Gaza who sell inherited real estate usually cannot purchase another house because of the tight real estate market in the two regions driven by housing shortage, difficulties in obtaining permits to build in East Jerusalem and shortage of land and construction material in Gaza. This leads to these families losing their primary physical asset.


Poverty is a driver of vulnerability for violations of the rights of children. There are clear economic causes for child labour. These include high rates of unemployment, slow economic growth, and poverty. Just over half of working children in the oPt are not attending school. The rest go to school and work after school or during vacations. In 2015, 15.5% of working children were not enrolled in education[292] and in the Gaza Strip, child labour is on the rise with the number of working 10-17 year olds having doubled in five years.[293]

Key Figures	
Palestinians living in poverty	25.8%
Poverty rate among refugees	31.2%
Poverty rate among non-refugees	21.8%
Food insecurity in Gaza	47%
Food insecurity in West Bank	16%
Dependency ratio	74.8%
Unemployment among youth (15-24 years)	40.7%

Poverty rates are also inextricably linked to other drivers of vulnerability. Poverty rates are higher in Area C, East Jerusalem, and Gaza where restrictions on freedom of movement have the greatest economic impact. Refugees living in refugee camps are usually poorer than those living outside the camps. Refugees in general tend to be poorer. Poverty rates among refugees in 2011 were 31.2% compared to 21.8% for non-refugees.[294] Higher rates of poverty among refugees is associated with higher rates of unemployment vis-à-vis non-refugees, in particular among women.

Figure 6.1: Unemployment Rate Q2 2016

In percent (%)



Source: PCBS, (2016).

In the second quarter of 2016, the unemployment rate among refugees stood at 34.1% compared to 22.1% among non-refugees. The unemployment rate among female refugees was 51.7% compared to 38.7% among female non-refugees.[295] Fertility rates and the proportion of persons within households aged less than 15 years are also slightly higher among refugees compared to non-refugees implying bigger families and thus greater dependency rates.[296]

Discriminatory legislation and cultural norms and traditions such as those governing the issues of inheritance, maintenance, property, decision-making and employment opportunities prevent women's economic empowerment and make them more vulnerable to poverty. In addition, the structural distortion of labour markets and the concentration of women in certain economic sectors are among the main reasons leading to the economic marginalization of women.[297] These issues are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8.

In tune with the SDG 1 target of implementing nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, the social safety net program of the MoSD has been expanding, starting with support for 42,000 poor households in 2004 and increasing to 122,000 families by 2014.[298] This indicates greater coverage but may also indicate increasing vulnerability. The probability of vulnerable Palestinians falling into poverty is high.[299] Palestine's social protection coverage targeting has been deemed among the best in the region and its unified beneficiary system is considered a regional best practice.[300] Complementing these efforts, the first ever Social Security Law for private sector workers and their family members was adopted by the Palestinian cabinet in February 2016.[301]

6.2 Inequality of Opportunity

Inequality of opportunity manifests itself in unequal access to productive resources and assets, unequal access to decent employment and an unequal burden of unpaid work. Inequitable distribution of income and wealth is driven at least in part by unequal distribution of economic opportunity. As a result, some groups are systematically at a disadvantage compared to others.

Unequal access to resources and assets can make some groups more vulnerable than others. For instance, households headed by women, and women in general, are often deprived of assets due to discriminatory inheritance laws. And lack of access to productive assets like livestock and agricultural land impacts women's economic self-sufficiency and food security. Increases in food prices have the greatest impact on low-income households. In 2014, food-insecurity levels reached 47% in Gaza and 16% in the West Bank. In the West Bank, 24.5% of households headed by women were food-insecure compared to around 15.3% of households headed by men, while in Gaza 49.6% and 46.1% of female and male headed households were food-insecure respectively.[302] Some 7.8% of food-insecure households headed by women own livestock, compared to 9.5% of food-insecure households headed by men. The disparity in access to productive assets is associated with disparities in income. The average monthly income for food -insecure households headed by women is 1,558.9 NIS (well below the deep poverty line) while the average monthly income for food-insecure households headed by men is 2,333.5 NIS (approx. US$ 621).[303] Lower access to assets, and hence collateral, for women also translates into lower access to formal sources of credit.

The link between low incomes and low access to credit affects small scale farmers and livestock herders, whose incomes are constrained by restrictions on movement and access to grazing land (see above).[304] The investment climate in the oPt is not conducive to enable agricultural cooperatives' to access capital and their lack of assets makes them unable to meet banks' requirements for finance. A Palestinian agricultural lending institution was recently established by the PA to assist farmers in accessing credit. Farmers in Gaza have no such mechanism or the benefits of agricultural insurance schemes. The



systematic erosion of the agriculture productive base, particularly in Gaza and Area C, deprives small-scale farmers and herders of their ability to produce food, turning most Palestinians into poor consumers of essential goods imported mainly from Israel and financed chiefly by donors.

For youth, economic hardship is directly linked to unequal access to productive resources and unequal access to decent work. Unemployment is a major driver of vulnerability for youth. In 2015, 40.7% of youth aged 15-24 years (36.4% of males and 60.8% of females) were unemployed compared to 25.9% of all persons above 15 years. The situation is worse in Gaza where 61.0% of 15-24 year olds (56.7% of males and 78.4% of females) were unemployed.[305] Consequently, poverty rates for youth are high: 27.4% of youth (15-29 years) lived under the poverty line in 2011 (19.2% in the West Bank and 40.9% in Gaza Strip).[306] The condition of youth is particularly strained in East Jerusalem, where 75.4% of families live in poverty as calculated against the Israeli poverty line[307] and 36% of children fail to complete a full 12 years of school.[308]

While some youth with low levels of schooling may access jobs in cash-for-work programmes, youth with degrees have even less access to jobs suitable for their education levels since there are fewer such opportunities. The unemployment rate among new graduates between 20 and 29 years that hold associate diploma certificates or higher in 2014 was 54.7% (42.3% in the West Bank and 69.5% in Gaza).[309] Moreover, vocational courses are often gendered ('masculine jobs') and not available for girls. This is exacerbated by social norms and expectations about what is an appropriate profession for a woman, outright excluding women from a number of professions. The transition period for obtaining a job for many youth is long, averaging 2.5 years. The long transition period risks de-skilling youth and affects their employability. Self-employment is not a preferred employment option among young Palestinians; almost 60% of self-employed youth indicated that they were self-employed only because they did not find wage employment.[310] In absence of a bankruptcy law, risk of losing personal assets if a business fails may discourage self-employment. The incidence of self-employment is particularly




limited among women, likely because of less access to the institutional infrastructure and productive resources necessary for entrepreneurship.

Unequal access to decent work is often associated with unequal access to the right networks and/or affiliation with political parties. While education and 'working hard' are seen as important for getting ahead, knowing the right persons, party affiliation and the like play a key role in securing an occupation, suggesting potential major hurdles to social mobility.[311] Young women are more affected by this than young men. These patterns are hardly unique to Palestine, but this makes them no less relevant to flag in this analysis.

Unequal burden of unpaid work is another factor that places some groups systematically at a disadvantage as compared to others. In the first quarter of 2016, 6.3% of employed persons were unpaid family members.[312] This does not include the burden of care work undertaken at home, primarily by women and girls. Women and youth are overrepresented among unpaid family members. Women are the dominant unpaid agricultural labour force. Rural communities living in area C, residents in the Seam Zone and residents in Gaza are particularly affected. Working children in the oPt also tend to be unpaid workers engaged in family-based agricultural labour. Working children also work in more hazardous environments and in highly vulnerable conditions.[313] For instance, in the Jordan Valley area children work in construction, pesticides, driving tractors, planting marijuana and sheepherding in areas that are considered dangerous.

Both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, women's labour force participation was much lower than men's.[314] Further, 68.6% of employed persons are wage employees (64.1% in the West Bank compared with 79.1% in Gaza Strip). Low labour market participation rates, together with the burden of unpaid work, imply that women are more financially dependent on others than men. It reduces their autonomy and their choices.

Figure 6.2: Labour Force Participation Rates: Q2 2016




Source: PCBS, (2016).

6.3 High Dependency Rates

A high dependency ratio in Palestine[315] together with very high unemployment is another critical driver of vulnerability. The dependency ratio in the oPt (74.8%) has been declining over time[316] but is still high compared to other Arab countries like Egypt (54.6% in 2011), Lebanon (48.5% in 2009) and Tunisia (44.2% in 2010).[317] While the declining dependency rate suggests that the burden on the productive population is decreasing, this is actually not the case. Given the very high unemployment rate, a large proportion of the potentially productive population in Palestine is not in fact productive. The ratio of the total population to the number of people employed or underemployed provides an indicator of the effective dependency rate in the economy. For Palestine, this ratio has declined since 2002 but has remained relatively stable at close to three since 2011 (Figure 6.3). This implies that on average three people depend on every person who is employed or underemployed.

Figure 6.3: Ratio of Population to Number of People Employed



Source: Estimated from PCBS data

At the household level a very high effective dependency rate manifests in large families[318] depending on the income of a single person. This not only implies a lower per capita income within the household but also that a shock such as a job loss, an illness or an injury to the breadwinner can drive an entire family into destitution within a very short time. If children are taken out of school and put into labour or medical expenses are deferred to cope with a shock, its effects persist long after the shock passes.

The informal system of care for the elderly compounds the problems of high effective-dependency rates in Palestinian families. An inadequate formal support system leads to reliance on traditional systems where the responsibility falls on families, usually women and girls, as the main source of care and support for elderly people. Some 78% of the elderly live in their own homes with other family members, 13% live in someone else's home and 9% live alone in their own homes.[319]

Absence of robust and inclusive economic growth is one of the primary drivers of high dependency rates. Labour market trends in the oPt over the past two decades reflect slow growth performance and employment growth has been insufficient to absorb the growing labour force. An estimated real annual growth rate of at least 8% (and 3% productivity growth) is needed to absorb new entrants and achieve reasonable unemployment and wage growth rates.[320] In the absence of robust economic activity and sufficient high-quality employment opportunities, returns to education tend to fall.

The increase in the size of the youth and working age population will put greater

pressure on the labour market over the coming years as new entrants to the labour market increase sharply until 2030. This may impact females, especially if they are considered a lower priority for the acquisition of jobs.

6.4 Environmental Threats

Environmental threats are undermining Palestine's economic potential and affecting different parts of the population to different degrees. The groups most affected are those that engage in climate-dependent livelihoods (agriculture, fishing, herding) and manual labour.

Consistent with global trends, there has been a warming of the weather in the MENA region since the middle of the 20th century, becoming more pronounced since the 1970s. This is evidenced by more frequent warm days and nights, higher extreme temperatures, fewer cold days and nights and cold spells of shorter duration. Changes in precipitation patterns are less consistent but are showing greater variability over both time and space.[321]

In Palestine, these changes are hurting the agricultural sector by reducing productivity and the economic viability of crops, the latter through shorter growing seasons. Land degradation and desertification is hurting agricultural productivity and making farmers more vulnerable to crop failure in the event of droughts.[322] Hotter weather and degraded soil have increased the water intensity of agriculture at the same time as per capita availability of water for Palestinians is declining due to falling water tables, a growing population and restrictions imposed by the occupation. Changes in weather patterns are




also associated with crop damage on account of floods, pests and pathogens. Ongoing loss of biodiversity is making it harder for the natural defences against these pests and pathogens.

Longer droughts pose a threat to livelihoods of herder communities in Area C that is compounded by restrictions on their movement imposed by the occupation. Given such restrictions, there is a significant threat of overgrazing in the areas where they do have access, degrading the land and trapping them in a downward spiral of vulnerability. Incomes of fishermen have also been compromised by the pollution of the sea off the coast of Gaza through the discharge of untreated sewage, and by over-fishing due to severe restrictions on how far the fleet can operate away from the coastline.

Agricultural output has been highly volatile over the last two decades (Figure 6.4). For the period 1994-2014, agricultural output (including agriculture, forestry and fishing) has been more volatile in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.[323] Further, output has not grown consistently over these two decades even as Palestine's population has grown by over 65% implying much higher demand for food.

Figure 6.4: Agricultural Output in Palestine



Source: PCBS. Includes Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

Palestine also stands at risk of catastrophic losses on account of natural calamities. Globally, weather-related disasters have increased in frequency and intensity.[324] The oPt is particularly vulnerable to floods and storms. Without enough adaptive infrastructure, flash floods have been disrupting lives and impairing livelihoods. In the West Bank in the last few years, storms and severe rains have added to agricultural losses, flooding and damages to existing poor infrastructure. With greater congestion in cities and unplanned build-up, a large proportion of Palestinians, in particular city-dwellers living in poverty, are becoming increasingly vulnerable to environmental disasters like earthquakes. Given the shortage of clean and affordable energy and very limited availability of water, a heatwave could also result in a public health emergency in Palestine.

Environmental threats are compounding the vulnerability of communities that are already marginalized, in part because they have the least capacity to pre-emptively cope with these threats. Remote communities with limited access to resources and services are especially vulnerable.

In a step towards taking stock of Palestine's contribution and vulnerability to climate change, the Government of Palestine is in the process of finalizing its first initial national communication report to be submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The report contains a Palestine greenhouse gases inventory, a national mitigation plan, a vulnerability assessment and the National Adaptation Plan. Sustaining the environment and building resilient communities features among the priorities of the new National Policy Agenda of the State of Palestine for 2017-2022.

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Understanding how uneven access to economic assets and opportunities explain the heightened vulnerabilities and disadvantage of some groups compared to others will be critical to any road map that seeks to 'leave no one behind'.

Recognizing the effect of poverty on food security, drop-out rates and coping strategies is essential for development programming to achieve SDG 1, Target 1.4 especially ("end poverty in all its forms"). Understanding how access to jobs, to assets, to capital and to markets plays a key role in alleviating vulnerabilities is an essential step, as is identifying the often-invisible impact of high dependency rates and unpaid work on disadvantage and vulnerability. To address the development challenge of access to decent work, particularly for youth in Palestine, SDG Goal 8 focuses on promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth for all, in part by Target 8.6 which aims to reduce the proportion of youth out of work or school and Target 8.3 which promotes development-oriented policies that support productive activities and decent job creation. The effects of climate change and environmental threats are also increasingly taking a toll on the stability and profitability of livelihoods and need to be factored into the long-term strategy to achieve SDG Goal 2 Target 2.4 (sustainable food production systems that increase production and resilient agricultural practices cognizant of environmental protection).





CHAPTER 7

Institutional and Political Drivers of Vulnerability


Patterns of vulnerability and disadvantage in Palestine appear to reflect different degrees of attention given to certain groups relative to others in policy-making and the law. This chapter explores the different ways in which Palestinian institutions play a role in leaving some groups behind and how the delivery of some services currently fall well short of meeting the development needs of key groups.

Responsive and accountable institutions, inclusive political processes, rule of law, and well-functioning justice and security systems are among the mainstays of good governance. Failure of any of these elements can lead to failure to protect the human rights of citizens and constrain a society's potential to develop. More importantly, when any element of good governance is compromised, the poorest and least powerful groups in society are the most affected.

In the Palestinian context, however, one must acknowledge additional constraints to the state's ability to govern. Two factors severely restrict the ability of the Palestinian authorities (including the de facto authorities in Gaza) to deliver on their obligations as duty bearers. First, due to the occupation, the PA does not have jurisdiction over the majority of the oPt and has only limited policy space in the rest. For instance, the government does not have effective access to East Jerusalem and the Seam Zone. It has very little operating space to provide basic services in Area C and Hebron H2 given that both remain under the full control of Israel or to impose law and order in Area B in which Israel is still responsible for security. Since the mandate of the PA under the Oslo Accords was not extended to refugees, refugee camps are also not included in national planning systems.[321] It is not clear who provides building permits in camps, for example, as neither UNRWA nor the PA administer the camps. The PA's remit does not extend to Palestinians working in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Hence it cannot ensure the rights of these workers whose working conditions are not regulated by the Israeli Ministry of Labour either.

The second factor that restricts the ability of the Palestinian government to deliver as a duty-bearer is its constrained fiscal space. As discussed in Chapter 2, clearance revenues controlled by Israel account for 60-70% of domestic revenue, leaving the PA with a large and unpredictable financing gap. In 2015, the fiscal deficit stood at an estimated 11.7% of GDP despite increased fiscal discipline to rein in government spending. The government is highly dependent on direct budgetary support from international donors, which declined by a third between 2014 and 2015[326] (Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1: External Budgetary Support to the PA (2009-2015)



Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning Monthly Reports

In 2015, external budgetary support covered 70.5% of the PA's current deficit and 35% of its financing gap.[327] Since the PA does not have its own currency and cannot borrow money in the international market, the only way for it to finance its deficit is through domestic borrowing. If international aid continues to decline, it will render the PA's domestic debt and ultimately its finances unsustainable.[328]

Since the State of Palestine has a legal obligation under the human rights treaties it has ratified to take concrete steps to realize the economic, social and cultural rights of all Palestinians, it is important to explore how and why some groups appear to receive less government support than others. This question is addressed at two levels. First, the symptoms of the problem are examined. It appears, for example, that some groups are less well-served by public services, laws and policy implementation than others even though all citizens have equal rights to basic services and protections of their rights by law. Second, a few root causes are examined. For instance, these groups appear to participate less in and have less of a voice in decisionmaking processes. Given the government's legal treaty obligations to ensure political and public participation rights and bearing in mind that states should ensure that groups at a higher risk of falling behind are not only adequately represented in decisionmaking processes that affect them but also empowered and supported to express their views, this second level of analysis seeks to shed light on the barriers faced by the many vulnerable groups. The analysis at both levels references and cuts through multiple elements of good governance, illustrating that weak governance is both a symptom and a driver of vulnerability.

Key Figures	
Fiscal deficit	11.7% of GDP
External budgetary support	70.5% of the PA's current deficit and 35% of its financing gap
Children with disabilities integrated into formal education	34%
Women victims of GVB who seek assistance	0.7%

7.1 How Do Some Groups Fall Through the Cracks?

The analysis of the 20 vulnerable groups shows that many have less access to basic public services than others. Further, some are unable to exercise their rights for want of adequate laws and adequate enforcement of existing laws and policies. Each of these reflects elements of weak governance. These are both manifestations and drivers of a chronic disadvantage under the existing system.

7.1.1 Lack of Access to Basic Services

Groups that systematically receive fewer or poorer quality public services are more likely to get 'left behind'. Two sets of gaps in service provision in the oPt stand out. The first set refers to the inadequate delivery of basic services: some groups have inadequate access to quality education and healthcare. Further, some groups like the elderly and persons with disabilities have special needs different from those of the majority. When their needs are not met they are at an additional disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the population. The second set of gaps is in services that enable and empower certain groups to seize economic opportunities and thereby drive change for themselves and for the rest of society. Given adequate support and enabling conditions, groups like farmers, entrepreneurs and youth transitioning from education to the job market can be agents of change. Necessary support services are in many cases not available, leaving them unable to make the best of their opportunities and resulting in lost potential and continued vulnerability.

7.1.1.1 Provision of Basic Services

Some groups are more affected than others by lack of access to quality education and health. Despite high literacy rates, Palestine's education system is deteriorating[329] due largely to insufficient school infrastructure, lack of adequately-trained teachers, out-dated methods of teaching and a lack of access to schooling in marginalized areas.[330] East Jerusalem has a shortage of 2,200 classrooms and the education service is divided among five service providers with no coordination.[331]

Youth are disproportionately affected. The lack of quality education and education relevant to the labour market impairs the ability of youth to transition successfully into the job market. Even though the MoEHE is among the better-funded ministries, funding falls well below needs. In particular, universities can barely cover their running costs. The education system in Gaza has faced several crises in the



last ten years. The effects of the destruction of infrastructure from repeated escalation of hostilities have been compounded by the impact of the internal Palestinian division since 2007. This has severely affected service delivery in the Gaza Strip. There is also a shortage of technical and vocational training to prepare youth for the job market. Thus the poor quality of education and its inability to equip youth for the job market reflects as much a policy gap as it does a funding gap. Additionally, the shortage of job opportunities that leaves many university graduates in Gaza unemployed also demoralizes youth.

Although national level health indicators for Palestine are strong compared with other countries at the same socioeconomic level, not all groups have equal access to quality healthcare. There is a high prevalence of common mental disorders.[332] Even though the MoH has the second highest funding in the social services sector it faces severe shortages of funds relative to its targeted beneficiaries and a large part of its budget is spent on referrals of patients to East Jerusalem hospitals, Israeli hospitals and other hospitals in the region (Jordan and Egypt) for specialized care.

Some groups like persons with disabilities, the elderly, and women facing GVB need specialized services. The formal care and support provided for the elderly is limited. It is charity-based rather than human rights-based. MoH staff provides health care for the insured elderly residing in nursing homes through a limited number of physicians, nurses and psychosocial counsellors. Non-institutionalized community-based long-term care and rehabilitation services, home care services, housing assistance and social pensions are not available through the formal support system.

Provision of health services responsive to the needs of the youth is limited in Palestine, except reproductive health services, which are available to married youth. While most youth perceive themselves as healthy, youth in Palestine are particularly vulnerable to psychosocial health issues, risky behaviour including substance abuse and sexually transmitted infections and diseases and chronic diseases.[333] These problems are worsened by the lack of knowledge, information and services tailored for adolescents and youth.

Government services for persons with disabilities are limited, and lack financial and qualified human resources, though two Intifadas and the successive escalation of hostilities in Gaza have led to many individuals with permanent disabilities.[334] Only 34% of 6-17 year olds with disabilities were integrated into formal education in 2011.[335] Many schools lack physical facilities and thus are not accessible to persons with disabilities.

Public transportation is not adapted for disabled persons, so that 76% of disabled persons over 18 years do not use public transport.[336] Adaptations at homes of persons with disabilities are not sufficient. Further, persons with disabilities have greater problems accessing healthcare services in comparison with others although they might be more prone to secondary health problems and age-related ailments. When youth with permanent disabilities grow out of the medical devices they use, new devices are not readily available.

Women exposed to GBV are not adequately protected or served by state institutions either. Family protection units were created in police departments in all 11 West Bank districts including East Jerusalem but uptake of such services remains low. Legal assistance programmes are being provided by NGOs and women's centres but there is no integrated programme to provide legal assistance to poor and marginalized groups yet.[337] Women exposed to GBV have limited access to confidential and compassionate services. Only 0.7% of women victims of GVB seek assistance[338] due to lack of appropriate responsive services, lack of information about services, and fear of stigma, social exclusion and so called 'honour killings' or reprisals. The lack of data makes honour killings difficult to track or redress.

7.1.1.2 Support Services to Productive Agents

Youth suffer from a lack of market-relevant employment services including labour market programmes, skill-building, and development of life skills. Support services are also lacking for those engaged in informal livelihoods. This group has little access to credit, markets, cooperative development and insurance. Lack of job opportunities in Gaza discourages even those with access to employment services.

While the main obstacle to agricultural

productivity remains restricted access to lands and water resources, the availability and accessibility of agricultural services including extension, veterinary and marketing services is limited, affecting especially small-scale farmers and food-insecure households headed by women in the agriculture sector. The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has a limited budget and staff and offers minimal agricultural supervision and services for small-scale farmers. This contributes to low productivity, poor quality of products, inefficient use of inputs and water and high post-harvest losses, perpetuating poverty.

Spending on economic development accounted for 2.6% of the PA's expenditure in 2015. The MoA accounted for 34% of the spending on economic development.[339] The services that enable and empower these productive agents within the economy are clearly underfunded. The absence of services that enable and empower key groups often impairs the ability of groups that could be drivers of change to act on their own behalf and benefit the wider economy.

7.1.2 Gaps in the Law

Palestinian Basic Law recognizes that "Palestinians are equal before the law and that there should be no discrimination because of ethnicity, sex, colour, religion, political opinion or disability".[340] However, some groups, especially women, feel the negative effects of discriminatory laws. Several groups in Palestine find themselves unable to exercise their rights because the law does not protect them. Three kinds of gaps are most evident: first, where relevant laws do not exist, second, where the special circumstances of a group are not adequately captured within existing laws, and third, where the laws discriminate against specific groups. The vulnerable groups especially affected include the elderly, persons with disabilities, women, children and the working poor.

No national law exists to protect the rights of the elderly, for example. A law has been drafted but has not yet been ratified. There are no laws that prohibit forced labour or human trafficking nor any that provide penalties for these acts.

While Palestine has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) with no reservations and the legal framework provides some protection from discrimination (which is still not fully implemented), there is no comprehensive anti-discrimination legislative framework, in particular in the economic sphere, as regards equal pay and equal employment opportunities. The Council of Ministers is developing a draft bill on domestic violence which, once endorsed, will improve women's access to justice. The next step for the government will include a review of the Personal Status Law and the Penal Code to remove discriminatory provisions therein.

Palestinian Law addresses worker's rights but lacks details on non-discrimination. Persons with disabilities fall through the gap. Workplaces are rarely accessible due to the absence of support tools for persons with disabilities. There are no laws prohibiting or penalizing discrimination against them either.

Laws on collective bargaining are not always adequately enforced for the benefit of Palestinian workers by both Israel and PA. Palestinian law provides for rights of workers to form and join unions and conduct legal strikes. While the law requires conducting collective bargaining without pressure or influence, it does not explicitly provide for the right to do so. Discrimination against unions and their members and interference by employers in functioning of unions are illegal but the law does not specifically prohibit termination of employment due to union activity.[341]

The PA acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. The PA has established laws and regulations related to child labour. The existing legal framework on child rights and protection, including child labour, is composed of the Child Law (2004), Labour Law (2000), and the Education Law. While the Labour Law clearly sets 15 years as the minimum age for entry into employment with restrictions concerning hazardous work prior to 18 years of age, the law does not apply to "family members of the first degree of the employer." Thus child labour is 'permitted' in effect if the children are working for their 'first degree' relatives, which is not consistent with the provisions of the Convention on the

Rights of the Child. The law also does not make any reference to the worst forms of child labour. There are no laws that provide for rehabilitation and social integration or any other assistance to Palestinian children who are removed from the worst forms of labour. This is a major gap in the law, which should comply with Article 7 of Convention 182 of the International Labour Standards.

Women are also affected by gaps in labour laws. According to the Palestinian Labour Law, a woman is only entitled to ten weeks paid maternity leave if she has worked 180 days before delivery. As a result of the lack of a universal social security system, the costs of maternity leave are borne completely by employers, influencing their preference to recruit men over women. Further, the 180-day qualification period for maternity leave limits the entitlement to maternity leave to women who are permanently employed or employed under long-term contracts and discriminates against women employed under temporary or short-term contracts.

More broadly, these legal challenges are exacerbated by the existence of several competing legal frameworks in the oPt (Egyptian, Jordanian, Ottoman, British mandate and Sharia legal systems, including the Israeli military law/rule imposed on Palestinians).

7.1.3 Inadequate Policy Implementation and Poor Law Enforcement

In other instances, laws and policies exist on paper but are not implemented or not fully enforced in practice. When gaps exist between policies and their implementation, and laws and their enforcement, in the oPt as elsewhere it reflects an absence of mechanisms of accountability of state institutions and is usually to the detriment of the socially and politically marginalized. Policies and laws exist to protect the rights of groups like the elderly and the working poor. However, these laws and policies are often not adequately implemented.

National Strategies on the Care for the Elderly were developed by the MoSD for 2010-2015 and 2016-2020. A set of rights for the elderly was elaborated in a National Social Protection Program that includes financial and in-kind assistance, insurance, rehabilitation and social care. However, neither has been implemented as yet.

The Ministry of Women's Affairs developed a 2011-2019 National Strategy to combat violence against women. An inter-sectoral referral system was introduced by the government in 2014 to assist GBV survivors but government engagement remains insufficient and inconsistent, especially in the health sector.

Sometimes the challenge is inadequate enforcement of laws. For instance, the Law on the Rights of Palestinian Persons with Disability No. 4 of 1999 requires ministries and governmental organizations to employ at least 5% of their staff from among persons with disabilities. But it is not fully implemented. Children in labour are particularly vulnerable when labour laws are not enforced. In 2015, the Ministry of Labour (MoL) had 54 labour inspectors, 15 of whom were trained on child labour issues. Government officials describe MoL as underfunded, understaffed and in need of at least an additional 300 labour inspectors in order to effectively enforce labour laws. In 2014 MoL employees carried out 6,500 workplace inspections of registered businesses, although by law they are required to inspect 100,000 annually. MoL staff in each directorate (local PA ministry field offices) only had access to one car for one day per week, while some employees reported using public transportation at their own expense to perform inspections. PA officials report that numerous individuals have been fined following child labour inspections but no specific statistics are available.[342]

7.1.4 Absence of Environmental Governance

Effective environmental governance is critical for protecting and managing environmental resources including renewable and non-renewable natural resources, managing the public health impacts of pollution, mitigating and adapting to climate change and ensuring all communities have equitable access to environmental resources. Globally, the terms of environmental governance determine a range of issues related to rights: who gets to pollute, who pays the price for such pollution, who can claim benefits of a natural resource

and at what cost, on what terms are jointly owned resources accessed, who pays for the upkeep of a jointly-owned resource, how much is spent for such upkeep, how to prevent over-use by one group vis-à-vis others and so forth. Each of these issues is bitterly contested at global, national and sub-national levels. In the absence of formal environmental governance mechanisms, natural resources are depleted faster than they can regenerate and such key questions usually get settled in favour of stronger interest groups and to the detriment of weaker and marginalized groups. Further, growing population and the increased use of natural resources for human consumption leads to competition over natural resources. If not well managed, these natural resources are at risk of being overused or polluted, inducing harm for environmental and human health.

The PA faces considerable challenges in environmental governance as it only has control in Area A, while most of the agricultural lands, solid waste and sewage systems are in, or run through, Area B and C where the PA has limited or no authority. That said, in Palestine the absence of environmental governance is systematically undermining the environmental rights of some of the most vulnerable groups (the poor, people living in Area C, the Seam Zone, and the Gaza Strip) and putting them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other groups. The inadequacy of governance manifests in weak institutions, ineffective environmental legislation, poor transparency and accountability and a general lack of public access and participation. Environment and climate change are not mainstreamed in the policy framework.[343] The Environmental Quality Authority accounted for less than 0.1% of the total expenditure of the PA organizations in 2015.[344] The 2010 Palestine MDG report also noted that the national support for environmental sustainability was only 'moderate'; the goal was unlikely to be achieved even if Palestine gained sovereignty.[345]

Out of the 17 SDGs, 15 are contingent on adequate environmental protection. Without a focus on environmental sustainability, the Government of Palestine will find it difficult to deliver on its many other obligations to the Palestinian people. It is, therefore, good news that the Government has taken concrete steps in recent years to recognize the importance of environmental priorities. The first steps include acceding to international treaties and incorporating environmental priorities in its National Policy Agenda.

In Focus: Steps Towards Addressing Environmental Priorities

In 2015, Palestine signed letters of accession to a number of international treaties and conventions including the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2016 Palestine submitted letters of access to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention.

The National Policy Agenda for 2017-2022 recognizes environmental sustainability as one of the policy priorities. It also identifies a set of policy interventions to achieve a sustainable environment.

7.2 Why Do Some Groups Fall Through the Cracks?

Institutional and policymaking gaps that overlook or ascribe lower priority to certain groups tend to reflect the relative lack of influence of such groups within the existing socio-political system. This section discusses two elements of that lack of influence, *viz.* lack of voice and participation and the limits to free media, freedom of speech and access to information in the oPt.[346] Both reflect failures of governance, specifically non-inclusive political processes and lack of accountability of state institutions.

7.2.1 Lack of Voice and Participation

Policies are people-centred when people actively participate in decision-making processes that influence their lives and when their voices are heard and responded to by decision-makers. Leaving no one behind will depend on active participation by people at

the grassroots level. A key characteristic of marginalized groups in Palestine, as elsewhere, is that they are relatively marginalized from political processes.

National-level elections have not taken place in Palestine in a decade. With a suspended PLC, laws are passed by presidential decree or by limited members of the Hamas PLC bloc in Gaza. The suspension of the PLC in 2007 has thus severely undermined the system of separation of powers of the three branches of the state (judicial, legislative and executive) resulting in an excessive concentration of power within the executive branch of government and an erosion of the independence of the judicial branch (now reflected in two separate courts in Gaza and the West Bank, run by two separate judicial/justice councils). Thus the normal mechanisms of accountability of national level policymakers are currently dramatically curtailed.

Institutions of local government including municipal tiers of the government are the mainstay of service delivery and vanguards of a functional, participatory democracy. At the time of publication of this report, the last local-level elections in Palestine took place in the West Bank in 2012 when voting took place in only about a quarter of the municipalities. Hamas did not participate.

Refugees, persons with disabilities and the elderly poor do not have effective access to decision makers or formal ways of influencing the policy making process even at the local level. While refugees do participate in PLC elections and many of them have been elected for the PLC, refugees residing in camps do not participate in local council elections in the West Bank though they make up 9.3% of the population in the oPt.[347] Youth and women have low levels of engagement in decision making processes. Women hold few high level supervisory and leadership positions in the public arena despite there being an initial 20%, and since 2015, 30% quota for women in both PLC and local elections. Youth are seldom seen in decision-making positions, though at the local government level there have been some youth elected to local councils. Social and political exclusion of youth is worsenedaggravated by the disengagement of youth themselves from political processes due to cynicism about the responsiveness of the political elite and the perception of corruption and lack of transparency in the management of public resources.

Palestine has made tangible progress towards engaging women in public life since the PA and its public institutions were established, but much remains to be done. The Palestinian Basic Law of 2008 stipulates women's equal participation in the political arena as a right, and Strategic Objective 5 of the Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy highlights the importance of women's political participation and access to decision-making positions. But only one out of the 18 PLO Executive Committee members, three of 22 ministers[348] and only one of 16 governors currently are female.[349] In 2013, women represented 40.6% of total employees in the public sector but only about 4% occupy assistant undersecretary positions in PA ministries.[350] In 2012 21% of the members of local councils were women in the West Bank.[351] In 2014 15.6% of judges, 25% of journalists, 5.8% of ambassadors and 3.4% of police were women.[352]

7.2.1.1 Lack of Data: Rendering Groups Invisible to Policymakers

Sometimes lack of voice translates into lack of visibility to policymakers. This manifests in lack of adequate data on specific groups. The PCBS has strong capacity in production of quality data within international standards. But up-to-date and periodic disaggregated data are lacking on several groups including out of school children, children in labour, persons living in the Seam Zone and Area C and persons with disabilities.

Statistical data on vulnerable groups are rarely made available for decision-makers and planners to formulate specific policies and programmes for these groups. Aggregate data are available on many social and economic indicators, but disaggregated data showing inequalities in achievements by specific groups are not always collected. There is limited research and surveys on socio-economic inequality, drivers and effects of vulnerability in the oPt. The limited research on social behaviours, attitudes, perceptions and drivers for vulnerability prevent proper framing of problems and solutions specific to certain vulnerable groups and their needs and contributions become excluded from the policy

agenda and development discussions.

The upcoming Population, Housing and Establishment Census in 2017 with its use of new technology will be a good opportunity to generate data at national, regional and at local levels. However, without in-depth analysis of the data, evidence to support vulnerable population groups will continue to be weak, leaving these groups out of sight of policymakers. Greater funding for data collection and development of Palestine's national research capacity will be essential to ensure greater visibility of vulnerable groups.

7.2.2 Restrictions on Civil Society, Media, Free Speech, and Access to Information

CSOs provide external oversight to monitor government institutions. They also play a key role in amplifying the voices of the voiceless. The Law 1/2000 formalizes the right of Palestinian citizens "to establish and run Associations and Community Organizations". However, attempts from both the Israeli and Palestinian side to impose greater control on CSO activities and funding streams will affect their independence and their ability to advocate for human rights and threaten the right to freedom of association (as observed in Gaza after the 2014 escalation).[353].

A free press and the right to information are critical for holding government institutions accountable and rendering them responsive to citizens' needs. When information on government is accessed as a right in practice rather than as a privilege and when the media is empowered to bring to light shortcomings in government functions, it has the potential to influence the rules of engagement between rights-holders and duty bearers.

Restriction on access to information, free speech and the media impairs the accountability of the state to its people. The State of Palestine acceded in 2014 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which acknowledges freedom of expression as a basic human right. Article 19 of the Palestinian Basic Law guarantees freedom of expression and opinion. However, this may be overridden by other laws and restrictions, for instance the Press and Publications Law, which allows for sanctions on journalists including imprisonment for infringements that are broadly defined and vague at best. For example, Article 7 of the Press and Publications Law makes it illegal to publish anything that goes against the "General System" which is not defined. It also forbids contradicting the principles of national responsibility.[354]

There is currently no enforceable law on right of access to information, a right enshrined in both the ICCPR and in SDG 16.10. Both the PA and the de facto authorities in Gaza exercise control over the information disseminated to and by the media. The adoption of a law on right of access to information is being discussed by the PA along with a draft law setting the framework for providing adequate protection for sensitive information in line with international standards.

A significant number of violations against media workers, including arbitrary arrests and detention, physical attacks and raids of media outlets have been recorded. This can result in media professionals resorting to self-censorship. Like other Palestinians, journalists also suffer from restrictions on their movement. Continued Palestinian division has also led to harassment and in some cases, arrests of journalists affiliated with either party in West Bank and Gaza.

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Successfully implementing a strategy to 'leave no one behind' will require a concerted policy-making effort that constantly seeks to look beyond national averages to disaggregated numbers, to fill policy and legislative gaps, and to close the distance between law and enforcement, policy and implementation. With Palestine's relatively high development indicators in many fields, the task will require a very high level of policy-making precision and openness to scrutiny. In this sense, robust governance will be essential in achieving most of the SDGs. Further achievement of social, economic and political inclusion (SDG Goal 10, Target 10.2) and ensuring equal opportunity will require elimination of discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting inclusive policies. Only then will vulnerable groups in Palestine be given a fair chance at development and realizing their potential.



CHAPTER 8

Sociocultural Drivers of Vulnerability

The previous chapters identified certain economic, institutional and other geographic factors that set some groups in Palestine at a systematic disadvantage compared to others. As in all societies, economic, institutional and political determinants of development in Palestine are also heavily influenced by sociocultural norms.[355] This chapter explores these linkages and the various ways in which sociocultural norms impair the development trajectory of some groups relative to the rest of the population.

Social norms are not static and are not automatically reproduced; they are actively produced and disseminated. Some social norms and traditional values can have a positive impact on development and human rights. Others have been used to justify gender-based inequalities, discrimination and violence.[356] Such norms have been actively contested by women's rights defenders and CSOs over decades. Globally, as in Palestine, there are both persistent stereotypes and social norms but also new and emerging norms.

Sociocultural norms show considerable variation across regions, socio-economic groups and ethnicities. Numerous factors influence these norms, notable among them being the day-to-day impact of the occupation, economic hardship or privilege, geophysical isolation of communities, the political history of Palestine, the culture of the Middle East and the influence of other cultures. Some of these norms can be empowering and enabling in certain contexts, for instance, family solidarity that acts as an informal social protection and support system. Other sociocultural norms (like those that favour dominant groups over marginalized ones) can disempower and limit the development potential of less powerful groups.

A discussion of sociocultural norms in the context of Palestine is rendered difficult for want of adequate data. This chapter focuses largely on patriarchal norms, though like in other contexts there are several different sociocultural norms that influence the development prospects of some groups more than others. Systematic study of the influence of different sociocultural norms backed by adequate, good quality data will be a useful and welcome contribution to Palestine's development discourse.

The next section showcases the way sociocultural norms derived from patriarchy exacerbate the vulnerability of select groups like women, persons with disabilities and orphans. The two sections that follow examine the connections between such sociocultural norms and the other economic, institutional and violence-related drivers of vulnerability. Discriminatory laws, policies and practices often exist because the discrimination is normalized by sociocultural mores.

8.1 Direct Effects of Sociocultural Norms on Select Groups

Palestinian society is predominantly patriarchal.[357] Fathers (and other male relatives in their absence) are considered heads of households with decision-making authority in family matters. Patriarchy is a global phenomenon and intersects class, power relations, rural-urban relations, history and contemporary political shifts.[358] Patriarchal norms lead to asymmetrical gender roles including gendered division of labour and contribute in varying degrees to the acceptance and legitimization of human rights violations including domestic violence, limitation of personal choices for the rest of the family and an iniquitous inheritance system. While women are more directly affected than men, the culture of dominance it engenders favours the able over the disabled, the physically strong over the weak and the mainstream over the marginal. This engenders models of masculinity that contribute to male-on-male violence and discrimination against persons with disabilities. Expectations of conformity with gender roles also deny men choices about lifestyles, professions and ways of expressing themselves. In favouring clear attributions of paternity and lineage, it discriminates against children born out of wedlock and to a lesser degree, orphans.

Adolescent girls and women of reproductive age are among the first victims of gender discrimination rooted in patriarchal norms. These norms are among the key drivers of Palestine's high fertility rates, which constrain women's participation in social and economic life. Prevailing social norms contribute to women being the primary caregivers in families, in charge of rearing children and caring for the elderly and disabled alongside everyday family responsibilities. The vast majority of unpaid work devolves on women by default. Balancing work with family responsibilities is felt by many women as an obstacle to their career aspirations.[359]

Traditional attitudes and behaviours that focus on the reproductive role of women also contribute to early marriage, and early childbearing among adolescent girls, with all attendant health and other risks.[360] Some 8% of females aged 15-19 were married before the age of 15 years as compared with 0.4% of males in the same age group.[361] Further, 24.2% of women 20-49 years old were married before the age of 18 years.[362]

Persons with disabilities, especially those with mental disabilities, are more vulnerable than other groups to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation on account of discrimination, isolation and exclusion from mainstream processes. Children with disabilities are three to four times more likely to be victims of violence and girls and women with disabilities endure violence, abuse and exploitation twice as often as non-disabled women over a longer period of time and suffer more serious injuries as a result of violence.[363] Since school systems are not specifically adapted to empower and address the needs of persons with physical and mental disabilities, their learning outcomes tend to suffer, further worsening their ability to participate in the labour market.

Orphans deprived of one or both parents are among the most vulnerable children in Palestinian society. Repeated escalations of violence especially in the Gaza Strip have left many children orphaned. Orphans are often fostered by next of kin of families, in fostering/orphanage homes and to a lesser extent by families other than next of kin. Adopting or fostering can sometimes take place in the form of what is known as '*kafala*' or guardianship, where the orphan does not necessarily become part of the family but receives financial support and caring until she or he becomes an adult. The economic hardship that Palestinians face in their daily life makes such support a challenge, and services at orphanages are poor.

8.2 Connections between Sociocultural Factors and Economic and Institutional Drivers

Patriarchal norms underlie a range of economic and institutional drivers of disadvantage for women and other marginalized groups. These norms also compound the effect of other factors that drive structural disadvantage of certain groups. Palestinian women's low labour force participation (19.6% compared to 71.1% for men)[364] shows how sociocultural, economic and institutional factors can intersect in undermining their economic and professional potential.

Key Figures	
Female youths married before the age of 15 years	8%
Male youths married before the age of 15 years	0.4%
Female labour force participation	19.6%
Male labour force participation	71.1%

A gap also persists between male and female unemployment rates (22.1% for men, 44.7% for women in the second quarter of 2016). The difference is even starker for youth. Among 20-24 year olds in the labour force, the unemployment rate for women (68.4%) is much higher than that for men (34.2%).[365] In Gaza, few women enter the labour force and very few formal employment opportunities exist beyond public sector jobs in health and education. Other women tend to work informally in agriculture, childcare, cleaning and other traditional activities, while the majority of women in the labour force remain unemployed. The average daily wage for Palestinian women is NIS 81.9, as compared to NIS 108 for men.[366] And contrary to Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which states that remuneration should be equal for work of equal value, the median wage for women in the manufacturing sector is only 57% that of men.[367] Some of these inequalities can be explained by the fact that women do not work in fast-growing construction and transport sectors, but sociocultural norms also contribute to that fact.

The Palestinian Labour Law does not prohibit discrimination in pay or promotion. It makes no reference to harassment in the workplace. It also prevents women from working in a number of occupations defined as hazardous or hard work where exceptions can be made if the employer provides safety guarantees. In addition, the Labour Law does not provide for employers to take special measures or affirmative action to promote women's employment in accordance to Convention No. 111 and CEDAW. While equality in employment is specified, there is no effective means to actualize equality or prevent discrimination.[368]

Thus, patriarchal norms compound disadvantages for groups that are already disadvantaged. Women in refugee camps are a case in point. Most refugee camps are run by committees that have no female representation. Similarly, youth representation in national committees established by law or under the leadership of the PA is marginal. This limits the voices of these two disadvantaged groups in shaping national policies and legislation.

Falling behind in amending laws such as the Personal Status Law impacts women's private lives as well as their freedom to participate in public spaces. The Personal Status Law[369] allows for girls to marry as young as 15 years of age (*hijri*). Provisions on arbitrary divorce and the conditions of marriage contracts are discriminatory. Provisions allowing women to initiate divorce themselves (*khulu'*) or to go to courts for divorce when a husband fails to pay maintenance are onerous.[370]

It is important to note, however, that the aggregated numbers disguise the fact that in some parts of the oPt, for instance in urban areas, women participate in the labour market more actively than in other parts of the country. Some regions are more conservative than others. Women in big cities in the West Bank may enjoy far greater freedom and rights than women in rural and isolated communities or in Gaza. The decade-long closure has insulated Gaza from a range of cross-cultural experiences and thus might have contributed to higher levels of conservatism as well.

Persons with disabilities are exposed to different forms of stigma and discrimination from their family members, service providers and other community members. Persons with mental disabilities experience an added

burden of violence. In 2011, 8.7% of persons with disabilities indicated that they usually avoid performing many activities because of others' attitudes towards them.[371] Social exclusion and isolation also affects persons with disabilities, with 34% of those 18 years or older indicating that they could not perform daily activities outside their homes due to their disabilities. Further, 73% of young disabled Palestinians reported having experienced discrimination in the last six months, most often when trying to access government services including schooling and healthcare.[372] Negative attitudes from some employers, where persons with disabilities are seen as unable to work, translate into discrimination and for many the denial of their right to work. This results in even greater marginalization, isolation and exclusion.

Youth are affected by social exclusion and weak representation because sociocultural mores favour more senior members of society over youth. This is reflected in the Palestinian political system where older age groups dominate or exercise almost full control.[373] As a result, youth lack voice, opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access to jobs. The majority of jobs in positions of decision-making are filled by older members of society.

The intersection of sociocultural norms with the state of service-provision creates overlapping vulnerabilities for some groups. For instance, lack of access to good quality treatment and care for mental health challenges may compound the problems of persons with mental disabilities, whose families choose to keep them out of the public eye to avoid social stigma.

8.3 Connections with Violence as a Driver

Patriarchal attitudes and practices that condone unequal power relations between men and women often enable and condone acts of violence.[374] For instance, such norms contribute to the notion of domestic issues being a private family matter resulting in a widespread acceptance of intimate partner violence. The same mind-set is among the main drivers of the blame, stigmatization, social exclusion and reprisals towards women subjected to GBV. This is not unique to Palestine but is observed in patterns of femicide and GBV worldwide.

The state and society at large have a responsibility to address the perception of domestic violence as a private matter. A low proportion of victims approach the police or



protection centres when they are exposed to violence.[375] Only in cases when abuse is overwhelming do women address the informal or the formal justice system. Some women do not trust the justice system to improve their conditions because many feel that by going to the justice system their condition worsens.[376] In the case of East Jerusalem, involving the Israeli police in family matters may create other risks such as exposing family issues related to residence, work and registration. The lack of legislation addressing domestic violence, also a form of discrimination before the law, leaves women with limited recourse.

Violence associated with the occupation contributes to GBV, especially against women.[377] Women in Palestine are exposed to both political and settler violence and GBV against women increased largely after the last war on the Gaza Strip.[378] Mobility restrictions, limited access to exiting support services and the escalating frustration related to the protracted humanitarian crises of the Israeli occupation is one of the drivers of GBV against women, specifically intimate partner violence and other forms of GBV.[379] Increased levels of domestic violence during and after conflict have been linked to weak rule of law, dysfunctional institutions and consequently high levels of impunity.

Adolescent girls are often exposed to additional forms of violence and control from their male relatives. Women with disabilities and mental health problems are more likely to be exposed to GBV. Patriarchal norms also imply parenting and teaching styles that condone inflicting violence on children as a way of disciplining them. Children suffer a relatively high degree of violence from parents and teachers in the form of corporal punishment. Palestine has one of the highest incidences of reported violent punishment in the Arab region: in 2014, 91.5% of 1-14 year olds reported experiencing psychological aggression or physical punishment during the previous month. In Gaza, 94.5% of children reported having experienced such aggression and punishment.[380]

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The analysis on the social-cultural factors that hinder development for some groups began with an acknowledgement that very little adequate data exists. This is not unique to Palestine. In addressing this challenge to better understand the situation of vulnerable groups, for groups such as the elderly, persons with disabilities and orphans, the first step is the collection of adequate data. In this regard, SDG Target 17.18 calls upon the international community to provide for capacity building support to other countries for the improvement of timely and adequate disaggregated data. Much attention in this chapter has focused on the patriarchal culture in Palestine; SDG Goal 5, which focuses on gender equality and women's empowerment is linked to these challenges. SDG Goal 5, Target 5.1, which aims to end discrimination against women and girls, Target 5.2 which aims for an end to violence against women and girls, Target 5.a which calls for reforms to give women equal access to economic resources and Target 5.5 which aims to ensure women's participation in decision-making all attempt to counter the disadvantage that often accompanies patriarchy. In Palestine, as in other countries, the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda will require a robust debate and action on some of these sociocultural factors that may have contributed to the patterns of disadvantage and vulnerability documented in this report.



CHAPTER 9

Leave No One Behind – What Will it Take?

The starting point for this report and the ongoing CCA-UNDAF process was the identification of some of the most vulnerable groups in Palestine and an analysis of the key drivers of their vulnerability.

The findings underline the fact that living under occupation makes every Palestinian vulnerable and disadvantaged in one way or another. Now in its fiftieth year, the occupation contributes directly to poverty, unemployment and a protracted humanitarian crisis. It constrains the ability of the Palestinian government and its development partners to address some of the key obstacles to realizing the goals of Agenda 2030. An end to the occupation would therefore be, unquestionably, a key enabler for Palestinian development.

In the spirit of the 2030 Agenda imperative to 'leave no one behind', the report also investigates the extent to which Palestinian development gains are equally accessed by all. The picture, unsurprisingly, is far from homogeneous. Looking more closely at 20 especially vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, the report makes the case that their vulnerability is in part a function of one or more structural factors including economic access, location or place of residence, institutional and governance factors, sociocultural norms and attitudes and exposure to violence. Some elements of these drivers are intimately linked to the occupation, others less so. The latter offer greater potential for Palestinian policymakers to affect changes that will improve the lives of Palestine's most disadvantaged and build a development path that leaves no one behind. Even where the link to the occupation is strong, there are at minimum mitigating measures that could be employed to reduce the impact of these factors.

How does a development actor or consortium of actors including the UN go about unlocking these constraints to development in Palestine? How should this analysis find its way into the forthcoming UN Development Assistance Framework? Or into the development assistance strategies of other bilateral or multilateral partners of Palestine for that matter? This final chapter aims to start the translation of these findings into action, a process that will intensify with the elaboration of the forthcoming UNDAF.

9.1 Closing Data Gaps

'What isn't counted, doesn't count', as they say. The difficulty of accessing some of the data for this analysis brought to light some major data gaps in Palestine. Groups that are falling behind are almost by definition less visible in the statistics, in other cases especially hard to track and in probably all cases assigned lower priority than others when resources are limited. There is a dramatic qualitative change in the SDGs as compared to the MDGs; the ability to disaggregate national numbers will be essential to the reporting and monitoring process. Upgrading the current data sets to catch and track these trailing groups will require considerable cooperation, investment and coordination. The government will need to assign clear custodians for the different SDG indicators. The disaggregation of data has its limits of course; the government will also need to decide for which areas and groups of people in the Palestinian context there is a need for greater data granularity.



The government's intention to integrate of some of these key SDG-related baseline data into the monitoring framework of the government's new National Policy Agenda is a welcome step in that direction. Specific indicators that allow tracking of at least some of these groups offer an opportunity to influence the sectoral strategies around which the plan will be built. Greater synergy between the SDGs and the NPA monitoring framework will also minimize the risk of a double reporting burden on the government.

9.2 Opening to New Voices & New Partners

How do these vulnerable or disadvantaged groups participate in these development processes? Are they ever invited to comment on success or failure? At least for the UNDAF, development actors will need to 'walk the talk' and be more open to listening to a larger cross-section of voices from Palestinian society – to advise, to assess, to critique, and where deserved, hopefully to applaud. The UN has had some experience with external advisory boards, of youth and of civil society, but new ideas will be needed to ensure that priority groups under the SDGs can participate more actively.

The nature of some of the drivers of vulnerability identified in this analysis also underlines the importance of working extensively with local organizations. Addressing sensitive sociocultural attitudes that are putting a brake on the opportunities of some important groups of Palestinians needs to be lead from the 'inside' by those with the credibility and insight to know how best to create change. The long-term nature of such undertakings also needs to be recognized – sociocultural change is measured in generations not years and will require much greater stamina than a typical development project or donor can sustain.

9.3 From Sectoral to Cross-cutting: Investing in Integrated Planning Processes

One clear message from this analysis CCA is that groups being left behind are more often than not simultaneously the subject of not just one, but rather multiple, drivers of vulnerability. Adolescent girls, for example, experience a host of obstacles to economic opportunities in addition to a greater exposure to violence and unhelpful sociocultural attitudes. The drivers themselves are inter-linked. For instance, several economic drivers of vulnerability derive directly from locational and institutional factors. Sociocultural norms contribute to violence and institutional drivers of vulnerability.

Hence, the strategies to respond to this global call for a more equitable development process will require a much greater integration of efforts in order to address the multiple dimensions of poverty and disadvantage experienced by different groups of people in society.

Sectoral interventions will continue to be the backbone of the way modern government and international development cooperation will be organized. Achieving the qualitative improvements in the development results expected by the SDGs will require the smart harnessing of these sectoral efforts towards clear outcomes that will likely transcend the individual sector or ministry.

Happily, interventions that address a specific driver of vulnerability of any one group may end up improving the conditions of several other groups as well. For instance, addressing the sociocultural norms that keep women out of the workforce and persons with disabilities out of public life may improve the conditions of the working poor by improving dependency rates within families. Similarly reducing the vulnerability of youth to violence may lower the extent of domestic violence as a by-product.

"While development actors including the UN Development Group are very much needed in Palestine for their financial or policy support, they are also (even especially) required to couple that aid with bilateral and multilateral advocacy vis-à-vis Israel and the occupation."

9.4 Bringing Politics to the Centre of Development Programming

While the State of Palestine has committed itself to Agenda 2030 and achieving the SDGs, the analysis in the preceding pages underlines the fact that accountability to reach these goals is a shared one while Israel remains an occupying power. Israel's progress towards the SDGs will also necessarily be measured by the progress of Palestinians. The SDGs emphasis on equity, access and justice will naturally increase the scrutiny on Israeli policies in the oPt. The Agenda 2030 GA resolution was also explicit in calling for the removal of "the obstacles to the full realization of the right of self-determination of peoples living under colonial and foreign occupation, which continue to adversely affect their economic and social development as well as their environment" (para 35 A/RES/70/1).

Budgetary support to the Government and humanitarian and development assistance will continue to provide a lifeline to a Government of Palestine, which has the severe constraints on its development space outlined in Chapter 2. External assistance will continue to be needed to close the gaps created by options denied to Palestinian policy-makers.

Recognizing the political context of these development efforts also means not losing sight of the fact that, as the World Bank documented in its 2013 report, simply permitting Palestinian access to the natural resources in Area C of the West Bank would unlock something in the order of 23% of Palestinian (2011) GDP and US$ 800 million in tax revenue – an amount that exceeds the projected total budget support projected to be received by the Palestinian Authority in 2016.

While development actors including the UN Development Group are very much needed in Palestine for their financial or policy support, they are also (even especially) required to couple that aid with bilateral and multilateral advocacy vis-à-vis Israel and the occupation. Direct support to Palestinian agriculture, for example, should be linked to advocacy around

enabling easier import of suitable fertilizers, improved access to olive trees, lifting of export restrictions in Gaza and the like that would arguably have a much greater development impact on the sector than any single project can hope to achieve. This kind of advocacy is not necessarily financially costly but the returns are potentially very significant.

9.5 Countering Fragmentation in Development Interventions

A geographically and politically fragmented Palestine requires a calibrated response from development partners to that reality. In any development context, locational variables are important but typically for physical or environmental reasons (ensuring development reaches the far north reaches of Mali or the isolated mountainous districts of Nepal, for example). In the oPt, these locational factors are in fact much more political and man-made. Policies around the closure (Gaza), annexation (East Jerusalem) or security (central Hebron) have created a patchwork of 'development micro-climates'. Development partners need to factor into their programme designs the increasingly different contexts posed by these areas. While these variables will change dramatically with a lifting of the occupation, some of the processes may take years to reverse; for example, the lack of integration between the West Bank and Gaza markets, or the changing school curriculum in East Jerusalem as compared to the rest of the West Bank. The impact of the Fatah-Hamas divide is of course also fuelling part of this fragmentation with potentially serious long-term consequences as diverging approaches to education, to social policy and to jurisprudence become entrenched.

The Government of Palestine needs to be encouraged and supported to keep making policy for all Palestinians, even those in hard-to-access areas. These include policy and support to Palestinian farmers in the seam zone, to Palestinian teachers in East Jerusalem schools and to all Palestinians in Gaza. New institutions like the recently-created Area C Coordination Office in the Prime Minister's office are important to provide leadership and ensure policy coherence in government support to this area. Support to East Jerusalem is somewhat ad hoc and institutionally fragmented today and there is no real consolidation of strategy to ensure coherent government policy in Gaza either. Where the government has limited or no access and programmes are delivered by donors, there is also an important obligation to ensure these efforts are aligned with government policies and coordinated with government programmes.

9.6 Bridging the Development-Humanitarian Divide?

The nature of the demands on international assistance for Palestine defies a traditional 'humanitarian vs. development' demarcation. The chronic nature of the protection crisis that drives the humanitarian need challenges any notion of the short-term nature of emergency response. Humanitarian actions include familiar components like food assistance, access to water and shelter assistance in the aftermath of the regular rounds of hostilities in Gaza. But as they enter their fifth or even tenth year, the extent to which these actions are harmonized with national policies and the sustainability of these actions if and when humanitarian funding begins to flag are reasonable discussions to have. A much closer collaboration between humanitarian actors and the government is necessary in such an environment.

Humanitarian actions in the Palestine context also extend to less traditional areas of intervention. Legal aid to communities with demolition orders over their heads or livelihoods support to Bedouin farmers in Area C of the West Bank are examples of types of humanitarian actions essentially intended to help households cope with the very real risks of forcible transfer; in short, helping communities remain in their homes as is their right under IHL.

A number of the vulnerable groups identified in this analysis and certainly many of the geographic areas in which they are found (Area C, the Seam Zone etc.) are places where humanitarian and development actions are operating alongside each other. There is a need for a more coordinated analysis of vulnerability in these communities and a partnership between humanitarian and development funding to sustain the long-term nature of the effort and to ensure that the

structural drivers at play find their way into long-term development planning, policymaking and investments.

Gaza deserves special mention here. As a unit of analysis of vulnerability, Gaza is truly too large to serve as a single vulnerable group for this CCA. However, as documented in the preceding pages, the staggering de-development of Gaza over the past 20 years has left 1.9 million people in almost permanent crisis; some 80% of Gazans will require emergency aid during the course of 2016. The nature of the needs and policies towards the de facto authorities currently in charge of Gaza has meant that assistance has been primarily of a humanitarian nature. There is a need to break out of this vicious circle, to re-build the economy, support livelihoods and address chronic needs in water and energy that cannot be solved with purely humanitarian interventions.

9.7 Looking Ahead Towards a New UN Development Assistance Framework

The 2030 Agenda with the sustainable SDGs at their core commits all countries and stakeholders to work together to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth, social development and environmental protection. The UNDG in Palestine will work to support the Government of Palestine in implementing this agenda. It will also continue to advocate strongly for Israel to fulfil its obligations as the occupying power to ensure that all Palestinians can exercise their basic human rights and partake in progress.

The UNDAF for 2018-2022 will align with the Palestinian government's development priorities for the next six years as outlined in its NPA and will seek to complement its key sectoral strategies. In the process, the UNDAF will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs which are integrated into the national priorities of the PA. The content of UN programming under the UNDAF will also be heavily informed by the need to address the drivers of vulnerability identified in this report. Taking into account the connections between these drivers, the intention is to complement sectoral efforts with a cross-cutting framework as well.

The UNDAF is a joint initiative of the government and the UN Country Team in Palestine and should serve as a framework for collaborative development action involving a broad range of development actors, ultimately aimed at assisting the Government of Palestine to achieve its development goals. By working to address the main drivers of vulnerability in Palestine and by placing its most vulnerable groups at the core of its development planning, the UNDG in Palestine will seek to ensure that no one is indeed left behind in these efforts.



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11. Contrary to international law, most of the Barrier is built inside the West Bank, creating a "Seam Zone" or closed military zone between the 1949 Green line and the Barrier itself.
12. Area C was created by the 1995 interim Oslo II agreement, as an interim 5-year measure to last until a final status agreement was reached within the following five years. Area C surrounds Areas A and B of the West Bank, and is mostly located in the eastern part of the West Bank along the Jordan Valley, and in the western and central parts of the West Bank.
13. Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Area C Vulnerability Profile*, (2014), p. 3.
14. UNDP, *INFOCUS: Bedouins in the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2013), p. 9.
15. OCHA, *The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlements in Hebron City*, (2013), p. 1.
16. Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), *Policies of Neglect in East Jerusalem: The Policies that Created 78% Poverty Rates and a Frail Job Market,* (2014) p. 9.
17. ACRI, *East Jerusalem 2015 – Facts and Figures*, (2015), p. 1.
18. The overall Palestine drop out rate for secondary education is 3.7%. PCBS, (2016), Accessed on 18 August 2016: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Education2014-07E.htm
19. Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza, *Detailed Needs Assessment (DNA) and Recovery Framework for Gaza Reconstruction*, (2015), p. 12.
20. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/28/45, (2015).
21. B'Tselem. (2011). The Basis for administrative detention in international law.
22. Incidents of settlers' violence include acts of vandalism, property damage, physical attacks, verbal abuse, and the harassment of children on their way to school.
23. Domestic violence refers to any type of violence inflicted by one member of a family or household on another family member.
24. PCBS, *On the Eve of the International Population Day ,* (2012), p. 3.
25. The national poverty line for the oPt set by PCBS in 2011, is NIS 2,293 (US$ 637) per month for a family of five (two adults and three children). Based on a consumption basket of essential food, clothing, housing, housekeeping and personal supplies, health care, education, and transportation.
26. Defined by a monthly income of NIS 1,832 (US$ 509) or less per month for food, clothing, and adequate housing. UNDP, *The 2014 Palestine Human Development Report: Development for*

Empowerment (2014), p. 53.

27. PCBS, *Palestinian Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014: Final Report*, (2014), p. 98.
28. Economic dependency ratio defined as the ratio of economically dependent population (Children below 15 and elderly above 64) to those economically active (working age 15-64).
29. 101.3% in 1997 to 74.8% in 2014.
30. International Monetary Fund (IMF), West Bank and Gaza Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, pp. 4-5
31. Palestinian Basic Law, (2003), Article 9.
32. The lack of power within socio-cultural norms is discussed in Chapter 8.
33. Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2015: Israel/Palestine* (2015).
34. Defined as "societal standards of conduct that determine appropriate behavior and serve to regulate manners to uphold social order. In an ideal society, socio-cultural norms encourage the expansion of choice and the empowerment of individuals. However, most societies have not traditionally functioned in this way and norms generally block decision making and action rather than encourage choice." S. Pick & J. Sirkin, *Breaking the Poverty Cycle: The Human Basis for Sustainable Development.* (2010).
35. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/22/71, (2012).
36. S. Walby, "Theorising Patriarchy" in *Sociology*, 23(2), (1989), pp. 213-234. Patriarchy is defined as "a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women." The author stresses that the use of the term 'social structure' implies rejection of both biological determinism, and the idea that every individual man is in a dominant position and every woman in a subordinate position. And that patriarchy is composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions.
37. Violence is defined by WHO as: the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development and deprivation.
38. The UNCT in Palestine consists of the following agencies: FAO, ILO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, UN Women, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNOPS, UNRWA, WFP, WHO, UNODC, UNCTAD, UNEP (Non-Resident Agency), UNIDO (Non-Resident Agency), ITC (Non-Resident Agency) and UNDSS.
39. See for example, United Nations Development Programme, *The 2014 Palestine Human Development Report: Development for Empowerment,* (2014).
40. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience,* (2014).
41. Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,* (2012).
42. Most official data for Palestine is not disaggregated by Areas A, B, and C. The analysis on Area C has been informed by studies specific to communities in Area C.
43. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2016), Available from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/881/default.aspx#Population (accessed on 17 August 2016)
44. Ibid.
45. UNDP, (2016), Available from http://www.ps.undp.org/content/papp/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed on 17 August 2016)
46. At 2004 constant US dollar. Estimated from quarterly GDP estimates of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
47. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development*, (2015), p. 213.
48. Freedom House, Available from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/gaza-strip (accessed on 17 August 2016).
49. Area A, and with limitations, Area B.
50. United Nations Fund for Population Activities, *Population Situation Analysis* (draft), (2016).
51. PCBS, (2016), Available from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/881/default.aspx#Population

(accessed on 17 August 2016)

52. Ibid.
53. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,. *On the 68th Anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba* (2016). p. 2.
54. According to Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR), "territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised." The legality of any particular occupation is regulated by the UN Charter and the law of jus ad bellum (Latin for "right to war"). Once a situation exists that factually amounts to an occupation the law of occupation applies – whether or not the occupation is considered lawful. International Committee for the Red Cross, *Occupation and international humanitarian law: questions and answer*s, (2004).
55. No matter the status imposed upon East Jerusalem by Israel, or the rest of the West Bank, Israel is bound to respect IHL in its entirety, the law of occupation related obligations and IHRL requirements. These two bodies of law apply complementarily and are mutually reinforcing. No basis exists under international law for the proposition that only the humanitarian aspects of IHL apply to the oPt and its population, which is accorded special protections under IHL. Diakonia, *Operation Protective Edge: Recalling the core principles of IHL* , (2014).
56. Art. 43 Hague Regulations.
57. Art. 56 Geneva Convention IV.
58. Art. 50 Geneva Convention IV.
59. Art. 53 Geneva Convention IV.
60. Art. 49 Geneva Convention IV.
61. Israel is a party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties. Israel ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on 3 January 1979, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on 3 October 1991, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 3 September 2012.
62. Art. 2 ICCPR; Art. 5 ICERD.
63. These two bodies of law apply complementarily and are mutually reinforcing. Such interpretation flows from the text of numerous human rights treaties themselves, as also confirmed by the human rights treaty bodies, state practice, and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Commission/Council, as well as the practice of fact-finding missions. The International Court of Justice further confirmed the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.*
64. UN Security Council Resolution 476 (1980) (UN Doc S/RES/476 (1980).
65. The Government of Israel passed a resolution to build the Barrier in 2002, in the context of the attacks carried out as part of the second Intifada. Government of Israel, Resolution 2077, (2002).
66. The 1949 Armistice Agreements determined territory left between the lines that was defined as "no man's land". They are primarily in the area between the western and southern parts of Jerusalem's Old City and Musrara.
67. OCHA, *The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier*, (2013), p. 1; and OCHA, *Barrier Update,* (2011), p.3.
68. A unit of area used for land measurement usually equal to 1,000 square metres.
69. World Bank, *The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank, (2008), p. 16*
70. R. Giacaman, et al, "Health status and health services in the occupied Palestinian territory", *The Lancet*, 373 (9666), (2009), p. 837.
71. General Authority of Civil Affairs., *Data collection system changes introduced in 2015 may partly account for the decrease in delayed-denied permits Annual Report 2015* (Arabic), (2015).
72. World Health Organization, *Right to health: Crossing barriers to access health in the occupied*

Palestinian territory, 2013, (2014), p. 23.

73. Ministry of Education and Higher Education, *The phenomenon of transferring students from formal education to non-formal education and the labour market* (Arabic), (2015). The report identified a range of drivers for school dropouts. These include economic, educational, and social factors, as well health and other factors. Some 20.9% of students that dropped out were reported to have faced moderate punitive measures in school, and 1.4% were exposed to severe punitive measures. The group of children facing obstacles to accessing schools, however, refers to children who face physical obstacles to get to their school.
74. Protection Cluster and Education Cluster, *Protection issues affecting access to education in the West Bank*, (2012), p.8.
75. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, *Education under Occupation: Access to Education in the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2013), p. 5.
76. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Children Affected by Armed Conflict: CAAC Bulletin*,*Fourth quarter of 2015*, (2015).
77. World Bank, *Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Volume 2*, (September 2015), p. 3.
78. PCBS, National Accounts Statistics time series, and World Bank, *Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (April 2016).
79. The clearance revenue mechanism came into effect as part of the 1994 Oslo accords. Under it the PA and Israel form a customs union levying and collecting taxes for a shared pool. Revenues are transferred using a unified invoice system and accounts are supposed to be settled once a month. Customs duties, value added tax and petroleum excises account for the majority of clearance revenues.
80. World Bank, *Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (April 2016).
81. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, (2015), p. 2.
82. Decent work involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.
83. PCBS, *The Labour Force Survey Results Second Quarter (April–June, 2016) Round* , (2016), p. 13.
84. PCBS, *Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Food Security Sector, Summary of Preliminary results of Socio-Economic and Food Security survey 2013-2014,* (2015).
85. Protocol on Economic Relations (PER), also called the Paris Protocol, signed in 1994.
86. UNCTAD, *The economic dimensions of prolonged occupation: Continuity and change in Israeli policy towards the Palestinian economy*, (2009), p.17.
87. Israel uses the remaining 80% either for its settler population in the West Bank or pumping from the shared aquifers for consumption in Israel or for sale back to the Palestinian utilities. EWASH, (2016) Available from http://www.ewash.org/wash-in-opt/west-bank (accessed on 17 August 2016)
88. World Bank, *Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy*, (2013), p.viii.
89. UNCTAD, *Policy Alternatives for Sustained Palestinian Development and State Formation*, (2009), p. 25.
90. Palestinian Ministry of National Economy and Applied Research Institute –Jerusalem, *The economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2011), p. 41.
91. Palestinian Ministry of National Economy and Applied Research Institute –Jerusalem, *The economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2011), p. 41
92. UNCTAD, *The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector*, (2015), p. 37.
93. World Bank, *World Development Indicators,* (2016), Available from http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi (accessed on 18 August 2016).
94. OCHA, *Area C of the West Bank: Key Humanitarian Concerns*, (2014).
95. Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. (2012). *Area C - The Key to the Two-State Solution*

96. This denies Palestinians the right to development.
97. The environmental impact of the Barrier, the impact of the closure of the Gaza Strip, and the degradation of natural resources in Area C affect different communities differently. These are discussed in Chapter 4.
98. Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), *Status Report of Water Resources in the Occupied State of Palestine - 2012*, (2013), p. 1.
99. B'tselem, *Foul Play: Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank*, (2009), p. 25.
100. B'tselem, *Discriminatory Water Supply*. (2014).
101. EWASH, *EWASH concerned by water restrictions in the West Bank resulting from Israeli discriminatory policies* , (2016), p. 1.
102. Jordan Ministry of Water and Irrigation, *Jordan Water Sector Facts and Figures 2013*, (2015), p. 13.
103. Office of the Quartet Representative Tony Blair. Initiative for the Palestinian Economy: Agriculture, page 3.
104. UNCTAD, *The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector*, (2015), p. 29.
105. Ibid., p. 25.
106. Ibid.
107. OCHA, *The Humanitarian Impact of Gaza's Electricity and Fuel Crisis* , (2015).
108. Ibid.
109. OCHA, *Severe power cuts in Gaza* , (2016).
110. UNCTAD, *Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, (2015), p. 13.
111. World Bank, *Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (April 2011), p. 5.
112. Ibid.
113. International Monetary Fund (IMF), *West Bank and Gaza: Recent Developments in Clearance Revenues*, (2011), pp. 2 and 4.
114. Coefficient of variance of clearance revenue receipts was 0.53 while that of gross domestic revenue was 0.29. Derived from the Monthly Financial Reports of the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
115. World Bank, *Electricity Non-Payment and Arrears Destabilize the Palestinian* Economy , (2015).
116. IMF, *West Bank and Gaza Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (2016), p. 10.
117. World Bank, *Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy*, (2013), pp. x and 34.
118. United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council, A/71/86 – E/2016/13, (2016).
119. Norwegian Refugee Council, *A Guide to Housing, Land and Property Law in Area C of the West Bank,* (2012), p. 9.
120. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
121. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience,* (2014).
122. Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation*, (2012).
123. Approximate figures, where possible based on 2016 population data (PCBS).
124. 30,171 individuals resided in 183 Bedouin and herding groups in Area C in 2013.
125. 10.9% female headed household x total population x 33% food-insecure.
126. (2,336,086 women x 66.2% female population are ever-married x 37% exposed to GBV = 572,201) + (2,336,086 women x 33.8% never married x 54% = 426,382).
127. Includes Palestinians working in Israel and Israeli settlements, and private sector wage employees earning below minimum wage. PCBS, *Press Release on the Results of the Labour Force Survey in Palestine, 2015* , (2016).
128. PCBS, *The Palestinian Child Day*, , (2016).

129. UNFPA, *Population Situation Analysis* (draft), (2016).
130. PCBS, *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014: Key Findings,* (2014), p. 22.
131. United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), *Needs of Women and Girls in Humanitarian Action in Gaza: Gender Alert for the 2016 Response Plan,* (2015), p. 3.
132. PCBS, *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014: Key Findings,* (2014), p. 16.
133. PCBS, (2016), Available from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Education2014-07E.htm (accessed on 17 August 2016)
134. OCHA, *Area C Vulnerability Profile*, (2014), p. 3.
135. PCBS, *The Status of the Rights of Palestinian Children 2014*, (2015), pp. 24-25.
136. Outdated curricula, shortage of highly qualified teachers, shortage of school infrastructure all contribute to the deteriorating quality of education in Palestine.
137. OCHA, *Humanitarian Coordinator calls for children's safe access to school in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem* , (2015).
138. UNICEF, *Children Affected by Armed Conflict: CAAC Bulletins*, (2015).
139. Minimum age to work in Palestine is 15.
140. Palestinian Labour Law 2000 No 7 Article 93.
141. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, Q2 2016, (2016), p. 6.
142. PCBS, *The Palestinian Child Day* , (2016), p. 1.
143. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, p. 6.
144. United States Department of Labor. (2014). 2014 Findings on the worst forms of child labor, page 995.
145. PCBS, *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014: Key Findings*, (2014), p. 21.
146. PCBS, *Main Findings of Violence survey in the Palestinian Society* , (2011), p. 25.
147. Of which 241 communities with 67,016 Palestinian residents lie entirely in Area C; 51 communities with 55,018 people have 50% to 99% of the communities lie within Area C, and 240 communities with 175,866 people have less than 50% of the communities that lie within Area C. OCHA, *Area C Vulnerability Profile*, (2014), p. 2.
148. It also affects Palestinians who reside in other parts of the oPt but own land and property in Area C.
149. PCBS, *Monitoring the situation of children and women: Palestinian Family Survey 2010*, (2013), p. 157.
150. UNFPA, *Population Situation Analysis* (draft), (2016).
151. PCBS and Food Security Sector, *Summary of Preliminary results of Socio-Economic and Food Security survey 2013-2014*, (2015).
152. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, Q2 2016, (2016), p. 30.
153. Socio-Economic and Food Security survey 2013-2014 Database.
154. EWASH, *Life Under Blockade: 86% of projects necessary to develop the ravaged WASH sector in Gaza remain at risk* , (2016), p. 1.
155. Ibid.
156. Protection Cluster, Pr*otection concerns and humanitarian impacts of settlement activity in Hebron city (H2)* (2014), p.1.
157. General Authority of Civil Affairs, *Annual Report 2015* (Arabic), (2015).
158. PCBS, *International Day of Persons with Disabilities* , (2015).
159. PCBS, *Disability Survey 2011 Press Conference Report* (2011), p. 11.
160. UNRWA determines the monetary value of the abject poverty line each year by the cost of meeting the average caloric needs of one persons for one day (2,423 calories), and the cost of purchasing essential non-food items. In 2011 this amounted to living on less than US$1.6 per person, per day. UNRWA, *Gaza's Poverty Survey,* (2011).
161. PCBS, *On the Eve of the International Day of Refugees* , (2015), pp. 2-3.

162. UNRWA, *UNRWA Camp Profiles*, (2016).
163. UNRWA, *UNRWA in Figures 2015,* p. 1.
164. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, Q2 2016, (2016), p. 17.
165. PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Main Findings of Violence survey in the Palestinian Society* , (2011), p. 17.
166. Ibid., p. 18.
167. ILO, *Definitions,* (2016), Available from https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/home/statisticaldata/conceptsdefinitions;jsessionid=cnicWzN1lv2YenuvGPUgOTrgT8PI0__3Z9PY4lJzYGlncx2lHXJA!86296383?_afrLoop=105434111449742#!%40%40%3F_afrLoop%3D105434111449742%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D11fnzs0oge_4 (accessed on 18 August 2016)
168. UNICEF, (2016).
169. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results,* p. 6.
170. In the manufacturing sector women, receive only 57 percent of the median wage of men.
171. PCBS, (2016), Available from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/881/default.aspx#Population (accessed on 18 August 2016).
172. PCBS, *On the Eve of International Youth Day,* (2016), p. 1.
173. UNFPA, *Population Situation Analysis* (draft), (2016).
174. Area C was created by the 1995 interim Oslo II agreement and is mostly located in the eastern part of the West Bank along the Jordan Valley, and in the western and central parts of the West Bank.
175. OCHA. (2016).
176. B'Tselem, *What is Area C? (*2014).
177. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/22/26, (2013).
178. OCHA, Area *C Vulnerability Profile*, (2014), p. 3. Thirty-one percent of these individuals resided in the Hebron district, followed by 24% that lived in the Jerusalem district, 14% that lived in the Jericho district, and 31% that lived in the remaining eight governorates.
179. UNDP, *INFOCUS: Bedouins in the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2013), p. 6.
180. World Bank, *Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy,* (2013), p. 8.
181. OCHA, *Under Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of the West Bank,* (2015), p. 4.
182. Middle East Quartet, *Report of the Middle East Quartet*, (2016), p. 5.
183. UNDP, *INFOCUS: Bedouins in the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2013), sp. 9.
184. Ibid.
185. OCHA, *Under Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of the West Bank, (*2015), p. 5.
186. Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), *Area C: The Key to the Two-State Solution,* (2012), p. 3.
187. OCHA *Bedouin Communities At Risk Of Forcible Transfer,* (2014), p. 1.
188. WHO, (2016).
189. UNSCO, *Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (April 2016), p. 5.
190. PCBS, *The Status of the Rights of Palestinian Children 2014*, (2015), pp. 24-25.
191. UNICEF, *Children Affected by Armed Conflict: CAAC Bulletins*, (2015).
192. PCBS, *The Status of the Rights of Palestinian Children 2014*, (2015), pp. 24-25.
193. OCHA, *The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlements in Hebron City*, (2013).
194. Ibid.
195. UNICEF. (2016).
196. OCHA, *Hebron: Access restrictions amidst increased violence further undermine living conditions*, (2015).

197. UNICEF. (2016).
198. Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, *Hebron's Old City Preservation and Revitalisation Master Plan,* (2015), p .67.
199. B'Tselem and Association for Civil Rights in Israel, *Ghost Town: Israel's Separation Policy and Forced Eviction of Palestinians from the Center of Hebron*, (2007), p. 14.
200. ICRC, *West Bank: Illegal settlements cause hardships for Palestinians,* (2009).
201. The right of everyone to the "enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" is guaranteed in article 12 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Several other treaties, to which both Israel and Palestine are also State parties, address the right to health including: CERD art. 5(e)(f), CEDAW arts. 11(1)(f), 12 and 14(2)(b), CRC art. 24 and CRPD art. 25.
202. UN Habitat, *Right to Develop: Planning Palestinian Communities in East Jerusalem,* (2015), p.10.
203. Association for Civil Rights in Israel, *Policies of Neglect in East Jerusalem: The Policies that Created 78% Poverty Rates and a Frail Job Market,* (2012), p. 9.
204. UN Habitat, *Right to Develop: Planning Palestinian Communities in East Jerusalem,* (2015), p. 5.
205. Ibid., p. 1.
206. Ibid.
207. Ibid., pp. 10 and 14.
208. WHO, *Right to health: Crossing barriers to access health in the occupied Palestinian territory, 2013*, (2014), p. 24.
209. The overall Palestine dropout rate for secondary education is 3.7%. PCBS. (2016). Accessed on 18 August 2016: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Education2014-07E.htm
210. Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), *East Jerusalem 2015 – Facts and Figures,* (2015), p. 1.
211. United Nations Special Coordinator (UNSCO), *Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (September 2015), p. 17.
212. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results,* Q2 2016, (2016), p.14.
213. ACRI, *East Jerusalem 2015 – Facts and Figures,* p. 1.
214. Abu-Ghallous, *Child Labor Supply in Palestine: Trends and Perspectives. Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies,* 14, (2012), p. 140.
215. OCHA, *West Bank Movement and Access Update*, (2012), p. 2.
216. Israeli citizens and the settlers living in the area, tourists, or persons of Jewish origin are exempt from this regulation. B'Tselem, *Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank,* (2012), p.25.
217. Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority, *The Impact of the Annexation and Expansion Wall on the Palestinian Environment*, (2010), p. 112.
218. UNRWA and Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, *Environmental Impact Monitoring*, (2012).
219. OCHA, *The Gaza Strip: The Long Term Impact of the 2014 Hostilities on Women and Girls, (*2016).
220. UNICEF, *State of Palestine Situation Report 21 November - 4 December 2014*, (2014), p. 1.
221. OCHA, *Reconstruction of 15 per cent of homes destroyed or severely damaged during the 2014 hostilities* , (2016).
222. PCBS, *On the Eve of International Literacy Day* , (2014). p. 1.
223. Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza, *Detailed Needs Assessment (DNA) and Recovery Framework for Gaza Reconstruction*, (2015), p. 12.
224. World Bank, *Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee,* (May 2015), p. 6.
225. OCHA,*The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade*, (2015), p. 1, and OCHA, *Monthly Figures*, (2016). Available from http://www.ochaopt.org/content/monthly-figures. (accessed on 18 August 2016)
226. The nautical mile limit imposed by the Government of Israel fluctuates – it changes from three nautical miles to six to nine and back. It has been six nautical miles in recent years. OCHA, *Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip* , (2013), p. 2.

227. EWASH *Life Under Blockade: 86% of projects necessary to develop the ravaged WASH sector in Gaza remain at risk* , (2016), p. 1.
228. UNRWA, *Gaza in 2020,* (2012), p. 3.
229. United Nations, *Gaza 2020: A Liveable Place?,* (2012), p. 11.
230. EWASH, *Water and Sanitation in Palestine,* (2016), p. 2.
231. Ma'an Development Centre, *Environmental Degradation and Impact on Gaza's Groundwater*, (2014), p. 1.
232. EWASH, *Life Under Blockade: 86% of projects necessary to develop the ravaged WASH sector in Gaza remain at risk* , (2016), p. 1.
233. UNICEF, W*ater, Sanitation and Hygiene Household Survey Gaza*, (2010), p. 15.
234. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, Q2 2016, (2016), p. 5.
235. PCBS. (2016). Results of the Labour Force Survey in Palestine, 2015 (Arabic), page 62.
236. OCHA, *The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade*, (2015), p. 1.
237. UNFPA, *UNFPA Situation Report: One year after the 2014 Gaza War,* (2015), p. 4.
238. Palestinian Ministry of Health, *National Mental Health Strategy 2015-2019*, (2015).
239. A. Thabet & P. Vostanis, *Impact of political violence and trauma in Gaza on children's mental health and types of interventions: A review of research evidence in a historical context,* (2012), p. 6.
240. In 2013 Palestinians already had high out-of-pocket health expenditures (37.7%) of total health expenditures. The rate was likely higher in the Gaza Strip after 2014, compared to the West Bank. Palestinian Ministry of Health, *Palestinian Health Accounts* (Arabic), (2013).
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242. WHO, (2016).
243. WHO, *WHO monthly reports on referral of patients from the Gaza Strip*, (2012) (2015) (2016
244. WHO, *Health Access for Referral Patients from the Gaza Strip: Monthly Report June 2016*, (2016). p. 4.
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293. PCBS, *The Status of the Rights of Palestinian Children 2014,* (2015), p. 55.
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295. PCBS. (2016). PCBS. (2016)., *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, Q2 2016, page(2016), p. 12.
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305. PCBS, *Results of the Labour Force Survey in Palestine, 2015* (Arabic) (2016), pp. 60 and 62.
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307. ACRI, *East Jerusalem 2015 – Facts and Figures*, (2015), p. 1.
308. ACRI, *Annual Status Report: The Failing East Jerusalem Education System*, (2013) p. 4.
309. PCBS, *For the students who sit for the General Secondary School Certification Examinations "Tawjihi" of the academic year 2014/2015* (2016).
310. ILO, *Labour market transitions of young women and men in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, (2014) p. 30.
311. IMF, *Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective*, (2015).
312. PCBS, *The Labour Force Survey Results First Quarter (January –March, 2016) Round* (2016). The sample group were persons aged 15 years and above who were at work at least one hour during the reference period, or who were not at work during the reference period, but held a job or owned a business from which they were temporarily absent, he\she was employed, whether an unpaid family member or other.

313. There are no comprehensive studies covering the oPt which examine the magnitude of specific activities and associated dangers that working children face. However, some light has been shed on the nature of dangers faced by child labourers in such circumstances.
314. Ibid.
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317. European Union, *Youth Age related dependency ratios*, (2016).
318. Even though there has been a decline in the average size of households in the oPt from 6.4 persons in 1997 to 5.2 in 2015, household sizes are still larger than most other middle-income economies. In the West Bank, this average declined from 6.1 persons in 1997 to 5.0 in 2015, while in Gaza it declined from 6.9 persons to 5.7 during the same period. Households headed by women tend to be smaller with an average size of 3.0 persons compared to 5.8 persons for households headed by men. PCBS, *Socio-Economic and Food Security survey 2013-2014 Database*, (2015).
319. PCBS, *Monitoring the situation of children and women: Palestinian Family Survey 2010*, (2013), p. 157.
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321. M. Donat, et al, "Changes in extreme temperature and precipitation in the Arab region: long-term trends and variability related to ENSO and NAO" in International Journal of Climatology, (2013), p. 582.
322. Palestinian Authority and UNDP, *Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority*, (2011).
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324. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *What is the human cost of weather-related disasters (1995-2015)?,* (2016).
325. Thus national spatial plans often have camps as a blank space, and national emergency preparedness plans do not cover camps.
326. IMF, *West Bank and Gaza Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, (2016). pp. 4-5.
327. Estimated from Ministry of Finance and Planning. *Monthly Financial Report December 2015*, (2015).
328. However, there still exist untapped sources of tax revenue, notably through the titling of land especially in Areas A and B. The process is stalled despite potential of clear economic benefits to be derived from it.
329. Average scores on national tests for grades 4 and 8 in mathematics and science, for instance, are low. Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education. (2011). Report of Achievement Trends in Unified Tests of 2009-2010-2011, page 4.
330. UNDP, *The 2014 Palestine Human Development Report: Development for Empowerment*, (2014), p. 135.
331. ACRI, *Annual Status Report: The Failing East Jerusalem Education System,* (2013). p. 4.
332. The MoH with the support of international agencies operates 13 Community Mental Health Centers and one Child and Adolescent Mental Health Center in the West Bank. In Gaza, there are six Community Mental Health Centers, one in each District, except for Gaza District, where two centers are available as a result of the high population density there. However, since 2007, due to the closure imposed by Israel and successive military assaults, there have been significant difficulties in keeping the clinics functioning, and drugs for patients with mental illness, trauma, and anxiety are in critically short supply.
333. PCBS, *Palestinian Youth Survey, 2015* , (2016).
334. Persons with disabilities need a range of specialized services to help them enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and live in dignity in their communities: health, diagnosis and rehabilitation services, provision of assistive devices, psychological counseling, recreational activities, empowerment and information services, special education, vocational training, employment services, pensions, institutional and community care, including making housing and public buildings accessible.

335. 8,032 out of 23,825 children with disabilities. PCBS, *International Day of Persons with Disabilities* , (2015), p. 2.
336. PCBS, *Disability Survey 2011 Press Conference Report*, (2011), p.14.
337. UN Women, *Building Ties: Towards Integrated Strategies & Policies for Empowering Palestinian Women,*, (2013), p.43.
338. PCBS, *Main Findings of Violence survey in the Palestinian Society* , (2011), p. 18.
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341. United States Department of State, *Investment Climate Statements for 2016*, (2016).
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347. UN Women, *Women, Political Participation and Decision-Making*, (2016). p. 2.
348. Palestinian Authority, Media Centre
349. PCBS, *On the Occasion of the eighth of March, The International Women's Day 2011* , (2011), p. 2.
350. PCBS, *International Women's Day 2014* , (2014), p. 2.
351. Ibid.
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353. Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2015: Israel/Palestine*, (2015).
354. T. Mendel, & A. Khashan, *The Legal Framework for Media in Palestine and Under International Law* (2005), p. 5.
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356. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/22/71, (2012).
357. S. Walby, "Theorising Patriarchy" in *Sociology*, 23(2), (1989), pp. 213-234. Patriarchy is defined as "a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women." The use of the term 'social structure,' the author writes, implies rejection of both biological determinism, and the idea that every individual man is in a dominant position and every woman in a subordinate position. Also, patriarchy is composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions.
358. W. Clement& J. Myles, *Relations of Ruling: Class and Gender in Postindustrial Societies*, (1994).
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362. PCBS. (2014). Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014: Key Findings, page 22.
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364. PCBS, *Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results*, Q2 2016, (2016), p. 5.
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370. World Bank, *Gender in MENA*, (2006), p. 7.
371. PCBS, *Disability Survey 2011 Press Conference Report,* (2011), p. 14.
372. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, *Human Rights Based Approach at SIDA: Compilations of Briefs on Persons with Disabilities*, (2014), p.111.
373. CCA consultations with stakeholders
374. Violence is defined by WHO as: the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development and deprivation.
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376. UN Women, *Access Denied: Palestinian Women's Access to Justice in the West Bank of the occupied Palestinian territory*, (2014), p. 6.
377. Economic and Social Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk*, (2005).
378. UNFPA, *UNFPA Situation Report: One year after the 2014 Gaza War,* (2015), p. 3.
379. UNFPA, *Working Together to stop Gender Based Violence,* (2014).
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ANNEX

Adolescent girls

Group characteristics

While there is no universally accepted definition of adolescence, the United Nations defines adolescents as persons aged 10-19 years[1]. According to PCBS, adolescent girls are estimated around 530,000, which constitute 11% of the total population and are projected to reach 720,000 in 2030.[2]

The vulnerability of adolescent girls not only affects girls' development but it affects the whole society. Palestine is facing a demographic opportunity due to a declining fertility rate and consequently a demographic change in the age structure. As a result, the child population will continue to decrease while the youth and working age population will increase. Thus Palestine faces a demographic advantage to development if it invests well in health, quality education and productive employment for young people including adolescent girls.

Realizing the benefit of this demographic dividend is hindered by child marriage, early and unplanned pregnancies and poor access to education and health services, all of which restrict the opportunities for adolescent girls. As such, sustainable development for the whole society cannot be achieved without assuring young girls' dignity, securing their reproductive health and rights and assuring access to quality of education to expand their capabilities and contribute to economic growth.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Exposure to violence

Adolescent girls are exposed to additional violence from male relatives, including those of the same age group or younger, as guardians of their reputation and the reputation of the family (overall 69% of 12-17 year olds were exposed to psychological abuse by their parents, while 33% were exposed to physical violence by their fathers[3]).

2. Institutional and political

Although adolescents are more exposed to direct physical violence by the Israeli occupation, with more adolescents killed, injured, and detained, female adolescents are less exposed to the Israeli physical violence as compared to male adolescents. At the same time, in Area C, the lack of or distance of adequate school facilities causes girls' irregular attendance and school drop-out, especially in secondary education. Again, despite school dropout rates being higher for boys (1.6% versus 0.9% for girls[4]), when there are security-related obstacles to accessing schools, adolescent girls are more affected than boys.

The focus on adolescents in oPt as a separate age group with specific needs and rights, is a fairly recent phenomena led by UNICEF in addition to UNFPA who is currently piloting a youth friendly health services as part of its efforts to integrate youth services into the health service package. This package of services which includes mental health, physical health, counseling and information, reproductive health among others, targets youth aged 15-24, of which adolescents aged 15-19 are benefiting as well. More work needs to be done to develop policies and services that target this specific age group and respond to their needs.

3. Social-cultural factors

Early marriage, early and unplanned pregnancies and poor access to education and health services, keep many adolescent girls trapped with restricted opportunities and limited capabilities. 24.2% of women aged 20-24 got married before 18 resulting in early child bearing[5]. Some 4.6% of females between 15 and 49 are married before their 15th birthday, with higher prevalence in in rural areas and refugee camps, as well as in Gaza (2.8% of women are married before the age of 15 in Gaza compared to 1.6% in the West Bank)[6]. The insecurity in day to day life of internally displaced persons, loss of livelihoods, overcrowded housing, and loss of social networks all contribute to an increased sense of urgency to get adolescent girls married off early.[7]

Adolescent Birth Rates (women aged 15-19 years old)[8]

Palestine Overall	48 per 1000
Gaza	66 per 1000
West Bank	35 per 1000

Poverty has an additional impact on birth rates, with the poorest having a birth rate of 86 per 1000. These high adolescent birth rates are a public health concern, as adolescents are exposed to a higher risk of complications and maternal and infant mortality.[9]

Adolescents are particularly vulnerable to psychosocial problems as a result of passing through the "teenage years", a major transitional period in their maturing to become adults. These problems include aggression, rebellion, risk-taking behavior, helplessness, frustration and withdrawal.

Adolescents are also seen as recipients rather than social actors or partners in decision making. The participation of adolescents in decisions that affect their lives inside their families, in educational institutions, at work and in the community at large is limited. Adolescent girls suffer from higher marginalization and exclusion in comparison to adolescent boys. Limited development opportunities exist as a result of the limited availability of such opportunities, the limited access to safe spaces for adolescent girls to participate, and the restricted mobility of adolescent girls.

Bedouins and herder communities living in area C

Group characteristics

OCHA estimated that a total of 30,171 individuals resided in 183 Bedouin and herding groups in Area C in 2013. 30% of these individuals resided in the Hebron district, followed by 24% who lived in the Jerusalem district, 14% who lived in the Jordan Valley district, and 32% who lived in the remaining 8 districts.[10] The social structure of Bedouin communities comprises three large confederations: Al Tayaha, al Azazmeh, and al Tarabeen, to which a number of 92 tribes are linked[11].

Drivers of vulnerability

1. location

Bedouins living in Area C have undergone several cycles of relocation, home demolitions and forced displacement over the years. Most Bedouins in Palestine are originally from the Negev Desert and were displaced from their land during the 1948 war[12].

Over 60% of the 6,000 Palestinians forcibly displaced since 2008 due to the demolition of their homes in Area C, on the grounds that they had no building permits, lived in Bedouin/herding communities[13]. Around 7,000 Palestinian Bedouins and herders, who reside in 46 small residential areas in the hills to the east of Jerusalem and in the central West Bank, are at risk of forcible transfer due to a "relocation" plan advanced by the Israeli authorities[14].

The access of Bedouin and herder communities to, and their use of, land, water, natural resources and transportation routes is limited because of the Israeli land and population policies in Area C. The livelihood of Bedouin and herder communities is especially hit as 85% of the existing grazing land in the West Bank is closed to Palestinians[15], and although, 32% of Bedouin families own agricultural land, not all land-ownership is certified which allows for eviction and expropriation[16]. Taking livestock out for pasture is forbidden in some rural areas near Jericho and the Jordan Valley[17].

The movement of Palestinians in Area C is controlled and restricted by a complex system of

physical and administrative means, including the limited access of Palestinians to transportation routes. Movement restrictions are even more pronounced for Bedouin and herder populations, as they often live in very isolated areas with scarce internal roads and public transportation.

2. Economic and socio-cultural factors

Bedouin and herder communities living in Area C suffer poor socio-economic conditions, having an average monthly income of around NIS1,000[18] (the minimum wage is NIS1,450). In 2010, 79%[19] of Bedouin and herder households in Area C were food-insecure as compared to 16.3% in the rest of the West Bank[20].

41% of Bedouin families do not have a source of 24-hour electricity, compared to 1% in the rest of the West Bank. Some use generators (community, neighborhood, or private), although this is an economic burden many cannot afford. Furthermore, poor economic conditions exacerbates the effects of movement restrictions on the Bedouin communities, with 84% of Bedouin not able to afford transportation costs to access health and education services.[21]

3. Exposure to violence

Palestinians living in Area C are at an increased risk of facing physical violence and other harassment from settlers, due to the proximity of their communities to Israeli settlements. Two-thirds of the Bedouin and herder communities living in the central West Bank reported facing settler violence during the past three years[22]. In addition to physical violence, settler groups are increasingly petitioning the Israeli High Court to enforce the state's implementation of pending demolition orders.

Children facing obstacles in accessing schools

Group characteristics

Israel's on-going closures of the Gaza Strip continues to have severe consequences on the civilian population. Throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem, education is severely impeded in at-risk geographic areas, including: seam zones and enclaves; schools and/or communities near the Barrier, settlements, military areas, and isolated communities. Large numbers of Palestinian school-age children continue to experience serious harassment and hurdles on their way to and from school. Children in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, face severe and chronic protection challenges getting to and from school every day. They cross Israeli military check points and go through closed military zones where they can experience harassment and even violence. On their daily commute, they pass by Israeli settlements which can also be a source of abuse, harassment and violence.

In Area C, 50,000 children enrolled in 183 schools suffer lack of access to education, insufficient schools and risk on the way to school, as well as school demolition orders[23].

2015	Q1[24]	Q2[25]	Q3[26]	Q4[27]	TOTAL
Total incidents documented	443	415	489		
Total affected children	4,911	4,902	2,954		
Number of Palestinian children injured as a result of clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces, military operations, settler violence and Explosive Remnants of War	104	137	165	1,310	1,716
Number of Palestinian children killed	0	1	4	25	30
Number of Israeli children injured	4	2	3	3	12
Number of Israeli children killed	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Palestinian children being held in detention at the end of the quarter	182	160	156	422	
Attacks on Schools	26	17	6	74	123
Denial of access to education[28]	28	15	9	91	143

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Over 1,700 children from 38 West Bank communities commute to schools more than 5km away[29]. Freedom of movement is restricted by over 500 military checkpoints, and permits, closures and curfews mean journeys to and from school can take three or four times longer. In Area C, demolitions and Stop Work Orders prevent communities from building adequate education facilities, making these students commute to other communities to access education[30]. In Gaza, there has been an inability to repair damage to schools due to the lack of access to building material[31].

2. Socio-cultural norms

Girls drop out when they have to travel to school outside their community, due to the presence of Israeli soldiers at checkpoints and mixed transportation, raising security and socio-cultural concerns[32].

3. Exposure to violence

Over 2,500 children from at least 35 West Bank communities cross through checkpoints to reach school every day, and at least 14 of those communities reported Israeli military harassment and/or violence[33].

Settler harassment and violence has also been identified as a primary challenge affecting access to education. The most frequently reported types of settler violence include throwing stones or children being physically pushed around. Settlers also set up their own checkpoints. UNICEF's protective presence teams have reported that their volunteers have been subjected to physical attacks, harassment, arrest and detention, and death threats[34]. During the most recent escalation of violence in October 2015, UNICEF's protective presence partners have faced access restrictions in some areas of the Old City of Hebron, which Israeli Security Forces declared "closed militarily zones". In November 2015, partners received an Israeli military order that prohibits their entry to Hebron H2 area.

Children in Labour

Group characteristics

As defined by the International Labour Organisation, child labour is work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, that is harmful to physical and mental development, and for which children are too young according to national legislation. In Palestine, children under 14 constitute nearly 40% of the total population[35] and their access to basic services, such as health and education, had continuously declined. As a direct consequence, enhanced by security concerns, mobility restrictions, classroom shortages and substandard facilities, many Palestinian families had to resort to paid options for their children. Overall, it is estimated that 3.7% of children aged 10-17 years old are working[36], and 15.5% of working children are not enrolled in education[37].

	% Working	*Age group as % of Population*	*Population*	*Approximate # Working Children*
Children 10-14 years old	2.0%	11.4%	548,201	10,964
Children 15-17 years old	9.0%	6.6%	318,666	28,680

SOURCE: PCBS. (2016). The Palestinian Child Day , Page 1.

Distribution of Children in Labour Aged 10-17 according to Economic Activity and Region in 2015

Economic Activity	*Palestine*	*West Bank*	*Gaza*
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing	27.4	29.3	21.6
Mining, quarries, transformational industries	17.8	21.5	6.4
Construction	13.1	14.9	7.4
Trade, restaurants, hotel	34.8	30.0	49.2
Transportation, warehouses, telecommunications	2.5	1.1	6.7
Services and other sectors	4.4	3.2	8.6
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: PCBS. (2016). The Palestinian Child Day , Page 1.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip lack a sufficient number of schools to serve all children, and the inability to access schools force many children to other alternatives including child labour.

2. Institutional and political and exposure to violence

The existing legal framework on child rights and protection is composed of the Child Law (2004), Labour Law (2000), and the Education Law. The legal framework does not include prohibitions against forced labor or human trafficking and the Labour Law does not apply to children working for first degree family members[38].

In 2015, the Ministry of Labour increased the number of labour inspectors to 54 (15 trained on child labor issues)[39], however Government officials have estimated they need at least 300 labor

inspectors in order to effectively enforce labor laws, including those on child labor[40]. A series of targeted training events for labour inspectors also took place in 2015. The Ministry of Labour typically handles between 250-350 cases of child labor annually and these are the cases that are either referred by police due to disputes between the child and the employer, or through Ministry of Labour labour inspectors[41].

In 2014, child protection officers of the MoSD, in charge of services to children engaged in the worst forms of child labor, stated that they were unable to manage their large caseloads effectively. As of December 2014, MoSD had fewer than 13 child protection officers in the West Bank. Child protection officers in each directorate had access to one car for 1 day a week, which they shared with employees of other ministries. In 2014, MoSD referred 101 cases to the Attorney General for violating child labor laws, compared with 162 cases in 2013[42].

The National Committee on Child Labor was established in 2013 yet no national child labor policy has been adopted yet. In 2014, the committee did develop a national action plan and revised the existing Hazardous Child Labour lists. A Policy of Non-Violence and Discipline in Schools also exists, however, child labor elimination and prevention strategies do not appear to have been integrated into this policy.

3. Economic

Over the past decade, Palestinian households have faced rising levels of poverty and are dependent on humanitarian aid for daily survival. Unemployment rates in Palestine have also increased to unprecedented levels, and these dynamics create direct pressure on children to work in order to support their households.[43]

4. Socio-cultural factors

In the West Bank and Gaza child labor is not associated with the loss of one or both parents, unemployment or lack of education on the part of the mother or father. The main reasons given by children were the child's own desire to work coupled with poor academic performance, and the desire to increase family income. In the case of Bedouin communities, a nomadic lifestyle results in irregular attendance of school with children sometimes preferring to work, most often within the family.[44]

Children subject to violence

Group characteristics

According to Palestinian law[45], a child is defined as any human being under the age of 18 years. It is estimated that there were 2,165,288 children in 2015 in Palestine, 45% of the total population[46].

Children are exposed to various forms of violence at home, in the school, in public places, and by the Israeli occupation. Violence includes all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, and sexual abuse. In 2014 over 92% of children reported having faced psychological aggression or punishment in the previous month[47].

West Bank			Boys	Girls
Children aged 12-17 years exposed to psychological abuse by	Teacher	28.3%	33.6%	22.8%
	Israeli occupation forces and settlers	5.3%	8.7%	1.7%
	Fellow Students	24.1%	30.4%	17.6%
	Friend	22.1%	29.6%	14.2%
	On the street	14.5%	18.0%	10.8%
Children aged 12-17 years exposed to physical abuse by	Teacher	20.2%	31.0%	8.9%
	Israeli occupation forces and settlers	3.0%	5.2%	0.7%
	Fellow Students	13.7%	20.0%	7.2%
	Friend	12%	19.3%	4.3%
	On the street	7.2%	10.2%	4.1%
Gaza				
Children aged 12-17 years exposed to psychological abuse by	Teacher	26.4%	29.4%	23.3%
	Israeli occupation forces and settlers	0.6%	0.8%	0.4%
	Fellow Students	26.4%	31.3%	21.3%
	Friend	25.9%	32.1%	19.6%
	On the street	16.8%	19.9%	13.5%
Children aged 12-17 years exposed to physical abuse by	Teacher	23.2%	32.1%	14.0%
	Israeli occupation forces and settlers	0.2%	0.3%	0.0%
	Fellow Students	14.8%	21.3%	8.1%
	Friend	11.7%	16.8%	6.5%
	On the street	7.6%	10.8%	4.2%

SOURCE: PCBS. (2012). Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society, 2011: Main Findings, pages 152-153.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Institutional and political

Child rights and protection have received special attention in the Palestinian public sphere since the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat in 1991. In 2004, the Palestinian Child Law No. 7 was adopted and the Palestinian Ministry of Planning drafted the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children. In 2010, the Palestinian Authority issued its first report on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by Palestinian institutions. A draft Juvenile Protection Law is being prepared with a draft Family Protection Law.[48]

On the ground gaps still exist in terms of protection services supporting children who are victims of violence, and juvenile services for children in conflict with the law. In general, the availability of services providing the necessary support for children exposed to violence and for those who care for them, the quality of the available services, and the capacity of the service providers remain limited. The 2013 Action Plan of the MoSD includes developing provincial and national networks to organize and integrate services and official strategies for the protection and care of children exposed to violence, and ensuring optimal use of the available services in the child's best interests through developing a national referral and monitoring system.

2. Economic and socio-cultural factors

Different forms of violence against children, including domestic violence, child marriage and child labour, are more prevalent among poorer households, and in 2011 there were 546,000 poor children[49].

3. Exposure to violence

Children are particularly vulnerable to exposure to violence and to the violence that surrounds them, as a result of their age, physical capabilities, and their still developing emotional and psychological capacities.

The prevailing parenting and teaching styles condone inflicting violence on children as a way of disciplining them, and are widespread in the Palestinian society.

Students aged 12-17 years[50]	
Exposed to psychological violence by fellow students	25.0%
Exposed to physical violence by fellow students	14.2%
Exposed to psychological violence by teachers	27.6%
Exposed to physical violence by teachers	21.4%
Children aged 12-17 years[51]	
Exposed to violence by a member of the household	51.0%
Exposed to psychological violence by father	69.0%
Exposed to physical violence by father	34.4%
Exposed to psychological violence by mother	66.4%
Exposed to physical violence by mother	34.5%

Children are also exposed to violence from the Israeli army and security forces during child detention. Children in Palestine are detained under military law and prosecuted in military courts, which denies them basic and fundamental human and child rights and exposes them to systematic ill-treatment and torture.

2015	Q1[52]	Q2[53]	Q3[54]	Q4[55]	
Number of Palestinian children aged 12-17 years being held in detention at the end of the quarter		182	160	156	422[56]
	Girls	1	1	2	8
	Boys	181	159	154	414
	Pre-trial or trial detention	106	90	90	Not reported
	Serving a sentence	76	70	66	Not reported
# sworn affidavits of Palestinian boys aged 13-17 years old reporting ill treatment in military detention[57]		11	15	17	61
# documented instances of arrest and ill-treatment of Palestinian boys aged 13-17 years old in East Jerusalem		17	26	16	7

At least 8,000 Palestinian children have been arrested, detained, and prosecuted in an Israeli military detention system since 2000, with around 500-700 Palestinian children arrested, detained and prosecuted in the Israeli military court system each year. The majority of Palestinian child detainees are charged with throwing stones, and 75% experience physical violence during arrest, transfer or interrogation.[58] The number of children aged 11-18 years detained in 2015 reached 2,179, a 72% increase from 2014 (when 1,266 children were detained), and a 36.0% increase from 2013[59].

4. Location

Palestinian children living in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip are exposed to different levels and types of violence based on their area of residence.

Palestinian children living in Gaza are especially affected by the Israeli military operations against the Gaza Strip, and the resulting deaths, injuries, and disabilities. UNICEF reported that during the last war on the Gaza Strip in July-August 2014, 2,257 people, including 540 children (340 males and 200 females) aged 10 days to 17 years were killed, 2,956 children (1,938 males and 1,018 females) were injured, 1,500 children were orphaned, and 54,000 children became homeless[60].

Communities in area C

Group characteristics

Area C[61] covers about 60% of the West Bank and was created by the 1995 interim Oslo II agreement. Area C is under full Israeli security and civil control, however the Palestinian Authority provides health and education services for the Palestinian population. There are an estimated 300,000 Palestinians living on land designated as Area C[62,] within 532 Palestinian communities[63]. Less than 1% of Area C is designated by the Israeli authorities for Palestinian use and development[64]. Area C includes 125 Israeli settlements, 100 illegal settlement outposts established since the mid-1990's, and at least 375,000 Jewish Israeli settlers[65].


Palestinian movement in Area C is controlled with limited access to transportation routes, the separation Barrier, checkpoints, roadblocks, and a permit system which undermine livelihoods and access to basic services.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Only 30% of Area C is designated for Palestinian spatial development, and the Israeli authorities can impose road closures at any time hindering investment[66]. The construction of the Separation Barrier denies Palestinians access to some of the most fertile parts of the West Bank and the richest water sources. The agriculture/livestock sector suffers from limited access to land[67].

Palestinian Agricultural Land



SOURCE: PCBS. (2011). Agricultural Census 2010.

Palestinians need to obtain Israeli permits for the construction or repair of any infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2014, Palestinians submitted 2,020 applications for building permits; just 33 of these – 1.5% – were approved[68]. Only one permit for house construction was approved in 2014, and there do not appear to have been any approved in 2015[69]. Those who build without permits risk having the built structures demolished; it is estimated that almost 5,000 Palestinian houses and other structures have been demolished for lack of a building permit since 2000, with an average of 500-600 Palestinian structures destroyed annually in Area C[70].

The industrial sector also suffers from limited land for building industrial zones, and from limited opportunities for mining minerals, especially in the Dead Sea Area, where the right to extract valuable mineral deposits from the Dead Sea was given to Israeli companies. Additionally, nature reserve areas in Area C are not available for use by the Palestinian tourism sector.

2. Economic and socio-cultural factors

According to the OCHA demolition portal, a total of 2,802 structures were demolished in Area C between 1988 and 2014[71]. Thousands more Palestinians are at risk of forced displacement through demolitions or forced evictions, with an estimated 11,134 demolition orders 'outstanding' in Palestinian communities of Area C[72]. Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley, in southern Hebron, and in villages unrecognized by Israel are at a higher risk of repeated demolitions and displacement. In 2012, the Israeli Government announced several plans to forcibly displace Palestinian villagers in the southern Hebron hills and Jordan Valley under the pretext that the land was needed for military training exercises. Israeli demolition and forced eviction of Palestinians have displaced at least 556 Palestinians, including 286 minors in these areas[73]. These Israeli actions are implemented in violation of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which states that "any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations"[74].

Israeli policies and practices in Area C disrupt the education and livelihoods of Palestinians, deepening poverty and increasing aid dependency. In Area C, water consumption is as low as 20L per capita per day, one-fifth of the WHO's recommendation[75]. Around 10,000 children were learning in tents, caravans and tin shacks that provided no protection against heat or cold, and about 50,000 children, enrolled in 183 schools in Area C[76], do not enjoy access to education because of insufficient schools and risk on the way to school. More than 1,700 children in 37 localities in Area C walked 5km or more to school, and around 2,500 children were forced to cross military checkpoints to reach school on a daily basis[77].

3. Exposure to violence

Palestinians living in Area C are at an increased risk of facing physical violence and other harassment from settlers, due to the proximity of their communities to Israeli settlements. Israeli settlers regularly engage in violence and intimidation against the Palestinian population, including attacks on children going to schools, farmers attending their agricultural land, attacks on livestock and agricultural land, and uprooting of trees. The conditions are made worse because of the lack of law enforcement to protect Palestinians from the violence of settlers who transgress private land and harass farmers, in violation of laws, including Israeli laws, as the rule of law is often disregarded in favor of the territorial interests of settlements.[78]

The elderly

Group characteristics

The term 'elderly' refers to people aged 60 years and above. It is estimated that the number of elderly people in Palestine represent 4.5% of the total population, and head 16.3% of Palestinian households[79].

Life expectancy has improved significantly in the last two decades, from 67 years for males and females in 1992 to 72 years for males and to 75 years for females in 2015, with the overall percentage of elderly expected to start increasing after the year 2020[80]. Their numbers are projected to reach 470,000 in 2030.[81]

The elderly in figures[82]

			% of Elderly Population	# Elderly (approx)
Total Elderly				216,742
	Male		45.5%	98,618
	Female		54.5%	118,124
	Live in Urban Areas		71%	153,887
	Live in Rural Areas		18%	39,014
	Live in Refugee Camps		10%	21,674
	Living Alone		9%	19,507
	Living in Someone Else's Home		13%	28,176
	Living in own home with family		78%	169,059
	In Labour Force		13.4%	29,043
		Self Employed	53.6%	15,567
		Paid Employees	15.2%	4,415
	Unemployed		1.1%	2,167
	Illiterate		32.3%	70,008
	Obtained a diploma or higher		11.1%	24,058
	Afflicted with at least one chronic disease		70.7%	153,237
Elderly Males				98,618
	Married		90.6%	89,348
	Widowed		8.4%	8,284
Elderly Females				118,124
	Married		42.7%	50,439
	Widowed		49%	57,881

Palestine ranked 93 out of 96 States assessed by the 2015 Global Age Watch Index according to the social and economic wellbeing of older people[83].

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Institutional and political

A draft Law has been prepared but is not yet approved, and national strategies on care for the elderly were developed for 2010-2015 and 2016-2020, yet implementation has not taken place.

The existing formal care and support system in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is charity-based and staff are not adequately trained in geriatric care. Long-term institutional care is mostly offered through the MoSD, religious organizations, Palestine Red Crescent Society, and local charitable organizations. The MoH offers health care for the Palestinian population, regardless of their age, however they do not offer specialized geriatric health or mental health care. Additionally, the government health services do not offer home-based health services for the elderly, which is only available through private practitioners.

Movement restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation limit the accessibility of the elderly to the tertiary care services available through the East Jerusalem Hospital, which are being developed by the Palestinian Authority as tertiary referral centers for the Palestinian population from the West Bank and Gaza Strip[84].

The Israeli formal care and support system serves the Palestinian elderly population living in East Jerusalem. The Israeli Community Long-Term Care Insurance Law, passed in 1986 and implemented in 1988, offers universal entitlement for elderly people to certain community-based benefits[85]. However, several language and geographic barriers limit the utilization of the Palestinian elderly living in East Jerusalem to these services.

2. Location

There are geographic discrepancies in the provision of care and support services for the elderly population living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip[86].

3. Economic and socio-cultural factors

Families are the main source of care and support for elderly people. 78% of the elderly live in their own with family members, and the principal economic dependency for the elderly in 2010 were their children[87].

Sources of Income[88]	*% Elderly*
Son	61.4%
Daughter	15.0%
Own Income	14.7%
Government Aid	13.3%
Retirement	12.7%
Nongovernment Aid	12.0%
Current Work	9.0%
Other	7.3%
Social Security	7.2%

The elderly population disproportionately suffer from health problems. 71% of the elderly population suffered from at least one chronic disease or condition, 64% of the elderly reported that they have difficulties moving, 58% reported having vision impairment and 39% reported having hearing impairment[89]. The health conditions of the elderly is made worse by the lack of affordable specialized geriatric services, often leading to complications/disability as a result of untreated chronic diseases.

4. Exposure to violence

Elderly women are particularly vulnerable to domestic violence and social violence.

Food insecure households headed by women

Group characteristics[90]

All Palestinian Households 27% Food Insecurity (47% Gaza 16% West Bank)							
11% Female Headed Households[91]				89% Male Headed Households			
8.6% Gaza		12.2% West Bank		Gaza		West Bank	
49.6% Food Insecure	29.7% Poverty	24.5% Food Insecure	22.5% Poverty	46.1% Food Insecure	39.4% Poverty	15.3% Food Insecure	17.5% Poverty

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

In Gaza, the root causes for food insecurity remain the closures, recurrent conflict, high unemployment and a declining private sector. In the West Bank restrictions on freedom of movement, land and water access and working permits continue to hamper livelihood opportunities, particularly in Area C and the Seam Zone.

2. Economic

Food insecurity is a direct consequence of income poverty and livelihoods erosion, leading to difficulties in accessing sufficient quantities of quality food. Another cause of food insecurity for households headed by women is their meagre access to assets, particularly those assets that contribute directly to food security such as livestock and agricultural land. An important outcome of this is the lack of access to collateral by women (assets, land normally) and hence, a lack of access to formal credit which further jeopardizes women's access to economic opportunities.

	Female Headed Households	*Food Insecure Female Headed Households*	*Male Headed Households*	*Food Insecure Male Headed Households*
Average size of household	3.3 people	4.2 people	5.8 people	7 people
Labor Force Participation[92]	19.6% for women	N/A	71.1% for men	N/A
Average Daily Wage[93]	81.9NIS for women	N/A	108NIS for men	N/A
Average monthly income	2620NIS	1558.9NIS	3856.2NIS	2,333.5NIS
% of households who own livestock	4.7%	7.8%	4.1%	9.5%
% of households who own agricultural land	13.2%	5.3%	15.7%	6.4%
% of households who own both agricultural land and livestock	4.0%	2.4%	5.4%	5.5%

SOURCE: Socio-Economic and Food Security survey 2013-2014 Database.

3. Socio-cultural factors

Palestinian women in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip remain subject to discriminatory family laws that regulate marriage, divorce and child custody. Domestic violence and gender based violence which have increased in recent years, pose significant challenges. There are numerous examples of discriminatory legislation in force, as well as cultural norms and traditions such as those governing the issues of inheritance, maintenance, property, and available education and employment opportunities that prevent women's economic empowerment and make them more vulnerable to poverty. In addition, the structural distortion of labor markets and the concentration of women in certain economic sectors but not others are among the main reasons leading to the economic marginalization of women[94].

Gazans without access to clean water or sanitation

Group characteristics

The total population of Gaza in mid-2015 totaled 1.9 million (925,000 men and 895,000 women), and the population density of Gaza was extremely high, standing at 5,070 persons/km2, compared to 513 persons/km2 in the West Bank.[95]

In June 2007, following the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, Israel imposed a land, sea and air closure on the Gaza Strip[96], making it impossible to recover or develop Gaza's WASH sector. 96% of Gaza's sole water source, the Coastal Aquifer is unfit for human consumption, while 100,000 people in Eastern areas of Gaza remain entirely disconnected from any water network[97]. Left with no choice but to severely reduce water consumption and to rely upon desalinated water purchased from private, mostly unregulated, vendors, 95% of Gaza's population may now be at risk of water-borne diseases, as 68% of this water is deemed bio-contaminated[98].

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location and exposure to violence

The discriminatory water sharing agreements (Oslo II, 1995) and the Israeli permit regime in place in the West Bank (especially in Area C), as well as the near-decade long closures on Gaza, deny Palestinians the control over their water resources and prevent them from developing adequate WASH infrastructure.

As part of the Gaza closures, Israel imposes entry restrictions on "dual use" items — items that, according to Israel, could be used for military purposes. Importing these items involves complex and costly procedures which also afford Israel an effective veto over some of Gaza's most critical WASH projects. Inconsistent with international standards, the "dual use" list includes 70% of the items needed for Gaza's water sector, which is therefore particularly impacted. To date, 46 out 53 projects necessary for the recovery and development of Gaza's water sector are at stake[99].

The already dire WASH situation was further deteriorated by the recent war as Israeli airstrikes caused approximately USD 34 million damage to WASH infrastructure[100].

2. Institutional and political

All of the water that ends up piped into residents' homes in the Gaza Strip originates from the Coastal Aquifer, from which 96% of the reserve is unsafe for human consumption. The over-extraction of this aquifer by three times its sustainable yield rate, coupled with the intrusion of seawater and the infiltration of agricultural fertilizers and untreated sewage, have resulted in levels of chloride up to twelve and sixteen times WHO recommended standards.

	WHO Recommended Standards	Gaza
Chloride Levels in Water[101]	<250mg per liter	500-3000mg per liter
Nitrate Levels in Water[102]	<50mg per liter	100-800mg per liter
Average Daily Water Consumption[103]	100 liters	79 liters

95% of Gaza's population depends on desalinated water purchased from private vendors for drinking yet its price so prohibitive that the most vulnerable households in Gaza end up spending up to a third of their income on water[104]. Furthermore, the contamination of the desalinated water poses public health risks which need to be addressed. Out of the existing 154 public and private desalination plants, only 48 of them are licensed by the designated authorities[105].

In total 23% of the population in Gaza is not connected to the municipal sewage network. Without a sewer, residents depend on cesspits to dispose of their liquid waste. This creates large, deep ponds of sewage that poses a serious threat to the residents of the neighborhood, particularly children. The implications of a Gaza health crisis will not be confined to the Gaza Strip but threaten regional stability. Some 90,000 cubic meters of raw sewage from Gaza flow into the Mediterranean Sea every day[106].

Hebron H2 residents

Group characteristics

The total population of Hebron Governorate in mid-2016 is over 729,000, making it the most highly populated governorate in Palestine[107]. Hebron is a commercial and industrial centre, and accounts for around one third of the West Bank GDP[108]. Hebron City has a total estimated population of over 215,000[109].

The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, signed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Government of Israel in 1997, divided the city of Hebron into H1 and H2. H1 (80% of Hebron City), is under Palestinian civil and security control. H2 (20% of Hebron City) is under Israeli military/security control and Palestinian civil control, including the Old City of Hebron. Approximately 40,000 Palestinians and 850 Israeli settlers reside in H2; a further 8,000 settlers reside in Kiryat Arba (also known as Qiryat Arba) settlement on the outskirts of Hebron City. Settlement activity continues in H2.[110]

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Over 6,000 Palestinians live in neighborhoods adjacent to the four settlements in H2 (hereafter: the restricted areas). There are over 120 physical obstacles deployed by the Israeli military, which segregate the restricted areas from the rest of the city, including 18 permanently staffed checkpoints. Several streets in the restricted areas that lead to the Israeli settlements are prohibited for Palestinian traffic and some also for pedestrian movement.[111]

6,791 girls and 4,538 boys are attending 29 schools in H2[112], and approximately 37% or 4,200 children pass through checkpoints to and from school[113]. Access to education is also hindered by arbitrary detention, settler harassment, attacks on schools with rubber bullets/live ammunition, tear gas and insufficient protective presence for students and teachers. In 2015, 29 incidents of denial of access to education were recorded in H2 affecting 2,787 children, and 45 incidents of attacks on schools were recorded, affecting 5,959 children[114]. Palestinians in H2 also lack access to emergency services and primary health care[115].

Palestinians living in the restricted areas face serious challenges in accessing water and sanitation. Water tankers are unable to reach many households, denying people a main coping mechanism for water shortages. In addition, the quality of housing is another concern in H2, with safety issues, poor infrastructure, dysfunctional water and sanitation infrastructure due to poverty and lack of employment opportunities and difficulties conducting maintenance work. The poor capacity of drainage and sanitation services in the old city leads to water overflow in the manholes which often meets the running water, causing floods which are exacerbated by the Israeli closure of alleys and paths of the old city using concrete blocks and steel doors.

Following the inclusion of the Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of the Patriarchs on a list of Israeli national heritage sites in 2010, concerns reported by Palestinian authorities include prevention of the call to prayer by Israeli forces on an average of 60 times per month in 2013 and 2014, and placing of Israeli flags on the mosque in April 2013[116].

2. Economic

Hebron's old market area used to be the main commercial hub of the southern West Bank. By 2007, 77% of Palestinian businesses (1,829) had closed and 42% of Palestinian housing units (1,014) had been vacated, with thousands of Palestinians displaced.[117] 512 Palestinian businesses in the restricted areas have been closed by Israeli military orders and at least 1,100 others have shut down due to restricted access for customers and suppliers[118]. Furthermore, 86% of families live in relative poverty, on only $97 per person per month for food, clothes and all other living expenses[119].

3. Exposure to violence

Since the beginning of 2012, approximately 700 Palestinians have been injured by Israeli forces or Israeli settlers in Hebron city, and 44 Israelis were injured by Palestinians[120].

In 2013, 8 incidents of settler violence resulting in Palestinian injuries, and 8 incidents of settler violence resulting in damage to Palestinian property were recorded in H2[121]. Settlers in Hebron City have routinely abused Palestinian residents, sometimes using extreme violence, including beatings, at times with clubs, stone throwing, and hurling of refuse, sand, water, chlorine, and empty bottles. Settlers have also been involved in gunfire, attempts to run people over, poisoning of a water well, breaking into homes, spilling of hot liquid on the face of a Palestinian, and the killing of a young Palestinian girl[122].

There are serious gaps in the enforcement of the rule of law on Israeli settlers involved in violence and intimidation against Palestinians. The large majority of complaints about settler attacks filed in recent years have been closed by the Israeli Police without indictment.

	# Incidents of violence by Israeli forces	*# Palestinian injuries recorded*	*# Complaints filed with Israeli police of settler violence*	*# Investigations closed without indictment*
2011	7	12	5	5
2012	12	98	8	7
2013	63	259	7	6

It should be noted that many Palestinian victims of settler violence do not file complaints with Israeli police due to various obstacles or disincentives, including mistrust or lack of confidence in Israeli law enforcement authorities, long waiting times to file a complaint, and fear of reprisals. In addition, Israeli authorities have repeatedly denied access to H2 for Palestinian security forces seeking to conduct law enforcement in relation to criminal activities.[123]

Individuals in need of urgent medical referral

Group characteristics

West Bank and Gaza Strip residents who are in need of specialized medical care unavailable in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, require referrals to specialized medical centers in East Jerusalem or elsewhere (primarily Israel, Egypt or Jordan). These patients are referred by the Palestinian MoH, are private patients under other insurance plans, or are self-funded.

	Total Referrals	*West Bank*	*Gaza*	*Total Cost*
2014	74,683	72.8%	27.2%	NIS569,588,180
2015	87,617	72.6%	27.4%	NIS521,684,215

SOURCE: WHO. (2016).

>87,000 Ministry of Health Referrals 2014	*Inside West Bank and Gaza*	*East Jerusalem*	*Israel*	*Egypt*	*Jordan*
	44%	42%	12%	2%	1%

SOURCE: Palestinian Ministry of Health. (2014). Health Annual Report, page 284.

The MoH referral data can include multiple referral decisions for the same patient, and the most frequent reason for referring patients was for oncology treatment (25% for the West Bank and 19% for Gaza in 2015)[124]. According to WHO, patients who are delayed or denied access to specialized medical services suffer from deterioration of their medical conditions, which can affect their quality of life and contribute to death in some cases[125].

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Access to referral medical services is restricted for the 60% of West Bank and Gaza referral patients who need to exit the West Bank or Gaza for specialized health care[126]. They require an Israeli permit to travel across checkpoints, on foot or by ambulance. Obtaining a permit issued by the Israeli authorities is a complex process that can result in health care being denied or delayed; the main reason given for denying access to patients is 'security'[127].

The WHO monitors trends in referral and access data of patients from the West Bank and Gaza, including the outcomes of permit application procedures. In 2015 22% of the almost 22,000 patients from Gaza who required a permit to exit Gaza from Erez checkpoint were either denied or delayed access, an increase over 2014 figures of 19% denied or delayed exit for health care. In 2015, the Rafah border with Egypt was open a total of only 26 days, allowing only 178 patients to travel to Egypt for health care, far short of the 1,670 patients referred by MoH to Egypt for health care. Additionally, in 2015, 12.8% of the more than 80,000 patients from the West Bank who required a permit were denied access.[128]

Ambulances can experience time-consuming delays, by being held waiting by Israeli military and civilian staff at the checkpoints even when the referring hospital and receiving hospital have obtained prior coordination from the Israeli Civil Administration to transfer a patient through a checkpoint. To avoid delay while negotiating for access at Jerusalem checkpoints, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, the main emergency service provider into Jerusalem, uses "back-to-back" procedures for 93% of its transfers of patients from the West Bank to East Jerusalem. This means that a West Bank-plated ambulance will transfer a patient by stretcher to a waiting Jerusalem-plated ambulance at the checkpoint, a process that takes place in the open, delays patient transfer by a minimum of 10 minutes and often longer due to security checks by checkpoint personnel.[129]

Although all age groups are affected by not being able to reach to their referred services, sick children are at increased risk of vulnerability as they might not access their referral medical centers because they do not have a companion with them. The regulations for companions receiving permits are becoming more and more complicated, and when there is no companion for a child, the child cannot go on his/her own. Companions must be first degree relatives only. According to a security directive implemented in late 2015, companions below 55 years must now undergo additional security scrutiny. Responses to permit applications are typically given to patients on the evening prior to their hospital appointment date, which causes stress and uncertainly for patients and their families.

2. Institutional and political

An underlying driver of vulnerability which influences the West Bank and Gaza patients and makes them dependent on external referrals is the shortages of medicines, medical disposables, medical equipment and specialists in MoH primary health care and secondary care facilities, especially for the treatment of non-communicable diseases. The cost of referral services represented 25% of the Palestinian Authority health expenditures in 2014, excluding deductions from tax reimbursements made directly to Israeli hospitals for referral patients[130].

People who need referrals do not get all the information they need. There is no proper policy for knowing why people's permit applications are refused or approved putting people who need referrals and need to access health services out of the West Bank and Gaza under additional stress.

3. Exposure to violence

People with referrals who need to cross checkpoints suffer from political violence against their right to access health services. People from Gaza suffer from the closure of the Rafah boarder, and difficulties in accessing Erez, and people from the West Bank suffer from the checkpoints between the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Economic and socio-cultural factors

While many people get their referral from MoH, private insurance, or are self-funded, poor and low-income people cannot afford to pay for extra costs such as transportation and medicine.

Out of school children

Group characteristics

Primary education is mandatory by law in Palestine, however there are no procedures in place for monitoring or compelling enrolment. Out of school children are either children who have never gone to school (mainly children with disabilities), or children that dropped out of the education system.

Net enrolment rate (NER) 2014[131]

		Male	*Female*
All Levels	88.6%		
Pre-Primary	45.35%	44.65%	46.09%
Primary	90.84%	90.68%	91.01%
Secondary	80.12%	76.53%	83.87%

Out of school children and adolescents 2014[132]

Male Children	Female Children	Male Adolescents	Female Adolescents
16,860	15,989	51,744	38,626
32,849		90,370	

School Drop Out Rate 2013-2014[133]

	All	Male	Female
Basic Education	0.9%	1.3%	0.6%
Secondary Education	3.7%	4.2%	3.3%
Overall	1.3%	1.6%	0.9%

Persons with Disabilities[134]

% of people with disabilities aged >15 years who have never enrolled in education	37.6%
% of people with disabilities aged >15 years who enrolled in education but dropped out	33.8%
% of people with disabilities aged >15 years who are illiterate	53.1%

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location and exposure to violence

Displacement forces many students out of school.[135]

	All 2015	January-April 2016
# Palestinian structures demolished, dismantled or confiscated by Israeli authorities across West Bank	548	598
# Palestinians forcibly displaced	787	858 (416 children)

Gaza War 2014[136]

Children Orphaned	1,500
Children Homeless[137]	54,000
Students Killed	250
Teachers Killed	15
Students Injured	856
Teachers Injured	19
Government Schools Damaged	187
UNRWA Schools Damaged	91
Private Schools Damaged	49
Kindergartens Damaged	199

At least 8,000 Palestinian children have had their access to education impeded by arrested, detained, and prosecuted in an Israeli military detention system since 2000, with around 500-700 Palestinian children arrested, detained and prosecuted in the Israeli military court system each year. The majority of Palestinian child detainees are charged with throwing stones, and 75% experience physical violence during arrest, transfer or interrogation.[138]

		Q1 2015	Q2 2015	Q3 2015	Q4 2015
# Children in military detention at end of quarter		182	160	156	422
	Pre-trial or trial detention	106	90	90	
	Serving a sentence	76	70	66	

SOURCES: UNICEF. (2015). Children Affected by Armed Conflict: CAAC Bulletins.

1. Economic

The number of poor children in 2010 was 544,000, and grew to 546,000 in 2011, with more and more children dropping out of school due to poverty[139].

2. Socio-cultural factors

Early marriage is a main cause for girls dropping out of school, especially at the secondary level, and the majority of children who never joined the education system are children with disabilities. The main causes for this are the inadequacy of the education and other support systems such as transportation and lack of suitable infrastructure, to cater for these children, in addition to socio-cultural norms where families opt to keep their disabled children at home.

3. Institutional and political

At the school level, children drop out due to a variety of reasons including unqualified teachers, counselors, and parents; poverty, bullying; boring and non-challenging learning environment, and; lack of specialized support programs for those suffering from learning difficulties. There is a lack of mechanisms to ensure full implementation of inclusive education policies, including a diagnosis and evaluation system for children with special needs and disabilities. In a lot of cases, the school environment is not conducive for learning, leading to many students not liking schools and eventually dropping out. Students report that they do not like school because of high rates of violence (teacher-student and student-student) and the undeveloped physical environment – lack of hygiene, closed spaces, libraries, and laboratories.

Many teachers embark on the profession without acquiring the necessary pedagogical skills. In 2011, 28% of students aged 12-17 years were exposed to psychological violence by their teachers, and 21% were exposed to physical violence by their teachers in the West Bank and Gaza[140].

Persons with disabilities

Group characteristics

PCBS estimated 113,000 individuals suffered from at least one disability in 2011 according to the narrow definition[141], or 6.9% of the population according to the wide definition[142]. Persons with Disabilities includes those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments that may hinder full and effective participation in society.

		% of Population
Prevalence of Disability	Total Population	2.7%
	Female	2.5%
	Male	2.9%
	West Bank	2.9%
	Gaza	2.4%
	0-17 year olds	1.5%
	>75 years old	32%

SOURCE: PCBS. (2011). Disability Survey 2011 Press Conference Report.

	% of Persons with Disabilities
Mobility Related Disability	48.4%
Learning Disability	24.7%
Visual Disability	23%
Remembering and Concentration Disability	23%
Communication Disability	23%
Hearing Disability	15%
Mental Health Disability	15%

SOURCE: PCBS. (2015). International Day of Persons with Disabilities .

Drivers of vulnerability

Persons with disabilities in Palestine face geographical, institutional and attitudinal barriers that hinder the enjoyment of their rights. These multiple barriers and the interrelatedness of the human rights put people with disabilities in Palestine in a particularly vulnerable situation, with a high risk of being caught in a vicious circle, where barriers to the enjoyment of one right negatively influences the enjoyment of other rights.

1. Institutional and political

The Law of the Rights of Palestinian Persons with Disability was passed in 1999 and addresses worker's rights but lacks detail, especially with regard to non-discrimination and poor facilities for persons with disabilities. Implementation of the Law has not been prioritized, particularly the

clause prescribing government organizations employ at least 5% of its staff from among persons with disabilities [143]. Persons with disabilities who reside in East Jerusalem are covered by several Israeli laws[144] that were enacted and enforced over the past 25 years in order to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.

Inaccessibility[145]	***%***
Schools with appropriate toilets for students with disabilities in Palestine	54.6%
Schools with ramps in Palestine	44%
% of persons with disabilities who have difficulty with inadequate pavements	54.7%
% of persons with disabilities who have difficulty crossing streets	60.4%
% of persons with disabilities who have difficulty with access to recreation services	42.9%
% of persons with disabilities >18 years who avoid activity because of public attitudes	8.7%
% of persons with disabilities >18 years who avoid public transportation due to inaccessibility	76.4%
% of persons with disabilities >18 years who cannot perform daily activities outside home due to disability	34.2%
% of persons with disabilities >18 years who dropped out of school due to environmental and physical obstacles	22.2%

The communities and environments where persons with disabilities live are highly inaccessible for them, due to insufficient adaptations of public services, workplaces and transportation for the use of persons with disabilities. Additionally, teachers still need capacity building to deal with students with disabilities, and the budget allocated by the government to remove environmental and physical restrictions to public transport have been criticized for being insufficient. Adaptations at home are also insufficient; 34% of persons with disabilities needed bathing adaptations, and 25% of persons with disabilities needed ramps. Government assistance for home adaptations is not available, leaving the burden on families of persons with disabilities.[146] Adaptations of other public services, workplaces and transportation is very limited and depends on local initiatives by municipalities, NGOs, and development partners.

2. Economic

Persons with disabilities have a worse socioeconomic profile in comparison to the general population. 53% of persons with disabilities are illiterate, and 34% of persons with disabilities have dropped out of school. Additionally, 38% of persons with disabilities aged 15 years and above have never been enrolled in a school.[147] Persons with disabilities also suffer from social exclusion and isolation as a result of their disability, only 12% of persons with disabilities worked, 34% of persons with disabilities 18 years or older indicated that they could not perform daily activities outside their home, and around a third of persons with disabilities never marry.[148]

3. Socio-cultural factors and exposure to violence

Persons with disabilities are exposed to stigma, discrimination, isolation and violence from their family members, service providers, and community members. In 2014, 73% of young persons with disabilities had experienced discrimination in the last six months, mostly when trying to access government services, including schooling and healthcare[149].

Persons living in the seam zone

Group characteristics

In 2002, the Government of Israel passed a resolution to a build a Barrier in the West Bank "to impede…the infiltration of terrorists and war materiel into Israel". However contrary to international law, most of the Barrier is built inside the West Bank, creating a "seam zone" or closed military zone between the Green line and the Barrier. Upon completion, the Barrier will cut off an area spanning over 9.4% of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from the rest of the West Bank.[150]

OCHA estimates some 11,000 individuals live in 12 Palestinian communities inside the Seam Zone. According to estimates, when the Barrier is completed 25,000 more Palestinians will be living in similar enclaves. More than half the land located in these areas is privately owned by Palestinians; much of it belongs to residents of 150 different communities that are located outside the seam zone. Closing the Seam Zone to Palestinians has effectively resulted in the military administering this area as if it were part of the State of Israel. A permit regime to enter or remain in the Seam Zone applies only to Palestinians.

Drivers of vulnerability


1. Institutional and political and exposure to violence

The root cause for vulnerability of persons living in the Seam Zone is clearly political. Splitting the West Bank in two and trapping Palestinian land and communities between the Barrier and the Green Line, is the key driver of vulnerability for the people living in this area. In many cases, and due to the compounded access restriction, people end up deserting their homes and moving elsewhere in the West Bank. As such, an environment has been created which encourages the forcible transfer of these communities.

2. Location

Palestinians' presence in the Seam Zone is subject to personal permits, even if their homes, relatives, lands or sources of income have been in this area for generations. All permits issued for the Seam Zone are temporary, the longest is two years, but most permits are for three months at most. The "permit regime" is a complex web of procedures made up of a collection of orders and protocols, beginning with the Declaration regarding Closed Zones, continuing with three orders issued by the Head of the Civil Administration and concluding with a thick book entitled "Standing Orders for the Seam Zone." Though the Standing Orders are designed for use by the Palestinian population, they have only been published in Hebrew and since they are extremely complex and written in legal language, they are not readily comprehensible even to Hebrew speakers.[151]

Reduced Validity of Long Term Permits[152]



3. Socio-cultural factors

Health services in the Seam Zone are very basic and limited. Restrictions on movement reduce Palestinians' access to health centers and educational institutions in the West Bank and their ability to rapidly reach a medical team.

The construction of the Barrier and the imposition of the permit regime create hardships for those who need to cross the Barrier to access educational institutions, which include all residents of the Seam Zone pursuing post-secondary studies. Further damage is done by the restrictions on entry for educational staff to the Seam Zone and the enclaves surrounded by the Barrier.

The hardships of traveling from one community to another harm people's ability to continue to lead a normal, orderly family life. Weddings and funerals are often held without members of the extended family who have trouble obtaining permits. The permit regime highly limits access to basic commodities and food (access to markets, and even if a market is on their side of the Barrier, supply would be limited). Persons with disabilities in the Seam Zone are in particular highly affected and face severe difficulties in movement.

4. Economic

The permit regime reduces the ability of many Palestinian landowners to cultivate their farmland. Communities were cut off from their agricultural lands which ended up on the Israeli side of the Barrier, and are only allowed access (in a highly restrictive manner) to their lands during harvest time subject to permits and accessible through agricultural gates. Delegates from 67 farming communities in the northern West Bank reported a decrease of more than 80% in the number of farmers who routinely cultivated their lands compared to before the Barrier[153]. Even with a permit, entry to the Seam Zone is channeled through 66 Barrier Gates[154], which open on a daily or seasonal basis. The majority of these are gates only open during the olive harvest season and usually for a limited period during the day.

Moreover, the unpredictable permit system results in many Palestinian farmers being unable to effectively plan the agricultural cycle and use their land throughout the year. The permit regime imposes additional restrictions on Palestinians seeking to build any structure in the Seam Zone, and requires that land be formally registered – a complicated and expensive process. The permit regime also limits the ability of Palestinians to use water sources in the Seam Zone (most of the 20 agricultural wells in the area also supply drinking water). Additionally, demolition of water cisterns in the Seam Zone is frequent.

Refugees living in abject poverty[155]

Group characteristics

Poverty affects all aspects of Palestinian refugees' lives. A large percentage of these poor refugees become food insecure and have to depend on food aid to survive. Many are unable to afford health and education services, and are becoming more and more dependent on UNRWA and other aid agencies. The majority are unable to cope with any kind of emergencies. As of January 2015, there were 35,993 persons in the West Bank and 98,870 persons in Gaza registered by UNRWA as special hardship cases[156].

	Palestinian Refugees		***Non-Refugees***
	West Bank	***Gaza***	
% of total Palestinian Population[157]	26.3%	67.7%	
% <15 Years Old	40.9%		39.2%
% >60 Years Old	4.2%		4.6%
% Poverty[158]	31.2%		21.8%
Food Insecurity[159]	22.4%	13.7%	27%
Food Insecurity in Camps[160]	29%	46%	
Unemployment[161]	34.1%		22.1%

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Severe restrictions have been placed on people's livelihoods and movements, and recurrent conflict has meant that everyday lives have been severely disrupted, resulting in high levels of poverty for the entire population, particularly refugees.

Refugees in Gaza are increasingly dependent on UNRWA, with the closures of Gaza and protracted crisis stifling health-care providers. Approximately 50% of the population suffers from more than one micronutrient deficiency, with 72% of female adolescents in Gaza suffering from Vitamin D deficiencies and 64% suffering from Vitamin A deficiencies[162].

In 2015 almost 868,000 Palestinian refugees in Gaza depended on food aid from UNRWA, half of Gaza's 1.76 million population and 65% of the registered refugee population[163]. UNRWA projects that some 928,000 refugees in Gaza will require food assistance in 2016, including 98,000 chronic poor who receive assistance under the UNRWA General Fund.[164]

2. Economic

The most vulnerable, abject poor households are unable to absorb even minimal costs, such as the additional expenditures at the start of the school year, while the majority of households struggle when faced with housing damage or destruction as a result of military operations, resulting in reduced food purchases and consumption.

3. Socio-cultural factors

In general, poverty rates increase with an increased size of household and an increased number of children. Poverty rates of households with children reached 22.7% in 2011, compared to 13.2% for households without children. Poor households with children in Gaza are double those in the West Bank[165].

Refugees residing in camps

Group characteristics

	Registered Palestinian Refugees Residing in Camps		***Registered Palestinian Refugees***	
	West Bank	Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
Population	228,560 in 19 camps	560,964 in 8 camps	774,167	1,276,929
% of total Palestinian Population[166]	9.3%		26.3%	67.7%
% Poverty	35.4%		31.2%	
Food Insecurity[167] % Households	29%	46%	22.4%	13.7%

SOURCES: PCBS. (2016), and UNRWA. (2015).

UNRWA is the main provider of services for registered refugees. In the West Bank, UNRWA's 97 schools cater for 50,566 pupils and UNRWA maintains 42 primary health care facilities. In Gaza on the other hand, UNRWA has 252 schools for 240,413 pupils and 22 primary health care facilities.[168]

Drivers of vulnerability

While there are overlaps between refugees living in abject poverty and refugees residing in camps, a distinct set of issues emerge for refugees residing in camps. Palestinian refugees in camps live under extremely poor living conditions: inadequate and poor sewage and water networks, chronic poverty, unemployment, over-crowding and occasional Israeli military incursions. The state of service delivery is far poorer than it is in the rest of Palestine, and people in many of these camps live under sub-human conditions. Areas close to camps like Shu'fat and Tulkarm also see frequent clashes with the Israeli Security Forces.

1. Socio-cultural factors and economic

Living mostly in highly dense overcrowded areas, refugees residing in camps have little or no assets such as land or livestock.

Refugee women in camps are a highly vulnerable group. Most refugee camps are run by committees that have no female representation, and to which the quote regime does not apply[169]. Refugee women are also exposed to GBV, with no specific laws against domestic violence or spousal rape, and have restricted access to employment opportunities.

Refugee children and youth in camps are particularly vulnerable. Children are often deprived from accessing quality basic education as well as other services such as recreational activities, health care and a safe environment. Most, if not all, suffer psychologically; particularly in light of the conditions they are living under. Youth in refugee camps also suffer from high unemployment, lack of opportunities, and physical and psychological challenges. Some youth respond to this violent and abusive context by engaging in criminal and/or violent behavior, while others, suffering from despair or depression, become apathetic.[170]

2. Institutional and political

Refugee camp residents make up 9.3% of the Palestinian population, yet do not participate in local council elections. Additionally, the Oslo Accords did not extend the mandate of the Palestinian Authority to refugees, thus, refugee camps are not included in national planning systems. National spatial plans often have camps as a blank space, national emergency preparedness plans do not cover camps, and there is a vacuum around basic functions such as who provides building permits.

3. Exposure to violence

In Gaza, the hostilities between July and August 2014 caused unprecedented death and destruction of social and private physical infrastructure, loss of human life and serious deterioration of the social fabric. UNRWA lost 11 staff and 118 of its installations were damaged, including 83 school buildings and 10 health centres. On seven separate occasions, UNRWA schools, which were being used as shelters for civilians, were either directly hit or struck in the immediate vicinity by air strikes or shelling, resulting in the deaths of at least 44 persons and injuring about 230.[171]

In the West Bank from 2012 to 2014, 39 Palestinian refugees were killed including 25 Palestinian refugees from West Bank camps and at least 1,410 Palestinian refugees were injured by Israeli security forces including 1,302 from refugee camps. The increasingly prevalent use of live ammunition during operations is resulting in a higher incidence of severe injuries and death.[172]

Small-scale farmers, non-bedouin herders, fishermen

Group characteristics

Agriculture, fisheries and forestry employ 7.4% and 8.8% of all employed men and women 15 years and over, respectively[173]. Overall, the agricultural sector's contribution to total Palestinian exports is around 20%, with olives, olive oil, vegetable and cut flowers as the main exports[174].


Farmers owning agricultural small holdings[175]

111,310 Palestine	
90,908 West Bank	20,402 Gaza

Land Holdings[176]

Plant Production	71%
Animal	13%
Mixed	16%

The ongoing occupation of Area C deprives the Palestinian economy of 63% of the agricultural resources of the West Bank[177], including the most fertile and best grazing land, while the construction of the separation barrier and the expansion of Israeli settlements have diminished the area available for agricultural activities. The key constraint driving down agricultural development is restricted access to arable land within the West Bank, and limited access to water.



SOURCES: World Bank. (2009). Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development, page 25; and Office of the Quartet Representative: Tony Blair. Initiative for the Palestinian Economy: Agriculture, page 4.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Small-scale farmers and non-Bedouin herders suffer from continued displacement by the Israeli occupation, and persistent restrictions on their movement, their access to land, their access to natural resources including water for irrigation, their access to equipment and materials, their access to markets and restrictions on export, and their construction of infrastructure.

Economic

Small-scale farmers, non-Bedouin herders, and fishermen suffer from low productivity and low quality of products due to Israel's restrictions on the importation of fertilizers, creating problems ranging from soil degradation to high costs as a result of using inferior alternatives. It is estimated that agricultural productivity in Palestine has declined by between 20% and 33% since the enforcement of the restrictions on the importation of fertilizers.[178]

Small scale farmers use traditional marketing strategies and fragmented trade chains which reduce the profit margins for farmers and increase retail prices. The MoA offers agricultural services for small-scale farmers through its plant production, animal production, and veterinary services, however the MoA has limited financial resources, and the capacity of the MoA staff that provide extension services is low. Production technologies have improved markedly in recent years, yet they still lag behind those in competing Israeli firms. There is a need to expand the use of efficient irrigation and water conservation and harvesting technologies.

Palestinian farmers are also faced by the high competition by settlements production and the fluctuation of prices. Products of small-scale farmers, non-Bedouin herders, and fishermen are not competitive in local and international markets. Israel's restrictions on the movement of farmers, services and agricultural trade entail additional financial and time-related costs. It is estimated that the costs of exporting and importing borne by Palestinian producers are twice as much as those borne by their Israeli counterparts, while procedures for importation require four times the amount of time Israeli importers spend on similar activities. Palestinian producers face unfair competition with the subsidized production in Israeli economy.[179]

2. Institutional and political

Legislative and fiscal support (VAT, taxes, and incentives) is insufficient to promote local production, and there is limited awareness on standards prevailing in key export markets, including Israel, EU and neighboring Arab countries.

Lack of access to finance is a salient constraint on Palestinian agriculture. Access to credit is compromised by the impact of the ongoing occupation and an unfavorable political environment. Additional constraints are related to the small size of the typical agricultural production unit, the lack of acceptable collateral for commercial loans and the high level of risk associated with agricultural production, emanating from occupation-related restrictions, weather and/or price fluctuations. Palestinian farmers have limited opportunities to enroll in agricultural insurance schemes to help them in cases where their crops are destroyed due to harsh climate conditions[180]. The Palestinian Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance Fund (PADRRIF) was recently established within the MoA to cover the gap and support farmers under disasters conditions.

Collective work among farmers and herders is weak. In the West Bank, only 20% of the farmers are organized in cooperatives, and women comprise only 7% of total cooperative members[181]. Weak collective work limits the access of individual farmers and herders to credit, to wholesale purchases of inputs and wholesale sale of produce, further marginalizing small-scale farmers by limiting their ability to compete in local and international markets.

3. Exposure to violence

Small-scale farmers and non-Bedouin herders, especially in Area C, are exposed to violence and harassment from Israeli settlers and the Israeli army while attending to their land (see 'Area C Communities'). Fishermen in Gaza are exposed to Israeli strikes as they access the sea for fishing.

4. Socio-cultural factors

The agricultural holdings of small scale farmers are further fragmented due to death and inheritance, the distribution of the father's land to his sons before his death, and in some cases abandoning agriculture and/or selling part of the land in order to look for another source of livelihood[182]. This fragmentation further marginalizes and impoverishes small-scale farmers.

Women exposed to GBV

Group characteristics

The United Nations defines gender-based violence as any act that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

The violence that women are exposed to in their households and from extended family members, is often compounded by violence facing women in their workplace, while receiving public services, and/or by the Israeli occupation, including military operations, injury and death, home demolition, movement restriction, and detention, among others.

		Percentage (%) of Ever Married Palestinian Women
Exposed to violence by husbands in previous 12 months; and of these:		37%
	Psychological violence	59%
	Economic violence	55%
	Social Violence	55%
	Physical Violence	24%
	Sexual Violence	12%
Exposed to psychological violence outside family in previous 12 months:		
	Street	5.1%
	Shopping Centre	3.1%
	Israeli check points	3.3%
	Transportation	2.5%
	Health, social and cultural service centres	4%
	School/University	2.5%

SOURCE: PCBS. (2011). Main Findings of Violence survey in the Palestinian Society , pages 30-31.

	Percentage (%) of Unmarried Palestinian Women >18 years
Exposed to Physical Violence	25%
Exposed to Psychological Violence	54%

SOURCE: PCBS. (2006). Press Conference on the Preliminary Results: Domestic Violence Survey -2005 , page 5.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Institutional and political

There is no legal recourse for domestic violence. Further, women in East Jerusalem desist from getting Israeli police involved for fear that it might imperil the entire family.

In 2008, a National Committee to Combat Violence Against Women was created, and in December 2014, a National Referral System for victims of violence against women was introduced. The CEDAW was endorsed by the Palestinian Authority in 2015, and UNSC Resolution 1325 was adopted. The 2011-2019 National Strategy to combat violence against women was developed, and Family Protection Units were created in police departments in some West Bank districts. There still remains an absence of laws that protect the rights of women, including within the Penal Code, the Personal Status Law, and the Civil Status Law. In general, the availability of services, the quality of services, and the capacity of service providers remain very limited.

2. Socio-cultural factors

The patriarchal attitudes and practices that condone violence against women are prevalent in the Palestinian society, and result in the high rates of exposure to GBV among Palestinian women. It also results in the low understanding and acceptance of the needs of women exposed to GBV.

65% of ever married women exposed to violence by their husbands prefer to remain silent with only 0.7% seeking support from formal services[183]. The low utilization rate of services is due to several factors including the prevailing patriarchal attitudes, fear of stigma, social exclusion, the lack of appropriate responsive services, and a lack of information about services.

3. Exposure to violence

Increasing global violence trends, especially in the Middle East, and the increased exposure to violence through media, the internet, and electronic games help normalize violence. Moreover, women are directly exposed to violence as a result of the Israeli occupation. About half the Palestinian households were directly exposed to violence by occupation forces/settles before July 2010 (49.1% in Gaza and 47.8% in the West Bank)[184].

4. Economic and Location

Exposure to violence among ever-married women can be associated with her socioeconomic status[185].

Exposure to sexual violence of ever married women	with elementary or lower education	12%
	with preparatory education	12.2%
	with secondary and higher education	8.5%
Exposure to physical violence of ever married women	with elementary or lower education	25.8%
	with preparatory education	25.1%
	with secondary and higher education	19.1%
Exposure to psychological violence of ever married women	with elementary or lower education	62.5%
	with preparatory education	64.3%
	with secondary and higher education	58.4%


source: PCBS. (2011) *Main Findings of Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society*

GBV is also influenced by the political violence that face Palestinians; a study in Gaza indicated that GBV has increased after the war[186], while the exposure of ever married women to one form of violence by their husbands in 2011 was higher in Gaza (51%) as compared to the West Bank (30%)[187].

Working poor

Group characteristics

According to the International Labour Organisation, vulnerable employment or the working poor represent the number of employed persons living in households with incomes below the nationally-defined poverty line[188]. The definition of the working poor involves two statistical units:



As well as having limited access to contributory social protection schemes, workers in vulnerable employment suffer from low productivity and low and highly volatile earnings. In Palestine, this definition includes Palestinians working in Israel and settlements, teachers and civil servants who experience income related shocks resulting from payroll unreliability following the withholding of tax revenues by Israeli authorities.

	Income/Month (NIS)	***Income/Day (NIS)***
Minimum Wage[189]	1,450	65
Female Headed Food Insecure Household	1,558.9	
Food Secure Male Headed Household[190]	3856.2	
Palestinian Public Sector Teacher	2,500-5,000	
Palestinian Public Sector Teacher in Nursery	400	
Palestinian Wage Employees in West Bank		98.3
Palestinian Wage Employees in Gaza		61.6
Palestinian Wage Employees in Israel and the Israeli Settlements[191]		221.9
Palestinian Private Sector Wage Employees in West Bank who receive less than minimum wage	1,104	
Palestinian Private Sector Wage Employees in Gaza who receive less than minimum wage[192]	734	
Deep Poverty Line	1,832	
Relative Poverty Line[193]	2,293	

The absence of sufficient and gainful work opportunities within the oPt has increased the pressure on thousands of Palestinians to seek employment in Israel or in Israeli settlements as the only option for securing an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families. In the second

quarter of 2016, 114,200 Palestinians were working in Israel and settlements, and of these, 60,400 had a permit, 40,600 worked without any permit and 13,200 had an Israeli identity card or foreign passport[194].

The Palestinian minimum wage came into effect on 1 January 2013, and 38.9% of wage employees (126,400) in the private sector received less than minimum wage (42,500 in West Bank and 83,900 in Gaza)[195].

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Institutional and political

The Israeli labour market has been inaccessible to Palestinians from Gaza since 2006. Physical obstacles to movement in the West Bank separate communities from their natural resources and each other, and limit economic development[196]. Additionally, Palestinians with permits are at risk of having them suddenly and arbitrarily revoked[197]. Palestinians working in Israeli settlements where the Israeli Ministry of Labour does not regulate the Palestinians labor market working conditions, are paid lower wage rates hourly than their Israeli equivalents, without receiving entitlements such as medical and accident insurance, pension schemes or entitled days off. The working poor are also at high risk of working in unsafe and hazardous working conditions and are subject to further exploitation.

Protracted fiscal crises are faced by the Palestinian Authority, caused by the withholding of clearance revenues by the Israeli government and drops/shortfalls in donor funding which lead the Palestinian Authority only partially paying salaries and allowances - sometimes only 60% of workers and employees' wages.

2. Economic

The combined weight of the continued occupation and the settlement activities has not permitted the development of a viable, productive Palestinian economy, which could provide sufficient opportunities in terms of decent work. Real wages earned in the Palestinian economy were unable to keep pace with the moderate level of inflation in 2014, which stood at 1.73%[198]. Wages earned for work in Israel and the settlements were boosted by the high proportion of Palestinian workers in the Israeli construction sector.

Meagre assets result from Palestinians not receiving income from property or other assets, which entrenches the working poor when shocks occur. In many cases, the working poor are unable to afford health and education services, Low income households are also most vulnerable to food insecurity. Food insecurity levels have reached 47% in Gaza and 16% in the West Bank.[199]

3. Socio-cultural factors

Women make up a greater share of the working poor than do men, probably because on average they earn lower wages and work fewer hours. A significant gender pay gap persists in Palestine. The average daily wage for Palestinian women is NIS 81.9, as compared to NIS 108 for men.[200] The gap is even wider in the manufacturing sector where women receive only 57% of the median wage of men. The prevalence and persistence pay discrimination against women is reflected in the 20 percent gender pay gap among recent graduates in their first private sector job.[201]

4. Exposure to violence

The working poor are highly vulnerable to workplace violence.


Youth (15– 29)

Group characteristics

Youth are defined as 15-29 year olds, and make up 30% of the Palestinian population, or 1,440,000 individuals, of which 37% are adolescents aged 15-19 and 63% are aged 20-29[202].

The Palestinian society has been continuously described as a 'young society' and the youth are projected to increase to 1.9 million in [203]0203. This opens a demographic opportunity that can be harnessed into a demographic dividend[204] and economic growth if youth empowerment is invested in; including access to quality health care, quality education and equal access for young males and females to productive employment and active citizenship.

Population Pyramid in Palestine, Mid-2016



SOURCE: PCBS. (2016). On the Eve of International Youth Day.

Drivers of vulnerability

1. Location

Being a "young" Palestinian automatically means that you are branded a "suspect" by the Israeli military, and thus bear additional access restrictions, interrogation, humiliation. Youth also suffer the most from housing vulnerabilities, especially in Gaza with many still homeless after their homes were demolished by Israeli military campaigns; and among Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and Area C where Israeli land and housing policies do not allow for the natural expansion of Palestinian communities. Youth are especially vulnerable to housing inadequacies as they are at a stage of seeking their own homes.

2. Socio-cultural factors

Participation is a fundamental right for youth who are also marginalized in terms of their civic and political participation and representation, in addition to their exclusion from the decision making process at the local and national level. In particular, youth in East Jerusalem are not part of decision making processes in their communities as Palestinians refuse to engage with Israeli stakeholders under the Israeli occupation.

The school system is geared toward the Tawjihi exam, and streams students rigidly into scientific, humanistic, and vocational tracks—in descending order of prestige— so that decisions about futures are made by the system, rather than by personal choice[205]. Choices for young women are further limited by the reluctance of their families to permit them to study in co-educational settings.

3. Economic

27% of youth lived under the poverty line in 2011 (19% in the West Bank and 41% in Gaza Strip)[206]. In East Jerusalem, 75% of families live below the poverty line[207], and 36% of children fail to complete a full 12 years of school[208].

Unemployment is a major source of stress and driver of vulnerability for youth. Unemployment also contributes to social exclusion and psychosocial problems among the youth. 24% of the youth in Palestine desire to migrate aboard, with 41% citing economic conditions and 15% citing a lack of work opportunities as the major reason.[209]

Q2 2016 Youth Unemployment[210]

Unemployed	***Youth 15-29 years old***		***39.5%***
		Male	32.5%
		Female	64.2%
	All persons >15 years old		26.9%
	Youth 15-19 years old		37.1%
	Youth 20-24 years old		42.6%
	Youth 25-29 years old		37.6%
	Youth 15-29 years old West Bank		28.4%
	Youth 15-29 years old Gaza		57.6%

4. Institutional and political

On the national policy making level there is a lack of targeted policies that address youth issues while ensuring proper mainstreaming in other sectoral plans and policies, taking into consideration the newly adopted UN Resolution on youth, peace and security 2250 and the global post 2015 development agenda. Programmes geared toward addressing youth issues do not engage and empower youth by fulfilling their rights to participate meaningfully in decision-making affecting their well-being.

While education in Palestine has achieved great accomplishments in enrolment levels, the quality of education remains one of the continuous challenges which need unremitting and strenuous efforts. The Israeli occupation policies and practices also limit the availability of and access to educational institutions through demolitions and movement restrictions imposed on Palestinian students, teachers, and materials. Furthermore, despite various undertakings at the level of higher education, many of the offerings still remain irrelevant to the needs of the labor market.

Youth Enrolment[211]

15-29 year olds enrolled in education	39%
15-17 year olds enrolled in education	82%
18-22 year olds enrolled in education	46%
23-29 year olds enrolled in education	9%

5. Exposure to violence

The youth of today were born and raised under the Israeli occupation, and grew up witnessing the 1987 and 2000 intifadas. Three major military campaigns were launched against Gaza over the past few years. Palestinians are continuously killed, injured, detained, and exposed to various forms of violence and harassment by Israeli soldiers and settlers. Youth are particularly affected by violence from the Israelis, as they are the ones leading the resistance of the occupation.

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